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I propose three new measures of social and economic well-being using different approaches. 
These measures are applied to Chile using two household surveys: the Panel CASEN and the 
Financial Survey. 
 
First, I use an income positions persistence approach to estimate the persistence of households 
in different positions of the income distribution. The application of this measure enables us to 
understand the mechanisms that explain why those at the lower end of the income distribution 
have a low probability of moving up (sticky floor), and those at the higher end of the income 
distribution have less chance of moving down (glass floor). The results show that income 
mobility is particularly high for all groups in the income distribution. 
 
Second, I use a low-income dynamic approach to estimate degrees of vulnerability to poverty. 
This measure enables us to obtain two vulnerability lines that measure the risk of non-poor 
households falling into poverty in the next period. This enables the identification of three types 
of households: those with high, moderate and low vulnerability. The latter corresponds to the 
income-secure middle class. The results show that vulnerability to poverty affects a significant 
part of the population that exited poverty in the last decade. 
 
Third, I use a multidimensional approach to measure economic insecurity at the household level. 
I build an index that combines four indicators of economic insecurity that cause stress and 
anxiety: unexpected economic shocks, unprotected employment, over-indebtedness and asset 
poverty. In this way, the index offers a measure that directly relates economic uncertainty to 
stress due to the lack of social protection and household buffers to face an unexpected economic 
shock. The results show that households in the entire income distribution, even in the highest 
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1.1 Motivation  
 
Most Latin American countries have been hit by the Covid-19 crisis in the context of high levels 
of income inequality combined with weak social security systems that fail to offer protection to 
those most at risk of falling back into poverty. Despite the efforts of governments to support 
the most vulnerable families, workers and firms, poverty is expected to increase again in the 
region after two decades of continuous decline. Besides, the pandemic came just after a year of 
social unrest in democratic countries that have had socio-economic progress such as Chile and 
Colombia. Large-scale uprisings and massive street protests show that the progress of these 
countries has been severely incomplete and insufficient (Ferreira & Schoch, 2020). 
 
The aftermath of this crisis could help to make a case for the need to redefine a new social 
contract based on a stronger social protection system centred on people’s well-being (OECD, 
2020). This will require new measures of progress and well-being so to design better policies 
that could lead Latin American countries towards more inclusive and sustainable development 
(OECD, CAF, ECLAC, & EU, 2019). However, how to measure progress differently than the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita or the Human Development Index (HDI) remains 
a pending strategic and methodological challenge, particularly in regions such as Latin America 
(Barcena, Manservisi, & Pezzini, 2017).  
 
During my PhD, I studied new approaches to measure economic and social well-being using 
longitudinal survey data. My contribution to this topic has been to propose three measures of 
well-being, adapted for and applicable to middle-income countries with fast-growing economies 
in the Global South, particularly in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean.1 The first 
is a measure of income mobility that shows the persistence of poverty and prosperity, defined 
 
1 The Global South considers four macro regions: Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania. This phrase works as 
a way to differentiate it from the North Atlantic countries, namely, Canada, the U.S.A. and Europe, referred to as 
the Global North. Initially used in political science and sociology to mark the North-South power relationship, it 
is now broadly used in developmental and economic studies as well (Dados & Connell, 2012). 
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as the probability that households have to remain at the extremes of the income distribution 
(Chapter 2). The second is a measure of vulnerability to poverty that corresponds to the risk 
that non-poor households have of falling into poverty (Chapter 3). The third is a measure of 
economic insecurity defined as the anxiety and stress that households experience when they are 
not capable of facing an unexpected economic shock (Chapter 4).  
 
Chile is the country that I have used to illustrate all three measures. From a social and economic 
perspective, Chile is an interesting case study. Its significant economic growth has gone hand-
in-hand with high levels of income inequality and a social security system that is still unable to 
offer adequate protection to those who are vulnerable to poverty and economically insecure. 
Additionally, Chile is the only country in the LAC region that has conducted longitudinal 
household surveys with more than three waves, enabling to build the measures a propose. 
 
The three approaches that I propose contribute to improve the measures on economic well-
being that have been developed so far. Separately, each one improves the existing measures and, 
when analysed together, they complement each other, providing a deeper understanding of the 
levels of well-being of the population. In the case of Chile, income mobility is highly correlated 
with both vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity. My results show that vulnerability 
to poverty affects a significant part of the population that exited poverty. I thus argue that 
previous research has underestimated the size of the population that is vulnerable to falling into 
poverty and overestimated the growth of the middle class. The results also show that more than 
half of the Chilean population experienced economic insecurity during the last decade, 
increasing between 2014 and 2017, affecting even the highest income groups. 
 
Measures of vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity allow for a better understanding 
of the implications of high mobility in an unequal country in terms of income. Households’ 
income mobility in Chile is far from positive. There is no evidence that this dynamism is 
associated with an improvement in people’s life prospects, as suggested in the debates on 
intragenerational mobility (e.g. Sapelli, 2013). The high mobility of income presents a rather 
negative aspect since a significant proportion of households are exposed to fluctuations in their 





Conventional measures of well-being and progress in Chile depict a country with low poverty 
and high GDP per capita, with a slight decline in income inequality and a high level of human 
development. Instead, when using the alternative measures of progress I propose, the reality 
appears quite different. They show that in Chile the high levels of income mobility are associated 
with economic instability, that a large -and growing- proportion of the population is vulnerable 
to poverty, and that the population is exposed to high levels of economic insecurity (also on the 
rise in the recent years). These well-being measures unveil the limits of the current model of 
social protection, which focuses on targeting poor people and offers limited social security to 
satisfy the need for economic stability by the new social group that has emerged in the recent 
years; the vulnerable-to-poverty.  
 
The COVID-19 crisis has exposed the weakness of the current social protection system that 
provides few benefits to low-wage workers facing illness, layoffs or retirements and leaves a 
significant group of workers unprotected (e.g. Maldonado, Prieto, & Feres, 2019; Sehnbruch, 
Carranza, & Prieto, 2019). The new look at the population’s well-being that the three measures 
I propose offer contribute to deepening the understanding of the massive social unrest in Chile 
that started in Chile few months before the COVID-19 pandemic. Incorporating this type of 
measures to monitor the countries’ progress and well-being implies, from a public policy 
perspective, going beyond the extension of the subsidiary state exploring the possibility of 
moving towards a universal security model. 
 
The structure of this introductory chapter is as follows. In section 2, I describe the progress in 
welfare measurements that go beyond GDP, showing the concepts that are relevant to my 
research. In section 3, I describe the political, economic and social background of Chile, 
incorporating the social policy context. In section 4, I describe the data sources I use in each 
chapter. Finally, in section 5, I present an outline of my thesis, including the most important 





1.2 Measuring progress and well-being beyond GDP 
 
Until now, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been the main measure used to monitor the 
transition to development of countries in the Global South. Indeed, the increase in GDP in 
recent decades has shown two concrete improvements in welfare in these countries: i) the real 
possibility of ending extreme poverty across the globe in the near future (World Bank, 2018b), 
and ii) a decrease in the inequality of aggregate indicators of human development between 
countries in the South and the North of the world (UNDP, 2013). 
 
However, GDP as an indicator of progress and well-being has limitations in terms of adequately 
reflecting the current reality in the Global South regions. For example, although Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) experienced a remarkable economic growth in the periods 2002-2008, 
and 2010-2014, changes in well-being of its population show mixed results. On the one hand, 
significant improvements were achieved in some indicators such as life expectancy, 
unemployment rates, health services and general satisfaction with life. Further, considering the 
GDP reached, these changes even surpassed what was expected (OECD et al., 2019). 
 
On the other hand, key aspects of well-being within the LAC region advanced at a much slower 
pace, showing apparent deficiencies concerning GDP growth as a measure of well-being. Low 
quality education, high labour informality, and distrust in institutions are persistent problems in 
these countries. Particularly worrying are the high levels of income inequality and weak social 
security systems that fail to offer adequate protection to those at risk of falling back into poverty 
(Levy, 2018). Comparing two countries within LAC such as Chile and El Salvador helps to 
illustrate this point. According to the World Bank’s measures, Chile is classified as a high-income 
country, and its income inequality, measured by the Gini index, is 0.47. El Salvador is classified 
as a medium-low income country, and its income inequality is lower (0.38). Despite these 
differences, in both countries, a third of the population is classified vulnerable to poverty using 
the World Bank vulnerability line (OECD et al., 2019). 
 
Therefore, while the GDP growth in Latin America has generated improvements in many 
important areas of development, in areas such as inequality and social vulnerability, limited 
progress has been achieved. GDP as an indicator of progress and well-being hides the reality of 
some crucial dimensions of development. Someway, as a measurement tool, it can distort or 
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mislead the formulation of policies aimed at supporting countries’ transition to development 
(Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). 
 
The need to use better development and welfare measures is not only of interest to countries in 
the Global South. In north-western countries, the financial crisis (2007-2008) and the increase 
in income inequality pressured governments, researchers and foundations to propose new 
measures of progress and well-being that go beyond GDP. The theoretical and empirical 
discussion of concepts such as economic insecurity, inequality of opportunities, vulnerability to 
poverty, subjective well-being, sustainability and horizontal inequality, has grown exponentially 
during the last decade. See Stiglitz et al. (2018) and D’Ambrosio (2018) for a comprehensive 
review.  
 
Some of these measures are summaries of changes in each households’ income over time (e.g. 
economic insecurity and income position persistence), requiring longitudinal data for their 
implementation (Cantó, García-Pérez, & Romaguera de la Cruz, 2019a; OECD, 2018a). Others 
require the consideration of specific dimensions of well-being that are not adequately covered 
by surveys or for which there is simply no such information (Balestra, Boarini, & Ruiz, 2018). 
In this way, together with the theoretical and conceptual discussion on how to satisfactorily 
measure social and economic well-being, the methodological and statistical challenges of its 
implementation are part of the development of these new measures (OECD, 2011, 2013a). The 
experience accumulated in the last decade mostly from developed countries should be 
considered in the discussion on how to measure the transition to development with equity and 
sustainability in the Global South. 
 
Below, I elaborate further on the paradigm shift when analysing transition to development in 
the Global South towards the notion of well-being and the challenges involved in measuring it. 
Also, I briefly present some of the theoretical concepts used to support the need for going 
beyond GDP and the most relevant initiatives taken in the field of national welfare 
measurements during the last decade. 
 
Global convergence and the challenges that entail measuring progress and well-being 
 
Several pieces of research suggest that we are currently witnessing a deep and continuous 
redesign of the global development map (Bourguignon, 2015; Horner & Hulme, 2019; Sumner, 
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2019). Reports show that the world’s middle class has grown in importance (Kharas, 2017) while 
the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty has fallen dramatically worldwide 
(World Bank, 2018b). At the same time, there has been remarkable progress in economic 
growth, education, and health in the Global South (UNDP, 2013). The rise of the South has led 
authors to suggest that countries are moving towards a global convergence in terms of aggregate 
development indicators (Baldwin, 2016; Mahbubani, 2013). This new way of understanding the 
transition to development has had distinct implications for the agenda of multilateral agencies. 
The World Bank (2016) affirmed that it will no longer distinguish between developed and 
developing countries in its annual development indicators. This decision means that the 
Sustainable Development Goals (2015) are formulated not only for ‘developing’ countries but 
also for countries in the Global North (OECD et al., 2019). 
 
However, some scholars have realised that the idea of ‘global convergence’ does not adequately 
capture the change that has caused the new prosperity generated by economic growth 
(Bourguignon, 2015; Horner & Hulme, 2019; Sumner, 2019). Horner & Hulme (2019) say we 
are facing a ‘converging divergence’. This concept refers to the idea that while inequalities 
between countries have decreased (‘converging’ referring to the North-South pattern), 
inequalities within-country have remained high and even grown in some cases. This ‘divergence’ 
in inequality within countries is observed in aspects of economic development, human 
development and the environment in both the Global North and Global South. 
 
Concerning economic development, while the globalisation process has drastically reduced 
income differences between Northern and Southern countries, the inequality in the living 
standards within countries has increased (Bourguignon, 2015). In North Atlantic countries, a 
significant proportion of the population has remained outside of the economic growth since the 
1990s (Milanovic, 2016). This explains why 17 out of the 22 OECD countries experienced  an 
increase in their income inequality between 1985 and 2013 (OECD, 2015a). Income inequality 
within Southern countries has been rising since the 1980s, though with considerable regional 
variation (Ravallion, 2014). Hence, while in countries such as China, India and Russia, income 
inequality has been steadily increasing in the last decades (ISCC, IDS, & UNESCO, 2016), in 
Latin America, a region with one of the highest levels of income inequality, several countries 




Another economic aspect that characterises this ‘divergence’ is the growth of the non-poor 
vulnerable group in both Southern and Northern countries. In the Global South, the divergence 
is explained by the large proportion of people who have escaped from absolute poverty but are 
not yet part of the income-secure middle class. This is because most are still living on relatively 
low incomes and are thus vulnerable to falling back into poverty (Birdsall, 2014). And in the 
countries from the Global North, the cause of the divergence is the increase in non-standard 
employment (e.g. fixed-term contracts and non-voluntary part-time work) in various sectors of 
the economy  (ILO, 2016). Authors like Standing (2011) go further and suggest that a new global 
class has emerged: ‘the precariat’. This class comprises people facing economic insecurity and 
moving in and out of jobs that offer no sense of secure occupational identity. 
 
It is a fact that within-country inequalities in human development are substantial. In particular 
in some countries with low human development, inequalities in education and health are almost 
as large, or even greater, than income inequalities (Harttgen & Klasen, 2012). This is hardly 
surprising if we consider the high correlation between income inequality and non-income 
inequalities, such as health (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015) and education (World Bank, 2016). 
Although there is little evidence of an increase in these inequalities given data availability issues 
(Bourguignon, 2015), there are some studies that have shown that in countries like the United 
States and in some cities in the UK life expectancy gaps have widened between people with 
higher incomes and those in the lower part of the income distribution during the last decades 
(Bosworth, Burtless, & Zhang, 2016; Chetty et al., 2016; CSDH, 2008).  
 
In the case of education in the Global North, although there is no clarity about a tendency 
towards greater inequality, the results of PISA 2015 show significant within-country inequalities 
in educational attainment. For example, students who are in the lower part of the income 
distribution in OECD countries are almost three times more likely to fail to achieve the basic 
level of proficiency in science compared to students in the higher part of the income distribution 
(OECD, 2016). This gap in education inequality is much higher in low-income countries. For 
instance, for every 100 well-off youths who complete primary education, only 36 do so among 
the poorest (UNESCO, 2016). 
 
The limited availability of and access to data on environmental inequalities makes it challenging 
to obtain a clear picture of trends within countries. However, recent studies have shown an 
apparent increase in within-country Green House Gas emission inequalities, in contrast with a 
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decrease in between-country inequalities (Chancel & Piketty, 2015; Sauter, Grether, & Mathys, 
2016). These within-country disparities are explained by differences between sectors of the 
economy, which, between 1970 and 2008, led to an increase in the gap between emission-
producing areas and damage-exposed areas within countries (Sauter et al., 2016). 
 
The evidence generated so far shows a complex reality: the economic growth of a country 
together with the progress in aspects of economic, human and environmental development do 
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with greater well-being for all of its households and individuals. 
Unless policies are implemented to counteract such trends, inequalities within countries can 
grow, even when countries become more prosperous. This reality is seen more clearly in regions 
such as Latin America, where, despite the steady economic growth in the last twenty years, all 
of the countries in the region still face severe social and developmental weaknesses, namely,  
high vulnerability to poverty, high income inequality, economic instability, unequal access to 
education and health services, and increase in the emissions that damage the environment 
(OECD et al., 2019). The transition of these countries to equitable and sustainable development 
will not be attainable as long as these vulnerabilities persist. 
 
The road to development does not follow a linear path, and economic growth alone is not 
enough. Equally relevant is the progress in the well-being and equity in the economic, social and 
environmental development of the population. There is a consensus that the approaches that 
account for nations progress towards sustainable development should continually be rethought. 
This entails defining new ways to measure it in a context of globalisation where countries show 
new vulnerabilities, specific capacities and their own priorities (Barcena, Manservisi, & Pezzini, 
2017). After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the countries in the Global North agreed that it 
was necessary to measure their development and well-being using measures that go beyond the 
gross domestic product (European Commission, 2009; G20, 2009; OECD, 2011; Stiglitz et al., 
2009). This explains the wide variety of social and economic welfare measures that have been 
proposed in the last decade (e.g. vertical and horizontal inequalities, inequality of opportunity, 
subjective well-being, vulnerability to poverty, economic security, sustainability, trust and social 
capital and so forth).2 These new measures have enriched the existing multidimensional welfare 
 
2 For an extensive review of these alternative welfare measures that have emerged as part of national initiatives as 
well as in academic articles see Stiglitz et al. (2018) and D’Ambrosio (2018). 
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measures that were developed prior to the financial crisis (e.g. the Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 1990) and the Index of Economic Well-Being (Osberg & Sharpe, 2002). 
 
The new efforts to improve social and economic welfare measures, and thus design better 
policies in Northern countries, have occurred in the context of a paradigm shift in what the 
transition to development means. It is no longer possible to think of a world divided between 
industrialised and non-industrialised countries or First and Third World, as it used to be in the 
twentieth century. Now, we live in a world with significant inequalities where emerging countries 
are now economic powers, and the production, trade and financial systems of all countries are 
profoundly intertwined and globalised. Additionally, there is the indisputable fact that the 
distribution of natural resources and their future availability will affect all countries equally. For 
this reason, authors such as Giovannini & Rondinella (2018) have promoted the idea that the 
new welfare approaches (with a focus on equity along with multidimensional measures), should 
apply to both OECD and non-OECD countries.3 
 
Nevertheless, this global agenda that aims to develop better measurements of welfare and 
progress of countries still has a long way to go. Well-being and development are complex 
concepts, and many of their economic, social and environmental dimensions are difficult to 
measure. And if this has been a statistical challenge for OECD member countries (OECD, 2011, 
2013a), moving forward in others regions of the world such as Latin America entails even more 
difficulties. In effect, the very process of designing and implementing measures of progress and 
welfare faces multiple challenges. In first place, the political difficulty of raising the standard 
with which development and well-being are measured. In second place, the technical difficulty 
of agreeing on measures on which there is no consensus yet. In third place, dealing with the 
long-lasting problem of access to adequate data. In the case of Latin America, this is not only 
due to the difficulty of coordinating the countries’ National Institutes of Statistics in 
homogenising and harmonising the data available to improve cross-country comparability, but 
also because in most of the countries the surveys and administrative data do not collect data on 
key aspects of well-being (e.g. subjective well-being and distribution of household wealth), let 
alone longitudinal data that would allow for the construction of intergenerational (e.g. inequality 
of opportunity) or intragenerational (e.g. vulnerability to poverty) welfare measures. 
 
3 For example, the equitable and sustainable well-being approach (Hall, Giovannini, & Ranuzzi, 2010) used as a 
theoretical framework for the construction of the Better Life index (OECD, 2011). 
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Moving towards broader metrics of well-being: the new consensus 
 
Societies need to measure the progress they are making towards their economic and social goals. 
After World War II, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the key metric to monitor and 
compare economic performance and social progress among countries (Marcuss & Kane, 2007; 
McCulla & Smith, 2007). The general consensus was that economic development should 
provide the means to improve individual living standards and that GDP could adequately reflect 
it. The measurement of economic growth was clear and was implicitly linked to changes in direct 
welfare measures such as employment or household consumption. However, GDP is an 
economic indicator that measures market production – expressed in monetary units – and does 
not necessarily meet the objective of appropriately measuring economic welfare and the well-
being of people. This issue was recognised by Kuznets himself, who developed the concept of 
GDP (Kuznets, 1934). 
 
The first criticisms related to the use of GDP as a measure of well-being arose during the 1970s 
(Seers, 1969). Some authors evidenced the need to start using economic welfare measures that 
account for the sustainability of the economic growth of countries (Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973) 
together with welfare measures that incorporate economic and social dimensions of human 
progress (Christian, 1974) and distributional aspects such as income inequality (Sen, 1976). 
 
It took two decades for official measures that go ‘beyond GDP’ to appear. In 1990 the United 
Nations Development Program launched the Human Development Index (HDI) as part of its 
first Human Development Report. Since then, the HDI, which combines GDP (well-being 
material) with health measures and educational achievements, has become the most successful 
index in the use of multiple dimensions that address economic development and social welfare. 
And yet, although several studies showed that the level of human development is inversely 
related to the level of inequality in health, education and income (Anand & Sen, 1993; Foster, 
Lopez-Calva, & Szekely, 2005; Grimm, Harttgen, Klasen, & Misselhorn, 2008; Hicks, 1997; 
Seth, 2009), it took another 20 years for the Human Development Report (2010) to include 
distributive considerations in the HDI. 
 
The Great Recession, which began in 2007–2008, made manifest the limits of GDP as an 
indicator of both economic performance and well-being. The years before the financial crisis 
accounted for GDP growth that reaffirmed the widespread impression that everything was 
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going in the right direction. The good performance of GDP did not allow to see the financial 
crisis that was coming. The key indicator of economic welfare was blind to the increase in 
inequality in advanced economies and to the accumulation of public and private debt in some 
of these countries (Atkinson & Morelli, 2011; Iacoviello, 2008).4 Measuring development solely 
through GDP proved to be a flawed approach to guiding the political and economic leaders in 
the countries that triggered the banking crisis. 
 
In the years since the financial crisis, policymakers and statistical offices in developed countries 
have recognised the importance of changing the emphasis of measuring economic production 
to measuring people’s well-being (European Commission, 2009; G20, 2009; OECD, 2011; 
Stiglitz et al., 2009). One of the most distinctive documents of this renewed emphasis on 
individual and social well-being is the report by the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress (the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report) published in 2009 
(Stiglitz et al., 2009). The report concludes that GDP as a single indicator fails to cover the 
multidimensionality of development, as well as the structural changes that have characterised 
the evolution of modern economies. Stiglitz et al. (2009) recommended combining the GDP 
measure with broader metrics of household economic well-being, considering: i) inequalities, ii) 
people’s quality of life, and iii) the sustainability of these results over time. Since then a ‘beyond 
GDP’ movement has crystallised, resulting in an expansion of new statistics on economic 
welfare, well-being, and sustainability (Bleys, 2012; D’Ambrosio, 2018; ECLAC, 2012; OECD, 
2017; Stiglitz et al., 2018; UNDP, 2018). 
 
Measuring progress and well-being: from macro data to micro data sources  
 
The first recommendation of the report by Stiglitz et al. (2009) was that the measurement of 
material well-being should assess individuals’ economic situation instead of focusing on 
indicators for the entire economy. There are two main measures of material living standards 
 
4 There are two mechanisms that would explain the relationship between income inequality and the financial crash 
of  2007–2008: i) the income inequality led to a redistribution in the form of  subsidised housing financing, which 
caused a boom in mortgages (Rajan, 2010), and ii) higher income inequality led to a higher level of  bank loans to 
middle-income and poor households to maintain their rising standard of  living due to real income drops 
(mechanism suggested by Stiglitz (2009) and theoretically developed by Kumhof  et al. (2015). 
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that have followed this argument.  The first privileges the household perspective obtained from 
the use of microdata sources, and the second incorporates distributional issues.5 
 
The household perspective on measuring economic well-being is based on the idea that the 
average household’s disposable income delivers the material standard of living of a ‘typical’ 
household in the country (Balestra et al., 2018). Two strategies stand out for the construction 
of such measures: i) calculating mean household disposable income using macro sources such 
as National Accounts, or ii) calculating mean or median household income using micro sources 
such as household surveys. Stiglitz et al. (2009) recommend the median income over the mean 
income as an adequate measure to represent the current material living standards of a ‘typical’ 
household because it provides a preliminary assessment of income inequality of the country. 
 
Figure 1.1: Real annual growth rates of GDP, mean and median household disposable incomes 
 
Source: OECD calculations based on OECD National Accounts and Income Distribution Databases. Figure 
appears on page 22 in OECD (2015a).  
Note: For median and mean equivalised household disposable incomes, PPP are those for private consumptions 
of households. For GDP per capita, PPPs are those for the GDP deflator. Countries are sorted in ascending order 
according to the difference between the annual average growth rates of mean and median disposable incomes. 
 
When comparing GDP growth among OECD member countries with the change in mean and 
median household disposable incomes (Figure 1.1), it is observed that, in many countries, 
 
5 There is a third measure that includes non-market activities. Under the premise that countries’ economic activity 
entails more than just market production (GDP), measures have been proposed that come from i) services provided 
by the government, ii) unpaid work inside the home, and iii) those related to the ‘third sector’. Access to better data 
has allowed for calculating household production satellite accounts that complement traditional estimates of 
economic activity by providing a better measure of the material well-being of households (Ahmad & Koh, 2011). 
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income inequality increased before the financial crisis (2007–2008), while the growth of 
household disposable income failed to match the earnings of GDP per capita.6 
 
Figure 1.1 shows that between the mid-1990s and 2007, in more than half of the OECD 
countries, GDP per capita grew faster than the mean household disposable income. Also, in 
Canada, Austria, France, Australia, Denmark, United States, Israel, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Portugal, Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, the median income 
growth rate was lower than the average income. In these countries, the income of those in the 
middle of the income distribution increased less compared to those in the upper part of the 
distribution. 
 
At the same time, in countries with high income inequality such as Turkey, Spain, Chile and 
Ireland, a substantial reduction in the gap between the mean and median incomes occurred. The 
increase of income in the lower part of the distribution occurred in a context where these 
countries had different annual GDP growth rates. Therefore, a linear relationship between 
economic growth and reduced inequality in these countries is not evident. 
 
Although the median income provides a better measure of what is happening to a ‘typical’ 
household than the mean income, for policy purposes, it is also important to know what is 
happening at the bottom or/and top of the income distribution. For example, an increase in the 
average income of a country may hide the fact that the economic prosperity is distributed 
unevenly among different groups of society, leaving some groups relatively worse off than 
others (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
 
The way to escape the ‘tyranny of averages’ is to use dispersion measures such as income 
inequality. These measures enable evaluating the distribution of income to account for the 
different challenges that countries face in moving towards more inclusive development. The 
 
6 There are discrepancies between the mean household disposable income obtained by National Accounts and the 
estimate using household surveys. See Balestra (2018, pp. 57–61) for a detailed account of the main differences and 
implications. In recent years, two projects have been developed to overcome these differences between micro and 
macro sources. To achieve this goal, these projects propose methodologies that compile the income distribution 
data available from micro sources with the totals of the national accounts in a systematic way. One of them is the 
EG DNA (Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounts), a project convened by the OECD and focused on 
income, consumption and savings distributions. The other is DINA (Distributional National Accounts). DINA 
project is focused on income and wealth and originates from the WID initiative developed by Piketty & Zucman 
(2014). More details of both research efforts can be found in Alvaredo et al. (2018). 
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three best-known income inequality measures that use cross-sectional data from micro sources 
are the Gini coefficient, the mean log deviation and the P90 / P10 inter-decile ratio. 
 
Figure 1.2: Gini coefficient of income inequalities, mid-1990s and late 2000s 
 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Databases. Figure appears on page 64 in Balestra et al. (2018). 
Notes: Data refer to the mid-2000s instead of the late 2000s for Greece and Switzerland. For Austria, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain and Switzerland, the values are provisional. 
 
Measuring income inequality using the Gini coefficient enables for observing two characteristics 
of the distribution of household disposable income in OECD member countries. The first is 
that there is considerable variation in income inequality between countries. Figure 1.2 shows 
that the Nordic countries and the countries of Eastern Europe have a less unequal income 
distribution, while countries such as Chile, Mexico and Turkey as well as the United States and 
Israel, have high income inequality. The second feature is that income inequality increased in 
most OECD countries between the mid-1990 and late 2000s, although there were some 
countries where it declined, such as Turkey, Ireland, Belgium, Greece and Chile. 
 
Measuring progress and well-being: from a static to a longitudinal perspective (the case of income inequality and 
economic growth) 
 
Income inequality measures are static measures. They do not consider that people in the group 
of the rich and people in the group of the poor are not the same over time. The fact that 
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individuals experience relative ups and downs in their economic well-being is relevant to 
understand the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. By using 
longitudinal data, it is possible to relate these three types of changes: i) in income inequality, ii) 
in aggregate economic growth, and iii) in the position of individuals in the income distribution 
(re-ranking). 
 
The case of the United States illustrates the implications of analysing trends in income inequality, 
ignoring the existence of re-ranking in the income distribution over time. Figure 1.2 shows that 
not only is the United States the most unequal nation among the North-Atlantic countries, it 
also increased its inequality during the period studied. A plausible interpretation would be that 
the income growth in the United States between the mid-1990s and late 2000s was greater for 
the rich than for the poor. However, the reality is more complicated. Using methods to 
decompose changes in income inequality and longitudinal data, Jenkins & Van Kerm (2006) 
observed a paradox during the 1980s (when income inequality in the USA also grew 
substantially). Although the poor fared badly relative to the rich, income growth was pro-poor. 
This means that income growth was higher for those with lower incomes despite the increase 
in income inequality. Thus, measures of changes in inequality from a longitudinal perspective 
(or non-anonymous approach) provide more adequate information in assessing the impact of 
growth on poverty.7 
 
The non-anonymous approach has also been implemented in ‘inclusive economic growth’ 
measurements (that is, growth that benefits all segments of society). Although the measure of 
the distributive impact of economic growth is not new (Kuznets, 1955), during the 2000s several 
authors made substantial theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions developing 
new methods for measuring pro-poor growth (Bourguignon, 2003; Essama-Nssah & Lambert, 
2009; Ferreira, 2010; Ravallion & Chen, 2003; Son, 2004). This literature analyses growth by 
comparing pre-growth and post-growth distributions using a repeated cross-section perspective. 
Growth Incidence Curves (GICs)8, introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2003), are the best-
known measures to assess the implications of well-being in different distributional patterns of 
 
7 The non-anonymous approach (or longitudinal perspective) analyses distributional changes identifying individuals 
over time using panel data. The anonymous approach (or repeated cross-section perspective) compares the 
distribution of  income at two points in time without identifying individuals between both distributions.  




economic growth. However, these measures ignore the non-anonymous income dynamics along 
with the distribution. Therefore, there is a problem of identification when extrapolating the 
results to particular individuals. 
 
When assessing economic growth in terms of welfare (e.g. using a social welfare function) it is 
relevant to take into account how individuals move in the income distribution (Palmisano & 
Peragine, 2015). This information shows who are the winners and losers of growth. It allows 
concluding whether or not those who were initially poor were affected by income growth 
(Grimm, 2007).  
 
Recently, based on this longitudinal perspective, methods have been proposed to measure 
whether the type of ‘economic growth’ some countries are experiencing is progressive or 
regressive (see Bourguignon, 2011; Dhongde & Silber, 2016; Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2016; 
Palmisano & Peragine, 2015). These new measures come from the economic literature on 
income mobility, specifically, from the ‘income movement’ analysis, that focuses on 
summarising at a population level the changes in income over time of individuals within the 
population (Cowell, 1985; Fields & Ok, 1999). This approach uses non-anonymous GICs (or 
income mobility profiles – see Van Kerm (2006)) to illustrate individual income movements 
considering the initial status and different assumptions in the social welfare function.9  
 
Figure 1.3 shows that the implications for economic well-being of changes in the income 
distribution depend critically on whether a non-anonymous approach is taken. In Britain over 
the 1990s and 2000s, the anonymous GICs in Panel A show that economic growth over four-
year periods was regressive in terms of changes in absolute income (change in real income). 
That is, income growth was lower for the poorest. This result was obtained using a repeated, 
cross-section perspective. When adopting a longitudinal perspective, the non-anonymous GICs 
or income growth profiles (Panel B), the image is different and shows that during the period 




9 For example, Bourguignon (2011) adopts a social welfare function, which is sensitive to the horizontal and vertical 
inequality of  growth, while Jenkins & Van Kerm (2016) adopt a rank dependent social welfare function, which is 
sensitive only to the vertical impact of  growth. Palmisano & Peragine (2015) follow the proposal of  Jenkins & Van 
Kerm (2016) but also focus on the horizontal inequality of  growth. 
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Figure 1.3: Comparing anonymous GICs vs non-anonymous GICs in Britain: 1992-2005 












Source: Data from British Household Panel Survey. Both figures Panel A and Panel B appear on page 27 and 17 respectively 
in Jenkins & Van Kerm (2011). 
 
It is worth mentioning that non-anonymous measures used to assess the economic growth have 
two limitations. The first is that they need longitudinal data for their implementation (most 
countries in the Global South lack this type of data). The second disadvantage is that their 
implementation and interpretation of the results require more effort compared to the analysis 
of trends in static measures of economic well-being. However, non-anonymous measures are 
crucial to assessing whether all groups in society benefit from the economic growth as well as 
the magnitude of those benefits. Besides, in economic crisis, these measures allow for identifying 
which groups have been most affected by economic losses. 
 
Measuring progress and well-being: from a unidimensional to a multidimensional perspective  
 
Both GDP and the welfare measures from household incomes reviewed so far provide a general 
idea of the levels of development of a country. In addition to being relatively easy to calculate, 
they are easy to understand and communicate. They also allow for comparisons to be made over 
time and between countries. However, they fail to capture the complexities of development or 
to obtain a more accurate picture of people’s living conditions. 
 
Besides economic resources, health, education, social relationships and subjective feelings are 
also constitutive elements of human life (Sen, 1987). These dimensions should not be ignored 
when assessing people’s well-being. GDP per capita or household disposable income as welfare 
measures to compare countries, not only hide disparities in different aspects that are essential 
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to people’s lives, but also a high per capita income of a nation alone does not guarantee a better 
quality of life. 
 
Table 1.1 presents the inconsistencies of a monetary measure, such as the Gross National 
Product (GNP), with some indicators of health and education well-being. These results first 
appeared in the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1990. The first group of three countries 
– Sri Lanka, Jamaica and Costa Rica – show high life expectancy and adult literacy rates and low 
infant mortality rates despite the low levels of GNP per capita. In contrast, the second group of 
three countries - Brazil, Oman and Saudi Arabia - show much lower life expectancy and adult 
literacy rates and higher infant mortality rates despite much higher levels of GNP per capita.10 
 
Table 1.1: The gross national product (GNP) per capita versus other social indicators 
     
Country GNP per capita  
(USD$) 1987 
Life expectancy  
(years) 
Adult literacy rate  
(%) 
Infant mortality  
(per 1,000 live births) 
Modest GNP per capita with high human development   
Sri Lanka 400 71 87 32 
Jamaica 940 74 82 18 
Costa Rica 1,610 75 93 18 
High GNP per capita with modest human development   
Brazil 2,020 65 78 62 
Oman 5,810 57 30 40 
Saudi Arabia 6,200 64 55 70 
     
 Source: Figure appears on page 9 in UNDP (UNDP, 1990). 
 
A more recent study in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) shows that different well-being 
outcomes diverge from the predictions that use GDP as an explanatory variable (OECD et al., 
2019). While real wages in LAC have increased less than in other countries with a similar GDP 
growth per capita, the life expectancy exceeded the level expected for the economic growth 
achieved in the region (Figure 1.4). 
 
 
10 It is important to mention that the figures in Table 1.1 are not corrected for variations in purchasing power for 
the six countries. UNDP report (1990, p. 12) points out that doing so would not change the ranking among 
countries, but if  distributional adjustments are made using each country’s Gini coefficient, the original order 
reverses between countries such as Brazil and Costa Rica. Therefore, such distributional corrections can make a 
significant difference in evaluations of  country performance. 
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Figure 1.4: Actual and expected performance for selected well-being outcomes in LAC over time 











Source: Based on www.clio-infra.eu/ and CEPALSTAT. Figure appears on page 83 in ECLAC et al. (2019). 
Notes: * Real wages are measured as the number of consumption baskets purchases with the real wages of a male unskilled 
worker in the building industry. Expected values are calculated with a panel dataset composed of 183 countries worldwide from 
1900 to 2010. The LAC average includes all countries in the Americas except Canada and the United States. 
 
In the same study (OECD et al., 2019), countries with similar per capita incomes are compared 
obtaining different outcomes. It shows that high-income countries within LAC have much 
worse development outcomes compared to countries in other regions of the world with the 
same classification. For example, Panel A in Figure 1.5 shows that vulnerable employment 
among high-income countries is 10 per cent across the globe, but, in Latin American high-
income countries, the vulnerable employment is double (20 per cent). In the same Figure, Panel 
B shows that high-income countries in LAC have only 34 per cent of people satisfied with health 
care availability. In contrast, in similar-income countries in other regions, that figure reaches 70 
per cent. This difference is also found among countries that belong to the same income group 
in LAC. For example, the proportion of people who are satisfied with the health system varies 
considerably among high-income countries within the region (from 67% in Uruguay to 33% in 
Chile). 
 
These results show that the relationship between GDP and different dimensions of well-being 
is not linear. Therefore, a higher national income does not automatically lead to higher levels of 
well-being for all. Since there are relevant dimensions of well-being that economic resources 
alone cannot capture, it has become necessary to move from a money-based perspective to a 
multidimensional perspective. The focus is no longer on just one economic dimension, but on 
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all of the aspects that constitute human life. This paradigm shift to measuring the social progress 
and well-being of countries has made a critical contribution to the design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies that aim to improve people’s life chances. 
 
Figure 1.5: Selected development indicators by country income groups 









Source: Based on World Bank (2018), UNODC (2018) and Gallup (2017). Figure appears on page 70 in ECLAC et al. (2019). 
Notes: Simple averages are used both for LAC and world averages. LAC lower middle-income countries include Bolivia, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. LAC upper middle-income countries include Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. LAC high-income countries include Argentina, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Panama, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
 
The two best-known multidimensional welfare indices were developed by international agencies: 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). In 1990, the UNDP published the first “Human 
Development Report” (HDR) with its Human Development Index (HDI). Currently, more 
than 180 countries have incorporated the HDI into their official indicators and, as a result, it 
has become the welfare index with the greatest influence worldwide. The OECD proposed the 
Better Life Index (BLI). The BLI was first presented in ‘How’s life?’ (2011), and since then it 
has been applied every two years in OECD and other partner countries (46 countries in total). 
 
Measuring progress and well-being: from ex post to ex ante measures (the case of economic insecurity and 
vulnerability to poverty)  
 
So far, I have presented measures of social progress and welfare that are alternative to GDP and 
are typically backwards looking. This means that they are ex-post measures based on household 
outcomes such as poverty or Gini coefficient after they have already occurred. The availability 
of household panel surveys has allowed the development of less traditional welfare measures 
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such as economic insecurity and vulnerability to poverty. These measures have two shared 
characteristics. First, they focus on the anticipation of future events. Thus, allow ex-ante 
monitoring of: i) the anxiety and stress of individuals caused by a potential economic loss, and 
ii) the risk of a non-poor individual of falling into poverty. 
 
Second, the two measures focus on the economic changes (e.g. income or earnings) of 
individuals from one period to another. This feature has been developed in-depth in the 
economic literature on income mobility (Jäntti & Jenkins, 2015), which has been crucial in the 
development of these concepts. In the case of economic insecurity and vulnerability to poverty 
the focus is on understanding changes in the income of individuals during their life 
(intragenerational changes). 
 
Although there is still no consensus on the formal definition of these forward-looking concepts, 
recent empirical evidence has shown some robustness in the results obtained using different 
definitions and methods. This suggests that, despite the conceptual and methodological 
challenges, these measures are already capable of delivering policy recommendations to move 
towards more inclusive development (D’Ambrosio, 2018, p. 10). 
 
Economic insecurity and vulnerability to poverty are the two measures I develop and implement 
for the case of LAC in this thesis. Below, I briefly describe these two new welfare measures that 
have a longitudinal perspective and have made a contribution to the ‘beyond GDP’ agenda in 
the last decade. A detailed empirical and theoretical review of these measures can be found in 
Stiglitz et al. (2018) and (D’Ambrosio, 2018). These reviews also address other social and 
economic welfare measures that are not included in this introduction, such as inequality of 
opportunity, social exclusion, social polarisation, horizontal inequalities and subjective well-




Anxiety is a feeling of worry or fear caused by future events or situations that are challenging or 
threatening. When this state of mental unease is caused by financial uncertainty, economic 
insecurity is discussed. An example of economic insecurity is the anxiety and stress that 
households experience when they feel/think they will not be able to make ends meet if they lose 
their job or have an unexpected family medical expense. Thus, the relationship between 
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economic insecurity and well-being is easy to intuit; the problem relies on its complex 
measurement (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
 
Measuring the impact of economic insecurity on a person’s well-being depends on several 
factors. The first is the level of risk of occurrence of an adverse event and the negative economic 
consequence (and stigma) if the event takes place. In addition, it depends on the protections 
that potentially compensate or prevent the loss and especially on the preferences of the people 
themselves (e.g. loss aversion). Finally, measurement requires the availability of longitudinal data 
that adequately measure these factors (Hacker, 2018; Rohde & Tang, 2018; Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
 
Several studies have shown an association between economic insecurity and different 
dimensions of well-being. Workers with safer jobs are happier than those in more vulnerable 
positions (Scheve & Slaughter, 2004). People with a higher risk of experiencing adverse 
economic events show behavioural changes that result in higher levels of obesity, a higher level 
of smoking and alcohol abuse (Barnes & Smith, 2009; Smith, Stoddard, & Barnes, 2009). Also, 
economic insecurity generates psychological distress in the family environment and makes it 
difficult for families to invest in education and housing (Hill, Morris, Gennetian, Wolf, & Tubbs, 
2013; Jansson, 2017). 
 
At an institutional level, economic security has been recognised as a social right from a human 
rights perspective and as a welfare concept from a human development perspective. In 1948, 
Article 25 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that every 
member of society has the “right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other losses of livelihood in circumstances that are beyond the control 
of each individual”. The Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 that economic security 
“requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative 
work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net” (HDR, p. 25). Although both 
statements refer to a broad concept of economic insecurity, they represent strong evidence of 
the value that societies and their governments attribute to it. 
 
The following definition of economic insecurity first appeared in Osberg’s work (1998, p. 7): 
“the anxiety produced by a lack of economic safety – that is, by an inability to obtain protection 
against subjectively significant potential economic losses”. This definition underlies the idea that 
to avoid the anxiety of an uncertain financial future, people can acquire insurance (public or 
 
23 
private), make less risky economic decisions, or build formal or informal social support 
networks (Osberg & Sharpe, 2002). However, formal private insurance or public social security 
options are not always available especially in Global South countries and, if they exist, they tend 
to be ineffective at the time they are needed (Morduch, 1999). 
 
Economic insecurity is not just a problem of the Global South. In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of the late 2000s, hundreds of millions of people in OECD countries faced economic 
losses associated with unemployment, the volatility of their income and sharp declines in wealth 
obtained from housing and other assets. Opinion polls in these countries show that citizens 
affected by the economic crisis are increasingly concerned about their degree of vulnerability to 
an unexpected economic loss (Hacker, 2018). This subjective barometer of fear and concern 
about economic uncertainty correlates with more objective measures. For example, 36 per cent 
of the population in OECD countries have insufficient financial assets to cover their expenses 
for more than three months without falling into poverty (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018). Similarly, 
Hacker (2018), using data panels from developed countries, estimates that about 12 per cent of 
adults experience a loss of income of 25 per cent in a year. 
 
In this context, the report on well-being measures by Stiglitz et al. (2009, p. 202) represents a 
milestone in the field. The report highlighted the relevance of the measurement of economic 
insecurity to understand the economic well-being of people, while also acknowledging that it is 
a complex task due to the multiple dimensions contained in the concept. Since then, several 
definitions, measures and methods for studying economic insecurity have been proposed in and 
for the countries of the Global North (Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013; Bucks, 2011; Hacker et 
al., 2014; Osberg & Sharpe, 2014; Rohde, Tang, & Rao, 2014; Romaguera de la Cruz, 2017). 
These proposals are based on objective and subjective measures of economic insecurity that 
deepen in the economic losses and the role that buffers play in reducing those losses. These 
measures can focus on only one dimension of the phenomenon or summarise on synthetic 
indexes based on (weighted) multiple measures. A detailed review of the state of the art of these 
measures can be found in Chapter Four of this thesis and the reviews by Hacker (2018), Osberg 







Vulnerability to poverty 
 
Although the economic literature has linked economic uncertainty to both economic insecurity 
and vulnerability to poverty, there is an important difference between the two concepts. While 
the entire population, independent of their position in the income distribution of a country, may 
feel economically insecure, only a part of the population, those who are vulnerable, are likely to 
experience poverty in the future.11 Therefore, vulnerability to poverty is the risk of an individual 
having an economic loss in the future that would cause him to fall into poverty. In this way, 
reducing vulnerability not only improves the well-being of people ex-post but is also crucial to 
the design of anti-poverty policies (World Bank, 2001, p. 7). 
 
For those who work in poverty eradication, it is apparent that alleviating poverty ex-post is not 
enough. Poverty alleviation should go hand-in-hand with the implementation of strategies that 
prevent poverty ex-ante (Chaudhuri, Jalan, & Suryahadi, 2002). The design of these types of 
policies requires identifying the non-poor people who are likely to fall into poverty (Zhang & 
Wan, 2009). However, since it is not possible to know the future distributions of results, it is 
necessary to study uncertainty as a determining part of poverty itself (Ceriani, 2018). 
 
The first work linking the study of poverty with the economy of uncertainty appeared more 
than two decades ago (Morduch, 1994). However, it is since the economic crisis (2007–2008), 
and with the growing recognition that poverty is a dynamic phenomenon (Jenkins, 2011), that 
a series of contributions have been developed to measure vulnerability to poverty. Like the other 
ex-ante welfare measures (economic insecurity), a consensus has not yet been reached on how 
to define and measure it. 
 
The definition of vulnerability to poverty has direct implications for its measurement. The main 
approaches found in the economic literature can be grouped into three definitions. The first 
definition, which is better known and commonly used, is of vulnerability as the ex-ante risk of 
an individual being poor in the future. In contrast to the definition of poverty, which is an ex-
post measure of households’ welfare, vulnerability is a prospective measure. Therefore, as stated 
 




by Chaudhuri et al. (2002), while the ‘poor’ state is observable, the’ vulnerable’ state can only be 
estimated or inferred. 
 
Within this definition, there are nuances. Some authors focus only on the probability of falling 
into poverty in the future (Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Dang & Lanjouw, 2017; López-Calva & Ortiz-
Juarez, 2014; Pritchett, Suryahadi, & Sumarto, 2000; Suryahadi & Sumarto, 2003), while others 
consider both the probability of being poor and the extent (depth) of future poverty (Calvo & 
Dercon, 2013; Christiaensen & Subbarao, 2005). 
 
The second definition of vulnerability follows a utilitarian approach has been used by authors 
such as Ligon & Schechter (2004) and Günther & Maier (2014). According to this approach, 
vulnerability corresponds to a consumption deficit threat for an average level of real 
consumption. In this definition, vulnerability depends not only on the variation in consumption 
(which can be broken down into two types of risk: aggregate and idiosyncratic) but also on 
average household consumption. 
 
The third definition has been posited by a group of authors who define vulnerability as the risk 
of being poor due to the inability to smooth consumption (Banerjee, 2004; Glewwe & Hall, 
1998; Kurosaki, 2006; Skoufias & Quisumbing, 2005). In this approach, someone is vulnerable 
if their current consumption is below the poverty line, although their permanent income is 
above it. Informal insurance mechanisms such as loans, assets and individuals’ own savings, as 
well as formal insurance, allow individuals to smooth consumption over time. Hence, this type 
of vulnerability can also be understood as the inability to cope with economic shocks due to a 
lack of insurance (Ceriani, 2018). 
 
These three definitions follow the same two steps in their measurement. First, quantify 
vulnerability. This step requires deciding on the welfare indicator to be used in the analysis. 
Given that a large number of these studies have been carried out in Global South countries, 
consumption is the indicator that has been most commonly used.12 The second step in 
measuring vulnerability to poverty is to estimate the future distribution of the indicator chosen 
 
12 See Ceriani (2018) to a review of  studies that using other welfare measures such as earnings and income. 
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for each household (or individual) in order to determine its vulnerability status. The different 
methods vary according to the types of data available (e.g. panel data or cross-sectional data).13  
 
Finally, the first definition requires a third step to estimate the vulnerability threshold. Once 
estimated, all of those whose probability of falling into poverty is above that threshold are 
classified as vulnerable. A probability of 0.5 is used in most studies. (e.g. Pritchett et al., (2000); 
Suryahadi and Sumarto, (2003); Christiaensen and Subbarao,(2005); Chiwaula et al., (2011)). 
Therefore, those who have a probability of falling into poverty of above 50 per cent are 
considered vulnerable. 
 
Recent works have linked the vulnerability threshold (risk) to a specific household income 
(Dang & Lanjouw, 2017; López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014; Schotte, Zizzamia, & Leibbrandt, 
2018). This income cut-off is known as the vulnerability line. In this way, individuals who have 




In this section, I have presented the evolution of the measures of social progress and individual 
well-being that have arisen since the first apprehensions about using GDP for that purpose 
appeared. I focused primarily on showing those new measurements that offer a longitudinal 
perspective on the study of the economic well-being of households and individuals. Although 
these measures are related to each other since they use income changes over time as the primary 
indicator, seminal works did not use similar measures and analysis (e.g. Morduch (1994) for 
vulnerability to poverty and Osberg (1998) for economic insecurity). 
 
Since the financial crisis (2007–08), a series of investigations have continued to develop these 
types of measures. Household panel surveys have made an essential contribution to the 
measures of economic insecurity as well as the measures that relate inequality to income mobility 
in developed countries. Additionally, some proposals to measure vulnerability to poverty in 
developing countries that lack longitudinal data have also contributed to this approach, though 
still insufficient. My thesis advances this line of knowledge, proposing better and more adequate 
methodologies to measure income position persistence, vulnerability to poverty, and economic 
 
13 For a detailed review of these methods, see Ceriani (2018), Calvo (2018) and Gallardo (2018). 
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insecurity in countries in the Global South that are moving towards inclusive and sustainable 
development.  
 
1.3 The Chilean case 
 
Chile, as a case study, illustrates particularly well the gap between traditional measures of 
progress and the social and economic reality at the household and individual level previously 
reviewed. Conventional social and economic welfare measures did not account for the profound 
and massive social discontent that led to strong protests and social uprising in October 2019 
(Ferreira & Schoch, 2020). In Chile, GDP per capita grew from $ 14,000 in 1997 to $ 23,000 in 
2017 (in PPP terms). In 2013, Chile entered in the select group of countries with the highest 
income according to the World Bank, and four years later, in 2017, was classified as a developed 
country by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (Tezanos, 2018). At the same 
time, poverty in Chile decreased significantly, reaching one of the lowest absolute poverty rates 
in Latin America (ECLAC, 2018). 
 
Undoubtedly, the alarming level of inequality in its different dimensions has been one of the 
main explanations when analysing social unrest in Chile after the protests. However, the levels 
of income inequality have remained at the same high level during all periods of government 
since the return to democracy, showing even a slight decrease in recent years. Another measure 
of well-being, such as the Human Development index does not help to understand this crisis 
either. The UNDP classifies Chile as a country that has a very high human development index 
(UNDP, 2019). 
 
In this way, recent events in Chile show the limitations of measures such as GDP, absolute 
poverty levels, income inequality measures and the Human Development Index in order to 
evaluate the progress and development of countries that are leaving behind underdevelopment. 
 
Below, I provide a more detailed description of the evolution of social policies in Chile and its 







Income growth and poverty reduction with persistent inequality 
 
Significant economic growth has been one of the most important hallmarks of the Chilean 
economy since the country’s return to democracy in 1990. The economy has grown on average 
by over 5 per cent per year over the last 25 years, making the Chilean per capita income one of 
the highest in Latin America (OECD et al., 2019). As a consequence of this economic progress 
and its highly focused social policies, Chile has experienced a remarkable decline in poverty over 
the last decades (Larrañaga & Rodríguez, 2015). According to the official poverty measure used 
by the Chilean government during this period, the share of people living below the national 
absolute poverty line decreased from 38.6 per cent in 1990 to 8.6 per cent in 2017 (MDS, 2018).  
 
However, the picture is different when the income distribution is analysed as a whole. Several 
measures of inequality indicate that the progress of the Chilean society towards a higher social 
inclusion has been limited. Based on post-transfer and post-tax household income per capita, 
official data from Chile shows that the Gini coefficient decreased only two points between 1990 
and 2017, from 0.521 to 0.502 (MDS, 2018). These figures are among the highest for OECD 
countries (OECD, 2018c). The high level of inequality reflects a large gap between the top and 
mean incomes (Chauvel, 2018). As a result of this gap, the income distribution is narrower in 
the lowest decile groups with a high turnover of many households around the absolute poverty 
line (Larrañaga, 2009).  This characteristic of the Chilean income distribution suggests that many 
households are extremely vulnerable to falling into poverty (Maldonado & Prieto, 2015; Neilson, 
Contreras, Cooper, & Hermann, 2008).14 
 
Evolution of social policy in Chile 
 
Some of the Chilean welfare state features can also help to understand the patterns observed in 
both poverty dynamic and labour market in Chile. In the context of Latin America, Chile 
belongs to the groups of pioneer welfare states, presenting middle level of welfare generosity in 
 
14 The trends in poverty and inequality in Chile are similar to those observed in the rest of Latin America. Poverty 
fell from 47 per cent to 26.4 per cent between 2002 and 2015, and the Gini coefficient declined from 0.550  to 
0.467 during the same period (ECLAC, 2017). It is worth mentioning the remarkable change in income distribution 
unfolded in Brazil, which represents one-third of the region’s population. During the 2000s and early 2010, 
Brazilian inequality fell by a fifth, and the share of the population living in poverty dropped by two-thirds. This 
change coincided with an expansion of the social safety net, steady progress in education, favourable demographics, 
and a long upturn in the business cycle (Sotomayor, 2019). However, between 2014 and 2017, poverty increased 
from 18 to 21 per cent of the population, revealing the high vulnerability in the lower end of the Brazilian income 
distribution (Vegh et al., 2019). 
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the region (Huber & Stephens, 2012). To explain the level of welfare generosity of Chile, 
scholars distinguish between periods of retrenchment and post-retrenchment reforms (Ewig & 
Kay, 2011). Although corporatist since 1920s (Haggard, Haggard, & Kaufman, 2008), Chile 
experienced radical neoliberal changes during the seventeen years of the dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet (1973–1989). The most commonly cited example of the liberalisation of the Chilean 
welfare state is the reform of the social insurance, the domain par excellence of the corporatist 
welfare state (Castiglioni, 2005). In the 1980s, policy reforms ended the pay-as-you-go social 
insurance system that had been in existence since the 1920s and established a system based upon 
individual contributions and compulsory private insurance administrated by private pension 
funds (Mesa-Lago & Bertranou, 2016). The reform of social insurance was accompanied by the 
privatisation of the health and education services (Cominetti & Raczynski, 1994). Most 
importantly to understand poverty dynamics is the fact that the Chilean retrenchment promoted 
a strong means-testing social policy that was meant to help only the extreme poor. The impact 
of this policy on poverty was limited because benefits were set at a low monetary level (Huber 
& Stephens, 2012). 
 
In the 1990s, democracy was re-established in Chile, and a centre-left coalition (Concertación) 
came into office in successive periods until 2010. Based on a social citizenship conception of 
social policy, the centre-left governments undertook a set of initiatives towards universalising 
the coverage of healthcare as well as income support against risks. Another turn towards a more 
active role of government was the introduction of unemployment insurance in 2002. Its impact 
on low-income workers, however, has been quite limited, because the coverage is restricted to 
the formal sector and benefit levels are modest (Sehnbruch, Carranza, & Prieto, 2019b). The 
tax system also has had a modest redistributive effect because the government tax take is very 
low. Indeed, the Chilean system has the lowest tax burden in Latin America (Huber & Stephens, 
2012). 
 
Although governments in the 1990s introduced several benefits for the poor, an institutionalised 
anti-poverty policy appeared only in the 2000s. This policy began with the Chile Solidario program 
during the government of Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006). This program sought to establish an 
integrated system of social protection that included non-contributory income security and 
access to a variety of social services for those who were extremely poor. In 2010, when the right-
wing coalition took office, this program was replaced by a new program called Ingreso Ético 
Familiar (Ethical Family Income). The new program combines unconditional and conditional 
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transfers for people living in extreme poverty. It also provides psycho-social support for the 
participants, as well as labour activation programs. Assessments have shown that these 
programs have increased the coverage of the benefits, but there is no clear evidence that Chile 
Solidario helped to improve household income (Larrañaga, Contreras, & Cabezas, 2015). 
 
In spite of the great changes experienced in Chile since 1990s when democracy was re-
established, the success of these changes have remained circumscribed to poverty reduction and 
the provision of support to formal workers. Social policies have been somehow blind to 
informality, which helps to understand why although poverty reduction has been significant, 
vulnerability to poverty is still very high and informal labour rates have remained constant along 
the two past decades. 
 
Welfare State in Chile: Small Subsidiary Government 
 
The characteristics of the Chilean welfare state can also help to understand this relationship 
between sustained economic growth accompanied by a significant reduction in poverty but 
without relevant changes in income inequality. The Chilean government characterises for being 
relatively small and based on the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Table 1.2: Revenues and expenditures of the Chilean Central Government (Percentage of GDP) 
                     
1990 2000 2003 2007 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total revenues  23.6 22.2 20.2 25.5 22.6 20.9 20.6 21.2 21.1 
Total expenditures  19.0 19.5 20.7 17.7 21.3 21.5 22.2 23.3 23.8 
Social spending 12.5 14.7 na na 11.6 12.3 12.6 13.3 13.9 
Social spending as a %  
of the total expenditures 65.8 75.4 na na 54.5 57.2 56.8 57.1 58.4 
Source: Government Budget Division Data appear on page 82 in Repetto (2016) and on page 15 in OECD (2018c). 
Note: For the years 1990 and 2000, central government expenditures include social protection, education, health and housing. 
For the other years, social spending does not include housing, only social protection, education and health. 
 
Table 1.2 presents the size of the Chilean government, defined based on its revenues and 
expenses as a percentage of GDP. Total tax revenue remained relatively constant over the period 
observed, despite the rise in tax collection during the 1990s and the 2014 tax reform. On 
average, OECD member countries collect about 15 per cent more of their GDP in taxes 
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(OECD, 2015a). Although government expenditure has increased slightly and social spending 
shows a growing weight within the budget, Chile still has a small government that executes 
reduced social spending. 
 
The difference between the level of public spending in Chile compared to other countries is 
partly due to the privatisation of social services. For example, while the public sector finances 
almost 85 per cent of education spending in OECD member countries on average, in Chile, 
only 60 per cent is funded with fiscal revenues (OECD, 2015a). Similar differences are observed 
in health financing and pensions. 
 
Public spending in Chile is highly progressive. The logic of targeting (generally in the first decile 
groups and even lower) has been central to Chile’s success in reducing poverty. The 
redistributive income strategy consists of low-money monetary transfers where the family 
allowance becomes only in a minor proportion of a household’s income. Also, a subsidy was 
introduced for low-income families that are not eligible for this transfer, as well as a welfare 
pension for those excluded from social security (PNUD, 2017). However, the budget constraint 
that this relatively small state entails does not allow households to benefit in the decile groups 
around the median. Chile’s income distribution shows that those who are not poor do not differ 
much in terms of the material resources available from those who are (Maldonado et al., 2019). 
 
In the context of Latin America, Chile belonged to the group of pioneer welfare states in the 
1990s, presenting the highest levels of welfare generosity – education, health and social 
protection – in the region, alongside Brazil, Uruguay and Costa Rica (Martín-Mayoral & Sastre, 
2017). However, although total public social expenditure as a percentage of the GDP in Chile 
reached its highest value in 2016 (13.9 per cent), it was still lower than the average level of social 
spending in the OECD (OECD, 2018c). This reality is directly associated with a low collection 
and slightly regressive tax system, in which the primary source of fiscal resources is value-added 
tax (VAT), which taxes almost all goods and services at a single rate. In 2017, the Chilean system 
ranked 35th out of 36 OECD countries in terms of the tax-to-GDP ratio (OECD, 2018c).15 
The public policy that the majority of OECD members countries have implemented to change 
the income redistribution is a progressive combination of public spending and income tax. In 
 




these countries, the inequality-reducing effect of taxes and transfers is slightly more than 25 per 
cent (Causa, Browne, & Vindics, 2018). However, as Figure 1.6 shows, Chile is the country that 
shows the lowest income redistribution level. The Gini coefficient in Chile – pre-monetary 
subsidies and pre-income taxes – is 47.2 for the working-age population. After these taxes and 
transfers, the Gini falls only five per cent (or 2.4 Gini points). 
 













Source: OECD Income Distribution Database. Figure appears on page 10 in Causa et al. (2018). 
Note: The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of incomes among households deviates from 
perfect equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of 100 extreme inequality. 
Redistribution is measured by the difference between the Gini coefficient before personal income taxes and 
transfers (market incomes) and the Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers (disposable incomes) in per cent of 
the Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers. For Hungary, Mexico and Turkey household incomes are only 
available net of personal income taxes, implying that inequality can only be measured after taxes and before 
transfers. The three countries are not included in the OECD average. Working-age populations include all 
individuals aged 18-65. Data refer to 2012 for Japan; 2015 for Chile, Finland, Israel, Korea, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the Unite Sates; and 2014 for the rest. 
 
The highly focused social expenditure, limited solidarity role and slightly regressive tax system, 
explains why Chile, although successful in fighting poverty, has failed to achieve greater equality 
in its income distribution (Repetto, 2016). During the last decades, social spending has 
materialised through monetary transfers in low-income households and in subsidising the offer 
of services in education, health and housing, with substantial participation of the private sector 
in the provision.  
 
In practice, this has resulted, on the one hand, in a social policy that segments their services 
socio-economically. Low-income households receive low-quality free services, middle-income 
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ones can acquire intermediate quality services through the co-financing of benefits, and those 
with higher incomes have access to quality services that they acquire in private markets. On the 
other hand, the tax system in Chile is designed to promote business savings and investment and 
not to reduce income inequality. The system treats with preference those who generate income 
in the form of business income and individuals who belong to the highest income groups of the 
population. 
 
The role of gender in welfare policies in Chile 
 
In order to have a complete understanding of the Chilean case, the role of gender in welfare 
policies in Chile is of particular importance. Chile has one of the lowest employment rates of 
women among the OECD countries. Chilean female labour participation rate in 2014 was 51.7 
per cent, only six percentage points above the average rate of classical familialistic regimes of 
Southern Europe such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal (OECD, 2015b). Just like these 
regimes, one explanation for the low labour activation of women in Chile is the gender-biased 
regime characterised by a strong male breadwinner model. Following Pribble’s (2006) classic 
breadwinner model, the household is the unit and recipient of family benefits in the Chilean 
regime. More specifically, the level of family allowances in this welfare system is lower for 
working women than for working-men, and the coverage of this benefit is limited because the 
entitlement is assigned to formal workers with open-ended contracts.  
 
Childcare policies offer a similar picture. Childcare coverage also focuses on the formal segment 
of workers, but additionally, it is restricted to those who have a proven need for which a means-
test is applied. It follows that the childcare system excludes several groups, such as women 
whose income exceeds the benefit threshold, inactive women, and women working in the 
informal sector. As a result of these exclusions, the traditional male breadwinner model may 
produce high levels of in-work poverty in Chile. Moreover, the risk of living in this type of 







1.4 Data sources 
 
In this section, I include a description of the databases I have used in the research in my thesis.  
The three empirical chapters or papers use data from two Chilean surveys: the Panel CASEN 
2006–2007–2008–2009, and the Financial Survey 2007–2011–2014–2017. Both surveys of 
households contain detailed information about the employment and income of each individual 
surveyed, among other socioeconomic and social security variables. Here I present a brief 




The Socioeconomic Household Panel Survey (P-CASEN) was carried out by the MIDEPLAN 
(former Ministry of Social Development) in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.16 The P-CASEN had 
the objective of gathering information to describe the socioeconomic conditions of Chileans 
over time and evaluate social policies. It is a household-based panel study that collected 
information related to income, education, employment, health, household composition, housing 
and so on. The interviews were conducted annually with all members of each household (adults 
and children).  
 
The P-CASEN is representative nationwide for urban and rural areas and was specifically 
designed to collect longitudinal data. It used a sub-sample of 8,079 households composed of 
30,104 individuals from the nationwide CASEN cross-sectional survey of 2006. Each person in 
the original sample was followed and re-interviewed consecutively at a time interval of about 
one year. I used both a balanced sample that contains information about the individuals that 
were interviewed in the four rounds, and an unbalanced sample that takes advantage of all 
available observations. The response rate between wave 1 and wave 2 was 73 percent, and for 
the following waves the attrition was 11 and 10 percent respectively.17 The balanced database 
has 18,065 individuals (adults and children) present in each of the four waves. The potential 
attrition bias will be discussed in more detail late in both chapter 2 and chapter 3. 
 
16 For more information on the Panel CASEN, see: 
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/enc_panel.php 
17 Respondents from wave 1 did not know they were going to participate in a panel survey. This situation explains 
the high non-response in the second wave. For the following waves, respondents agreed to participate in the 




The initial selection process was systematic and proportional, in order to obtain homogeneous 
probabilities of selection (EPSEM – equal probability selection method – design for each 
household). The stratification of the sample was done considering geographic, socioeconomic 
and demographic variables. This design ensured the representativeness of important groups of 
the population, like poor households, and again improved the accuracy of the estimates (Lynn, 
Zubizarreta, & Castillo, 2007).  
 
The P-CASEN is the only household survey in Latin America that collected data each year over 
a period of four years. Unfortunately, the new government administration that took office in 
2010 took the decision to discontinue funding for the following waves, prioritising the idea of 




The Financial Household Survey (FHS) has been implemented by the Central Bank of Chile 
since 2007 and aims to generate detailed information on household income and expenses, as 
well as to provide a follow-up of their financial situation over time. Four surveys with urban 
national representativeness have so far been carried out, in 2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017.18 The 
size of the sample in 2007 was 3,827 households. The 2011 sample comprised 4,057 households 
and the samples in 2014 and 2017 comprised 4,502 and 4,449 households respectively. 
 
The FHS used a stratified, multi-stage probability sample selected from the population Census 
(2002 and 2012) sampling frame and included an oversample of well-off households using 
taxpayer information from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (SII for its acronym in 
Spanish). The FHS design is similar to that of the U.S.A. Survey of Consumer Finances 
(Kennickell & Woodburn, 1999), and the Household Finance and Consumption Survey 




18 For more information on the SHF, see: https://www.bcentral.cl/financiera-de-hogares 
19 These characteristics have made it possible to include the Chilean FHS in the OECD Wealth Distribution 
Database,  which  has  been used for comparative studies on households’ wealth inequality (Balestra & Tonkin, 
2018; Murtin & d’Ercole, 2015; OECD, 2013b). 
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1.5 Thesis outline 
 
The rest of  the thesis is built around three empirical chapters (or papers). Each paper addresses 
a different type of  question. The second chapter assesses income mobility at the bottom and 
the top of the income distribution. I answer the question of why, in Chile, people who have 
been in the low-income or high-income groups are more likely to persist in the same position 
in the income distribution again in the future. The third chapter estimates degrees of  
vulnerability to poverty. This enables the measurement of  the proportion of  both those who 
are highly vulnerable to falling into poverty and those who belong to the income-secure middle 
class. The fourth chapter develops a multidimensional approach to measuring economic 
insecurity at the household level.  
 
The second chapter contributes to the economic literature that relates income mobility to 
income inequality. I examine the mechanisms that explain why those that are in the lower end 
of  the income distribution have a low probability of  moving up (sticky floor) and, why those 
that are in the higher end of  the income distribution have a low chance of  moving down (glass 
floor). I measure persistence at the bottom and the top of the income distribution, breaking-
down the persistence observed at both ends of the income distribution into the components 
that can be attributed to state dependence and to non-observed heterogeneity as well as to the 
effects of the observed characteristics of individuals and households.  
 
The contributions of this chapter are three. First, I use econometric strategies that allow for the 
first time the estimation of state dependence for different income persistence groups along the 
income distribution. Second, until now, to the best of my knowledge, no studies have analysed 
the causes of persistence at both the bottom and the top of the income distribution in any Latin 
American country. Third, I perform robustness checks to validate the results concerning 
attrition bias. 
 
I find that income mobility at the bottom and the top of the income distribution in Chile is 
much higher than the expected, showing signs of high economic insecurity. That is, all groups 
within the income distribution are likely to move upwards in the income ladder, but this does 
not ensure the sustainability of those changes over time. Second, the observable individual 
characteristics have a much stronger impact than the true state dependence to explain the 
current income position of individuals. 
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In the third chapter, I propose an approach to identify different degrees of vulnerability to 
poverty using two vulnerability lines that measure the risk of falling into poverty in the next 
period. This enables the identification of three types of households: those with high 
vulnerability, moderate vulnerability and low vulnerability to poverty. The last of these is the 
income-secure middle class. My approach makes three contributions. Firstly, it extends the 
model proposed by López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) by distinguishing different degrees of 
vulnerability to poverty (rather than simply vulnerable versus non-vulnerable). Second, it uses a 
more sophisticated model of income dynamics than previous works as part of the vulnerability 
estimation procedures. Third, having two vulnerability lines allows for improving the efficiency 
and efficacy of risk-management and anti-poverty policies by enabling the design of supporting 
strategies tailored to the specific needs of the three vulnerable populations identified.  
 
The vulnerability cut-offs obtained (using the poverty line for upper-middle-income countries) 
are for the low vulnerability line $20.0 dollars per person per day (pppd) and for the high 
vulnerability line $9.9 dollars pppd (both in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP)). The 
vulnerability lines I derive differ significantly from those estimated in earlier research on 
vulnerability and the middle-class in Latin America. I argue that the previous research has 
underestimated the size of the population that is vulnerable to falling into poverty and has 
overestimated the growth of the middle-class. Misclassifying the vulnerable as middle-class 
limits their chances of accessing to anti-poverty protection policies. 
 
In the fourth chapter , I propose a measure of economic insecurity at the household level that 
can be applied in contexts where: i) inequalities in household wealth are high, ii) the social safety 
net is limited, iii) indebted households are increasing due to strong credit growth, and iv) the 
reduction of absolute income poverty rather than relative poverty is the primary concern for 
policy. I build an index that combines four indicators of economic insecurity (each of which 
represents a specific vulnerability) that cause stress and anxiety: unexpected economic shocks, 
unprotected employment, over-indebtedness and asset poverty. In this way, the index offers a 
measure that directly relates households’ economic uncertainty to stress due to the lack of 
protection and buffers to face an unexpected economic shock. 
 
This chapter makes two contributions. First, I use the two components of the economic 
insecurity definition as the dimensions of my measure: i) an unexpected economic event and, ii) 
the household buffer to protect from this potential economic loss. This distinction allows 
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understanding the Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index (MEII) results 
comprehensively. In previous research, the focus in terms of the selection of indicators has 
either been on choosing between subjective and objective indicators or on just one source of 
economic insecurity. Second, this is the first time that economic insecurity has been measured 
in a Latin-American country, delivering a measure of well-being that contemplates the risk of 
adverse economic event in the future, which complements the forward-looking measures of 
vulnerability to poverty used in the region. 
 
My estimates for Chile between 2007/2017 show high levels of economic insecurity regarding 
both the risk of an unexpected economic event and the lack of a household buffer to offset a 
potential loss. More than a third of households were exposed to unexpected economic shocks 
during this period. The indicators providing information about households’ lack of protection 
reveal that 62.8 per cent were asset poor, 30 per cent had workers without social protection or 
non-workers, and 15.4 per cent faced over-indebtedness. When I combine the measures in the 
MEII, I find two main results. First, about half of the Chilean households experienced, on 
average, two or more economic vulnerabilities during the last decade with an intensity of 2.3 
vulnerabilities. And second, economic insecurity affects households on the entire income 
distribution, even in the highest income deciles groups.  
 
The final thesis chapter summarises the findings of the three empirical chapters. Additionally, it 
discusses the main implications and contributions of these findings, both concerning policy and 
methodology, in particular how my proposals improve these approaches to measuring economic 










I propose analysing the dynamics of income positions using dynamic panel ordered probit 
models. I disentangle, simultaneously, the roles of state dependence and heterogeneity 
(observed and non-observed) in explaining income position persistence, such as poverty 
persistence and affluence persistence. I apply my approach to Chile exploiting longitudinal data 
from the P-CASEN 2006–2009. First, I find that income position mobility at the bottom and 
the top of the income distribution is much higher than expected, showing signs that income 
mobility in the case of Chile, might be connected to economic insecurity. Second, the observable 
individual characteristics have a much stronger impact than true state dependence to explain 






In the last two decades, inequality has been changing in different regions of the world. While 
most of the OECD countries have experienced an increase in income inequality, in regions such 
as Latin America, though the starting point was much higher than in the OECD, income 
inequality has decreased (Amarante & Colacce, 2018; OECD, 2015a). These increases or 
decreases in inequality can occur in different income mobility contexts. For example, a country 
may have a simple stretch or shrinkage of the ends of the income distribution where households 
remain in the same position within the distribution. However, longitudinal data have shown that 
changes in inequality are explained, in relative terms, by the movement of households up and 
down within the income distribution (Fields, 2008; Jäntti & Jenkins, 2015). 
 
Although this high mobility of income may be associated with greater economic insecurity 
(Jarvis & Jenkins, 1998), for any society a desirable objective is to prevent poor households from 
remaining stuck in their condition over time. The aim is for a type of income mobility that will 
allow these households to stay out of poverty for long periods. Conversely, a society may want 
to prevent those households at the top of the income distribution from remaining the same, 
generating barriers for others to move up as well. As Krugman (1992) puts it, “an increase in 
income mobility tends to make the distribution of lifetime income more equal, since those who 
are rich have nowhere to go but down, while those who are poor have nowhere to go but up”.  
 
A recent study used longitudinal household panel surveys from OECD countries to measure 
the intragenerational income mobility in the last two decades (OECD, 2018b). It found that 
there is currently a greater persistence in the income positions than what was found by the end 
of the nineties. However, it has not been studied in depth why individuals stay longer in the 
same position in the distribution of income. To answer this question, it is necessary to know if 
the income persistence is explained by the characteristics of the individual (observable and non-
observable) or by the mere fact of being in a certain income position (state dependence). In 
other regions of the world, such as Latin America, the shortage of longitudinal household 
surveys has resulted in a lack of knowledge about income mobility levels. The exception that 
confirms the rule are the works that used the panel data from Chile with three waves over a 
decade (1996–2001–2006).  These works show that the unequal income distribution in Chile 
contrasts with the high mobility of all but those at the high-end of the income distribution 
(Contreras, Cooper, Herman, & Neilson, 2005; Sapelli, 2013). 
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In this chapter, I study one specific dimension of the intragenerational income mobility in Chile. 
It is known in the literature as ‘positional movement’, which measures the movement of 
individuals across different positions (quintiles, deciles, or ranks) in the income distribution. In 
particular, I analyse the ‘origin independence’, which measures whether an individual’s position 
in the income distribution affects their chances of overcoming poverty or remaining at the top 
of the income distribution. To do that, I use four rounds of the Socioeconomic Household 
Panel Survey (P-CASEN) for the period between 2006 and 2009. 
 
Based on this mobility concept, a most desirable type of society would be one where the income 
mobility is high and the current position of an individual in the income distribution does not 
depend on his/her previous position. It should be mentioned that when a society has high 
fluidity but inadequate or insufficient social protection, the well-being of the population can be 
affected by the stress or anxiety generated by economic uncertainty. However, this issue cannot 
be addressed just by looking into income mobility, it requires studying economic insecurity using 
a different empirical framework (Hacker, 2018). This is addressed in Chapter 4.  
 
Studying the ‘positional movement’ of mobility will enable me to: i) generate transition matrices 
of entry and exit of both poverty rates and affluence rates, and ii) understand the mechanisms 
that explain why households at the lower-end of the income distribution have a low probability 
of moving up, and those that at the higher-end of the income distribution have little chance of 
moving down. Therefore, the dual objective of this paper is to measure the persistence at the 
bottom and at the top of the income distribution, and to break down the persistence observed 
at both ends of the income distribution into the components that can be attributed to state 
dependence and non-observed heterogeneity as well as to the effects of the observed 
characteristics of individuals and households. 
 
The contributions of this chapter are three. First, I use econometric strategies to model joint 
low-income persistence and high-income persistence. Existing studies have primarily focused 
on analysing only one end of the income distribution, estimating the state dependence effect in 
poverty persistence (e.g. Giarda & Moroni, 2018). For a review of these studies see Biewen 
(2014). I use a random effect dynamic ordered probit model that takes into account the state 
dependence of previous income position, individual heterogeneity, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. It also controls for the initial condition problem (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2013; Wooldridge, 2005) and the possible correlation between random effects and time-varying 
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explanatory variables (Chamberlain, 1984; Mundlak, 1978). Second, I provide an answer to the 
question on why people in Chile who have been on a low income or a high income are more 
likely to persist in the same position in the income distribution in the future. Until now, to the 
best of my knowledge, no studies in the literature have analysed the causes of the persistence 
both at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution in any Latin American country.  
 
Third, I perform two robustness checks to validate the results concerning attrition bias. When 
I use the P-CASEN to analyse low-income/high-income persistence, there is a risk of getting 
biased results due to non-random attrition. Not considering attrition may result in misleading 
estimates of income position persistence. I test whether or not attrition is correlated with the 
dependent variables applying variable-addition tests proposed in Verbeek & Nijman (1992). 
Also, I use inverse probability weights to adjust for attrition to compare weighted estimates and 
unweighted estimates from the baseline model to determine whether attrition bias has a 
significant effect on the estimated coefficients of interest (Wooldridge, 2002b). 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows.  In section 2, I provide an overview of 
the relevant literature about intragenerational income mobility and income position persistence. 
In Section 3, I describe the datasets and definitions. In section 4, I present the descriptive 
statistics and transition matrices. In section 5, I introduce the econometric model (REDOP) 
and estimation strategy that I followed. In section 6, I show and discuss the empirical results, 






The economic literature has debated for several decades whether or not greater income mobility 
represents a social improvement (Atkinson, Bourguignon, & Morrisson, 1992). The positive 
view understands high income mobility as a sign of dynamism, social mobility and equal 
opportunities compared to a more rigid society (Friedman, 1962). A critical interpretation of 
high income mobility is the economic insecurity that is generated in the households that are 
exposed to fluctuations in households’ income (Jarvis & Jenkins, 1998).  
 
This discussion is not foreign to emerging economies such as Chile. Two studies have analysed 
income mobility for the periods 1996-2001, and 1996-2006 in Chile using a panel survey of three 
rounds (Contreras et al., 2005; Sapelli, 2013). Both studies found high mobility, although they 
differ in their interpretation. While Sapelli (2013) considers that high levels of income mobility 
are desirable because they imply that the lowest income has a high probability of rising up the 
income ladder and episodes of income reduction are transitory, Contreras et al. (2005) relate 
this high mobility to greater vulnerability to poverty since the unanticipated income fluctuations 
or shocks are socially undesirable considering that the median income is not very far from the 
official poverty line in Chile. 
 
The current debate about whether or not a society with high income mobility is desirable has 
incorporated the different dimensions of mobility in the discussion.20 In this way, the answer to 
whether a fluid society is preferable to a rigid society will depend on the concept of income 
mobility that is being studied (Jäntti & Jenkins, 2015). For instance, when using inter-temporal 
dependency as a mobility concept, a society with high mobility is desirable, as individuals’ 
current income does not depend on their previous income. From an intergenerational 
perspective, when measuring income mobility using the concept of positional movement, a 
more fluid society is also preferable. In this type of society, the richest can become less rich and 
the poorest can become less poor. When using the same concept in an intra-generational 
 
20 Since the concept of mobility has multiple dimensions several types of indicators are needed to measure it. This 
partly explains why, in the last 40 years, at least twenty indicators have been proposed to study income mobility 
(Atkinson, 1970; Chakravarty, Dutta, & Weymark, 1985; Fields, 2001; Fields & Ok, 1999; Hart, 1976; Shorrocks, 
1978). The works of Jenkins (2011) and Fields (2008, 2010) have made an important contribution to organising the 
discussion and relating these indicators to different mobility dimensions such as positional change, individual 
income growth, reduction of longer-term inequality, and income risk. 
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analysis, this preference is not so clear because the mobility of income is also explained by the 
life cycle of individuals. 
 
In this same line of argument, in which the preference regarding income mobility levels within 
a society depends on the concept used, it is possible to find that income mobility can reduce 
inequality in the long term, but from the perspective of mobility as income risk, that would not 
be socially beneficial. From the perspective of income risk, if mobility occurs in a context of 
economic shocks where income fluctuations cannot be predicted at the individual level, 
generating economic uncertainty (mobility as income risk), a high mobility of income would not 
be desirable. Additionally, applying different concepts of mobility to compare countries also 
gives us different answers about the level of income mobility. For example, income mobility is 
more rigid in the UK than in the U.S.A. if the dependence on current income from the past is 
used as a mobility concept, but the UK has more mobility than the U.S. if mobility is measured 
as changes in the individuals’ position within the income distribution (Fields, 2008). 
 
In order to analyse income persistence, I use the concept of income mobility known as 
positional income mobility, which takes into account the position in the previous period. A 
recent study that used this definition of mobility for country members of the OECD found that 
income persistence is stronger at the bottom and, in particular, the top of the income 
distribution, where respectively 60 per cent and 70 per cent of individuals stay over four years 
(OECD, 2018b). This translates into both lower chances of moving upwards for those at the 
bottom, and lower chances of moving down for those at the top. For emerging countries the 
lack of mobility is more pronounced at the bottom of the income distribution (OECD, 2018b). 
 
There is extensive literature that has focused on the analysis of income mobility at the bottom 
of the income distribution. Individual persisting in their poverty situation, known as poverty 
traps, have been studied in developed countries (Andriopoulou & Tsakloglou, 2011; Ayllón, 
2013; Biewen, 2014; Devicienti, 2011; Giarda & Moroni, 2018), as well as in developing 
countries (Alem, 2015; Bigsten & Shimeles, 2008; Thomas & Gaspart, 2014).21 The empirical 
evidence from these studies, for both type of societies, shows that those who have been in 
poverty have a high probability of experiencing it again in future periods. 
 
21 Poverty persistence has also been studied for groups of  the population as households with children (Bárcena-
Martín, Blanco-Arana, & Perez-Moreno, 2017; Fabrizi & Mussida, 2020; Jenkins, Schluter, & Wagner, 2003). 
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Two mechanisms explain the influence of time on the persistence of poverty. First, the 
experience of poverty in one year per se raises the risk of being poor in the next year. This process 
is called true state dependence or the ‘scarring effect’. In other words, the fact of experiencing 
poverty – independent of other factors – has a real causal impact on future poverty (Heckman, 
1981). The literature suggests two possible explanations behind true state dependence in 
poverty. According to Biewen (2009), a low income may be associated with adverse incentives 
such as moral hazard (e.g. no willingness to search for jobs so to not lose the economic benefits 
of the unemployment insurance). In addition to these work disincentives, negative duration 
dependence in poverty can be explained by vicious circle processes, which make the search for 
a new job more complicated. For example, the absence of counselling and training or a 
demoralising attitude towards work explained by the habituation or stigmatisation of being 
jobless (Devicienti, 2011). 
 
The second mechanism is known as individual heterogeneity. This means that people who 
remain in poverty for longer may possess similar characteristics that hinder their exit of the 
poverty spell. These features may be observable (e.g. educational level, unemployment, health 
problems) or unobservable (e.g. lack of cognitive skills, low motivation). Therefore, being poor 
with these characteristics over time increases the risk of being poor in the future. In other words, 
poverty is unrelated to the duration of the poverty spell.  
 
Although high-income persistence has not been studied as much as the persistence of poverty, 
there are authors who argue that the high end of the income distribution can show even more 
persistence (Solon, 2017). Affluence shields have the same effect as poverty traps, this is, an 
individual’s current position in the highest income group increases their probability of remaining 
in the same position in the future. There is extensive sociological literature on the barriers to 
entry to the upper classes (e.g. the professionals and managers’ class, to use Erikson and 
Goldthorpe’s (1992) definition). Some barriers emerge from the ownership of different types of 
assets, such as property, sectoral barriers, or authority in the workplace (Torche, 2015). Other 
mechanisms that reproduce the upper classes are mediated by getting educational credentials 
(Ishida, Muller, & Ridge, 1995) or their peers and social network  (DiMaggio & Garip, 2012). 
 
Reeves (2017) calls this process opportunity hoarding among the top of the income distribution. 
He argues that the parents of the upper middle class of the United States (the top 20 percent on 
the income distribution) have successfully managed to ensure that their children maintain the 
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same status and position in the income distribution, which has resulted in a reduction in the 
overall intergenerational mobility. According to Reeves, mechanisms such as zoning laws and 
schooling, occupational licensing, college application procedures, and the allocation of 
internships have allowed the highest quintile of American society to build a glass floor that not 
only protects their children from falling in the income distribution when they are older but also 
prevents others who were born in a lower position from crossing the glass roof that has been 
built, thus generating a society with less social mobility. 
 
There are several modelling approaches to studying the persistence of someone’s income 
position. In general, these methods have focused on studying only low income and not the 
upper part of the income distribution. See Aassve et al. (2006) for a complete review. Each 
approach is associated with a specific methodology, as they rely on different definitions of 
income mobility related to the poverty line. Some of these are, for instance, chronic versus 
transient poverty, consecutive periods in poverty, or years in poverty during a fixed timeframe 
(Jenkins, 2011). One of these approaches is known as the components of variance model. It 
focuses on estimating the permanent and transitory components of poverty as well as the 
determinants of both types of deprivation. One of the first works in this line of research was 
carried out by Lillard and Willis (1978), in which they captured the dynamics of income through 
a complex structure of the error term. Once the dynamic model has been estimated, the 
frequency and duration of periods of poverty are calculated. 
 
A disadvantage of the component approach is that all of the deviations that are captured by 
transitory poverty are considered as if they were random and therefore equivalent. However, as 
Bane and Ellwood (1986) observed, the changes in income over time neither lead to the same 
long-term dynamics, nor are they random. For example, the trajectories of future income of a 
person that falls into poverty due to a job loss may not be equivalent to the income trajectory 
of a person suffering due to a negative health shock. These authors propose a different approach 
known as hazard rate models. These consist in analysing on their own merit the deviations or 
changes in income over time, by examining the duration of the periods in poverty, the odds of 
exiting and re-entering this state and the events associated with these transitions (Bane & 
Ellwood, 1986; Stevens, 1994). One of the main contributions of this approach to the study of 
poverty dynamics is that it shows that the longer people persist on a low income the lower their 
chances of exiting poverty (Arranz & Cantó, 2012a; Biewen, 2009; Cellini, McKernan, & 
Ratcliffe, 2008; Jenkins, 2011). 
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However, the problem with these models is that they do not consider the fact that individuals 
in poverty in the first interview, as well as in the sample attrition, are not randomly distributed. 
Markov models of transition to poverty – first-order models – do control the initial conditions 
of individuals and the attrition, allowing for predicting rates of poverty, rates of escaping and 
entering poverty, and the length of time of remaining in poverty for individuals with different 
characteristics (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). 
 
There is a fourth methodology that can be used to analyse poverty dynamics, which has some 
overlapping features with the others; it is known as dynamic discrete choice models. These 
models are designed to measure the two mechanisms that explain the influence of time on the 
persistence of poverty: i) the true state dependence, and ii) the observed and unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. These models assume that poverty follows a first order Markov 
process. This means that if an individual remains for two consecutive years below the poverty 
line then it is possible to confirm that there is poverty persistence. To do that, the models have 
to distinguish the true state dependence captured by the impact of the lagged dependent variable 
from the spurious state dependence caused by the presence of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
This last approach is the one that I use here. However, since the outcome in this research is not 
a poor/non-poor dichotomous category but rather considers the categories for poor/middle 
class/affluent in the income distribution, it requires working with Random Effect Dynamic 
Ordered Probit (REDOP) models. In doing so I have to deal with three issues: i) the correlated 
individual effects (persistence may be partially explained as being due to individual observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity rather than true state dependence), ii) the initial conditions 
problem (the observed start of the Markov process does not coincide with the true start of the 
process) and iii) the attrition bias (the variables affecting attrition might be correlated with the 
underlying income mobility process under study).  To deal with the correlated individual effects 
and the initial condition problem, I adopt the approach suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and 
modified by Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2013). And, to assess whether attrition bias is a problem 
in my REDOP models, I apply variable addition tests (Verbeek & Nijman, 1992) and I compare 
estimated coefficients of interest variables between pooled model with inverse probability 
weights and without weights (Wooldridge, 2002b). Further details on the methodological 




2.3 Data and definitions 
 
The dataset I use is the Chilean Socioeconomic Household Panel Survey (P-CASEN) for the 
years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.22 The P-CASEN provides longitudinal data on the 
socioeconomic conditions of the Chilean population at a household and individual level 
(Observatorio Social, 2011c). For more details of the P-CASEN see data section in Chapter 1.   
 
The final national sample consists of 8,079 households, comprising a total of 30,104 individuals. 
Each person in the original sample was followed and re-interviewed consecutively at a time 
interval of about one year. In the analyses I used both a balanced sample that contains 
information about the individuals that were interviewed in the four rounds, and an unbalanced 
sample that takes advantage of all available observations. The response rate between wave 1 and 
wave 2 was 73 percent, and for the following waves the attrition was 11 and 10 percent 
respectively. The balanced database has 18,065 individuals (adults and children) present in each 
of the four waves. The attrition of the sample will be discussed in more detail later. 
 
The P-CASEN contains a wide range of economic and sociodemographic variables, which are 
available for each round. I use characteristics of the head of household and characteristics of 
the household in the multivariate analysis. The head of the household is defined as the person 
in the household who contributes the most with her salary to the household income. In the case 
of a workless household, the household head is the self-reported household head in the survey. 
In keeping with previous studies on income distribution that use household survey data, the 
covariates are defined at the level of the head of household. Therefore, in the analysis I use a 
sample of households. The methodological reason for not including children is that they do not 
make decisions that cause changes to the household’s income mobility. In the case of adults, 
the reason is not to replicate the information of the head of household in the econometric 
models. 
 
I use an income perspective to study the income position persistence of poor and affluent 
populations, which means that people’s well-being is captured in terms of income. I construct 
post-transfer monthly household income based on the sum of income from labour, assets, 
 




imputed rent, private transfers and public transfers.23 It is worth noting that November was the 
reference month for income questions in each wave. In general, household surveys in Latin 
American countries, including Chile, collect income for official poverty and inequality measures 
using a monthly reference period to build these measures (e.g. ECLAC, 2019). All income has 
been converted to November 2009 prices to compare with real income. 
 
Recognizing that there is no single way to define low income or poverty nor to define high 
income or affluence, I use both relative and absolute cut-offs to identify both groups at the 
extremes of the income distribution. First, for the relative measure, to identify the poverty line 
I use the threshold that determines the first income quintile group for each wave, and for the 
affluence line, I use the cut-off that identifies the fifth income quintile group. These types of 
thresholds capture relative poverty and affluence. I applied both cut-offs to the equivalised total 
household income. Equivalization allows for comparison between individuals from different 
sized households. To equivalise incomes I use the scale that divides total household income by 
the square root of household size (Buhmann, Rainwater, Schmaus, & Smeeding, 1988). This 
equivalization allows me to compare some of the results I obtained with those from studies that 
also use these relative income cut-offs to analyse OECD countries (CASE & III, 2018; OECD, 
2018a). 
 
Second, for the absolute cut-offs, to identify poor households, I use the international poverty 
line suggested by the World Bank for upper-middle-income countries in Latin America (US $ 
5.5 per person per day in 2011 PPP). To identify the affluent group, I use the ninetieth percentile 
of the income distribution in wave one following the conventional approach to building an 
affluence line in Latin American countries (e.g. Birdsall, 2007). Since the international poverty 
line makes a per-capita adjustment within the household's income, I follow the same 
equivalization procedure. 
 
Following the argument of Jarvis & Jenkins (1998), there are conceptual and empirical 
advantages that justify the use of relative and absolute cut-offs in parallel in order to identify 
groups in the income distribution. Conceptually, this strategy constitutes a midpoint between 
two different views. On the one hand, are those who advocate for a fixed real income cut-off 
 
23 Differently from the procedure of  income construction in industrialised countries, I did not extract taxes from 
disposable income, which is obtained through socioeconomic surveys because in the case of  Chile the survey asks 
respondents for their net income. 
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because poverty should decrease as real income goes up (Ferreira et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, those who prefer to study changes in income positions by defining thresholds that depend 
on the distribution of income itself (OECD, 2018a). From an empirical point of view, the use 
of absolute and relative thresholds allows for a sensitivity analysis of outcomes based on the 
differences between thresholds. For example, the cut-off from the lower quintile is higher than 
the international poverty line used. 
 
The two dependent variables that I use in the empirical models developed in Section 2.5 are 
income quintile groups (IQGs) and welfare level both in the current year. Regarding IQG 
variable, the relative cut-offs allow me to group the data in three categories: low income (IQG1), 
middle income (IQG2+ IQG3+ IQG4), high income (IQG5). Concerning the welfare level 
variable, the absolute thresholds identify: poor, middle class and rich. It is important to say that 
the middle-income group and the middle class are presented as a broad group in the income 
distribution. However, I do not make categorizations within these middle-groups because, as I 
have explained before, I focus on the positional change of the extremes of the income 
distribution.24 A similar argument is also valid to explain why I do not work with the continuous 
income distribution. Since my objective is to model the joint persistence of households in both 
high income and low income, as well as the poverty persistence and affluence persistence, I have 
to work with intrinsically discrete data. 
 
The explanatory variables included in the models are the income quintile groups and the welfare 
level in the previous year (the lagged dependent variable), and three sets of variables related to 
the composition of each household, the different assets that the household owns, and the 
household’s environment (location of the house). In the literature, these three vectors are 
described as the main determinants of the income mobility and poverty dynamics of a household 
(Galster, 2012; Jenkins, 2011).  
 
Household composition is summarised in terms of the household size, the number of children 
in the household, whether the household has a female head or not, and the age of the household 
head in the first wave. In order to estimate the effect of different types of family structures on 
the probability of moving in the distribution of income (Wiepking & Maas, 2005), I have also 
 
24 As will be seen in chapter 3, those who are between the poverty line and the affluence line can be divided into 
groups according to degrees of  vulnerability. Based on this approach, the middle class is the group of  households 
with a low risk of  falling into poverty. 
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included a family typology that distinguishes between households with and without children, 
that have a single parent with children, and that comprise a lone person. 
 
Human capital, household labour market attachment and physical assets are used to measure 
household assets. Human capital is proxied by the education of the household head and the 
household head’s partner. Household labour market attachment is summarised by the 
employment status of the household head and the household head’s partner, and the number 
of workers in the household. When information on households’ financial or physical assets is 
not available, the house ownership information is used as a proxy for physical assets (Neilson 
et al., 2008). 
 
Regarding the location variables, I include the variable zone (urban or rural) and region. As will 
be explained in section 5, for the advanced modelling of Wooldridge’s model, I include 
additional time-invariant variables to solve both the unobserved heterogeneity and initial 
conditions problems.   
 
I do not include among explanatory variables those variables related to income shocks or trigger 
events, such as losing a job, having a separation or suffering from a disease (DiPrete & 
McManus, 2000). There are two reasons for not including this type of variable in regressions of 
positional income dynamics. The first reason is the difficulty of identifying the influence of the 
trigger-event variables on the transitions from one position to another in the income distribution 
if one also controls for characteristics measured at a particular point in time (Stevens, 1999).  
 
Second, variable trigger-events cannot be treated as exogenous variables. A change in the entry 
position and a trigger-event can be determined by a common factor that is not observable and 
the inclusion of the variable trigger-event could bias the estimated parameters. Biewen (2009) 
shows that this endogeneity situation can also occur for other point-in-time variables and, 
emphasises that caution should be exercised in regard to including explanatory variables in 







2.4 Persistence at the extremes of the income distribution in Chile: a description 
 
In this section I briefly describe the transitions of those in the two extremes of the income 
distribution in Chile during the analysed period for the balanced sample. Table 2.1 provides 
descriptive information of the variables for four subsamples. These subsamples are constructed 
using the persistence-at income-position indicator. This is defined as individuals living in 
households in a specific extreme income position in the current year and at least in two of the 
preceding three years.25  The first column of the table presents information for those who persist 
in the first income quintile group, while the second column corresponds to those who were in 
the fifth quintile in 2009 and were in that quintile at least twice between 2006 and 2008. The 
third and fourth columns present the persistence results for the poor and the affluent categories 
for the absolute thresholds. These represent the two extremes of the categories that measure 
income position in terms of welfare. The comparison between the columns in Table 2.1 allows 
for observing that certain variables are correlated with the extremes of the income position for 
both dependent variables.  
 
Regarding the relative cut-offs to identify the income position on both extremes of the income 
distribution, the results show that those who persisted in quintile group 1 show a higher 
proportion of women as head of household compared to those who remained in quintile group 
5. Also, more than a third of those who remained in the highest income quintile group had a 
university education level compared to less than zero percent in the lowest quintile. Formal 
work and the number of workers per household show a significantly higher proportion in 
quintile group 5. The average number of couples with children is higher in quintile group 1. The 
same is true for the number of children per household. Income quintile group 1 also shows a 
higher proportion of households in rural areas whose housing is either subsidised or rent free. 
All in all, most of the differences between the averages of the variables mentioned above are 










Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables by subsample (persistence-at income-position) 
          
 Relative thresholds  Absolute thresholds 







 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics          
   Female 0.361 (0.018) 0.315 (0.024)  0.332 (0.030) 0.370 (0.043) 
   Age 46.5 (0.617) 48.6 (0.726)  41.5 (0.685) 50.0 (1.536) 
   Education: Primary school 0.508 (0.021) 0.059 (0.010)  0.506 (0.036) 0.034 (0.012) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.425 (0.021) 0.416 (0.028)  0.400 (0.036) 0.327 (0.047) 
   Education: University degree 0.016 (0.006) 0.525 (0.029)  0.030 (0.015) 0.639 (0.048) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.496 (0.016) 0.839 (0.018)  0.496 (0.025) 0.786 (0.037) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.199 (0.011) 0.076 (0.011)  0.262 (0.022) 0.095 (0.022) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.050 (0.005) 0.005 (0.002)  0.065 (0.011) 0.003 (0.002) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.254 (0.015) 0.080 (0.014)  0.177 (0.021) 0.116 (0.029) 
HH head’s partner characteristics          
   Age 39.3 (0.567) 47.4 (0.764)  37.5 (0.713) 47.7 (1.799) 
   Education: Primary school 0.562 (0.030) 0.065 (0.013)  0.624 (0.047) 0.038 (0.019) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.420 (0.030) 0.551 (0.035)  0.362 (0.047) 0.478 (0.076) 
   Education: University degree 0.000 (0.000) 0.380 (0.035)  0.000 (0.000) 0.484 (0.076) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.087 (0.011) 0.504 (0.030)  0.075 (0.017) 0.576 (0.067) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.078 (0.011) 0.060 (0.010)  0.073 (0.016) 0.021 (0.010) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.063 (0.010) 0.027 (0.007)  0.064 (0.015) 0.006 (0.004) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.772 (0.018) 0.408 (0.030)  0.788 (0.027) 0.397 (0.067) 
Household characteristics          
   Equivalised total household income 96,334 (1,212) 828,461 (35,081)  82,730 (2,164) 1,096,466 (69,300) 
   Household type: Couple without children 0.134 (0.012) 0.399 (0.026)  0.054 (0.014) 0.394 (0.048) 
   Household type: Single without children 0.100 (0.011) 0.140 (0.022)  0.063 (0.015) 0.155 (0.032) 
   Household type: Couple with children 0.458 (0.020) 0.322 (0.024)  0.622 (0.033) 0.186 (0.039) 
   Household type: Single with children 0.192 (0.016) 0.060 (0.011)  0.241 (0.029) 0.040 (0.016) 
   Household type: Lone person 0.117 (0.013) 0.079 (0.017)  0.020 (0.010) 0.224 (0.041) 
   Number of persons 3.7 (0.070) 3.6 (0.088)  5.0 (0.137) 2.7 (0.125) 
   Number of children < 15  1.241 (0.051) 0.580 (0.043)  2.091 (0.099) 0.329 (0.062) 
   Number of workers 0.751 (0.020) 1.653 (0.045)  0.844 (0.036) 1.372 (0.072) 
   Housing: Own housing (no mortgage) 0.449 (0.021) 0.448 (0.028)  0.406 (0.035) 0.413 (0.049) 
   Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.041 (0.008) 0.262 (0.023)  0.031 (0.013) 0.246 (0.039) 
   Housing: Rent 0.141 (0.017) 0.228 (0.033)  0.133 (0.029) 0.271 (0.061) 
   Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.369 (0.021) 0.062 (0.011)  0.430 (0.036) 0.070 (0.022) 
   Rural 0.239 (0.017) 0.036 (0.008)  0.261 (0.030) 0.026 (0.012) 
   Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.095 (0.012) 0.104 (0.014)  0.092 (0.020) 0.069 (0.019) 
   Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.648 (0.021) 0.362 (0.026)  0.614 (0.036) 0.316 (0.044) 
   Regions: 11th and 12th  0.006 (0.002) 0.019 (0.005)  0.008 (0.005) 0.017 (0.009) 
   Regions: 13th 0.251 (0.020) 0.515 (0.029)  0.285 (0.034) 0.598 (0.048) 
          
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights are used). 
Notes: Maximum number of observations: 18,772 household-year observations. All results are rates (%) unless 
stated otherwise. The equivalised total household income is valued in terms of 2009 Chilean pesos. 
 
The descriptive analysis is complemented by showing the changes in the individuals in the two 
ends of the income distribution taking into account the central question of this investigation, 
which is: how does the position in the income distribution in the previous period affects the 
probability of being in the current position? I use transition matrices to analyse the state 
dependence. In Table 2.2 the rows indicate the previous position of the individual in the income 
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distribution while the columns indicate the current position of the individual. For example, the 
elements of the first row provide information on the conditional distribution of the ranking of 
individuals in the income quintiles at time t since the individuals had been in the lowest quintile 
group. Transitions by quintiles are also shown for transitions between welfare measures.  
 
Table 2.2: Annual income position at t conditional on income position at t -1  
(A) Income quintile groups (IQGs): relative thresholds (B) Welfare level: absolute thresholds  
         
IQGs, year t -1 IQGs, year t (row %)  Welfare year t -1 Welfare, year t (row %) 
 IQG 1 IQGs 2-3-4 IQG 5   Poor Middle Class Affluent 
IQG 1 49.6 47.2 3.2  Poor 36.1 62.9 1.0 
IQGs 2-3-4 14.7 73.7 11.6  Middle class 7.4 88.2 4.4 
IQG 5 3.7 32.1 64.2  Affluent 1.8 37.3 60.8 
Total 19.2 59.6 21.3  Total 9.8 81.0 9.2 
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights are used). 
 
In this way, the elements of Table 2.2 can be interpreted as the conditional probability under a 
Markov model. The persistence of the initial position in the distribution of income is observed, 
again, when considering the relative magnitudes of the elements of the diagonal and the 
elements close to it, in comparison to those that are far from the diagonal. When focusing on 
the two ends of the income distribution, I observe that staying in the highest quintile group 
(persistence at the top of the income distribution) has a probability of 0.64, while the probability 
of remaining in the lowest quintile group is 0.5 (persistence at the bottom of the income 
distribution). In regard to welfare levels, persistence in the affluent category has a probability of 
0.61, and persistence in poverty has a probability of 0.36. 
 
Regarding the issue of whether the sample retention is exogenous or endogenous to income 
position at t-1, Table A.2.2 (in the appendix) shows that the same calculations are made for both 
the balanced sample and the unbalanced sample, but without calculating the longitudinal 
weights. The proportion of missing income data is shown in the unbalanced sample. The results 
show the biggest problem is not the level of attrition of the sample but the proportion of missing 
income data, which is significantly different for income positions at t-1. As a result of this, 
provide evidence of attrition bias in the econometric strategy for modelling low-income/high-
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income persistence takes on real importance. In the next section, this point is explained in more 
detail. 
 
Figure 2.1: Probability of persistence in the bottom and top income quintile group in European countries 
during the period 2006-2009 
 
Sources: EU-SILC 2006-2009, values taken from Rendtel (2015). 
 
Finally, to complement the descriptive analysis, I compare the indicators shown by the transition 
matrix of the income quintiles in Chile with other countries. To make this comparison, I use 
the Rendtel (2015) results, who uses the longitudinal component of the EU-SILC to compare 
income quintile groups transitions of European countries between 2006-2009. Two precautions 
must be taken when making this comparison. First, Rendelt (2015) did not use the current scale 
suggested by the OECD to equivalise incomes of each country. Therefore, these results may 
vary slightly because I use the last scale suggested, which is the square root of household size. 
Second, I calculated an equivalised total household monthly income for Chile while Rendelt 
(2015) uses an annual income measure.26 Since changes in annual income are smoother than 
 
26 The reason for not using annual equivalised income in my work is because the official measures of  income 
inequality and poverty in Chile have a monthly period of  reference. Therefore, the design of  the P-CASEN 2006-
2009 focuses on obtaining a monthly income household making it challenging to build annual measures. For 
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changes in monthly income, the comparison could be not adequate. However, despite these 
limitations, the information is useful as a reference of persistence in the bottom and top income 
quintile group in European countries during the same period analysed in Chile. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the probability that individuals remain in the highest income quintile group 
during the period analysed together with the probability that individuals continue in the lowest 
quintile group. The persistence in low income is known as the sticky floor phenomenon due to 
the difficulty that households face to exit low income. In contrast, the glass floor image refers 
to the idea of high income people who observe others move along the income distribution 
without themselves falling from their current high-income position (OECD, 2018b). 
 
Overall, all countries show high mobility in terms of income position, though there are 
interesting specific differences when comparing them. Taking into account the precautions 
mentioned above to make the comparison, Chile could be included in the lower-left position in 
Figure 2.1 because it shows a lower recurrence of both high-income spells and low-income 
spells. Conversely, the European countries that show more evidence of the existence of a glass 
floor and a sticky floor (top-right position in Figure 2.1), are Finland (FIN), Holland (NLD), 
Sweden (SWE), Portugal (PRT), Norway (NOR) and Denmark (DNK). For this group of 
countries, the probability of persisting in the highest quintile group is 0.8 and the probability of 
persisting in the lowest quintile group is 0.6. during the period between 2006 and 2009. The 
Czech Republic (CZE), Poland (POL) and Bulgaria (BGR) show less persistence in the lowest 
quintile group but high persistence in the highest quintile group (top-left position in Figure 2.1). 
The rest of the countries are in the centre of the figure. 
 
The results obtained from the descriptive analysis provide interesting elements for the 
discussion of individuals’ mobility within the income distribution in Chile. In the first place, 
there is the indisputable fact that in Chile, as in the rest of the OECD countries, a high 
persistence in terms of positions within the income distribution occurs at the two extremes of 
high and low income groups, both for the measure that uses relative cut-offs (income quintile 
groups) and the measure that uses absolute cuts (level of welfare).  
 
However, this is not particularly novel since all OECD countries follow a similar trend. What is 
new in the case of Chile is that the proportion of the population that persists at the extremes of 
the income distribution is significantly lower when compared with the group of Europeans 
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OECD countries. Somehow, neither the sticky floor nor glass floor appear to be clearly 
displayed for the Chilean case. Comparing the results of Panel A in Table 2.2 with Figure 2.1, 
Chile shows not only the lowest probability of persistence in low incomes but also, and to a 
greater extent, in high incomes.  
 
These results are quite counterintuitive since, among all of the OECD countries, Chile has the 
weakest social protection system and the highest levels of inequality, where the redistribution 
mechanisms make little difference in the levels of inequality before and after they are 
implemented. Therefore, one would have expected to see that those in poverty would have less 
capacity to get out of that situation and that the more affluent ones would not easily move from 
their position, generating strategies to keep their privileges and advantages with respect to the 
rest of the society. As I mentioned earlier, the greater mobility at the extremes of the income 
distribution in Chile may be explained by the fact that I use the monthly disposable income for 
Chile, while Rendelt (2015) uses the annual disposable income. However, these results are 
consistent with other approaches on this topic in Chile.  
 
The high mobility at the bottom of the income distribution is probably related to Chile’s high 
income inequality. As it is well known, the inequality in Chile is mainly explained by the high 
concentration at the top (first income decile group) (Torche, 2005). Thus, for the case of the 
relative measure, the cut-offs between quintile groups 1 to 4 are not too far from each other 
(Chauvel, 2018). This means that changes in the positions in the income distribution do not 
necessarily represent significant changes in the individuals’ income. And, from the point of view 
of the absolute measures, the fact that poor individuals move up is what would explain the slight 
improvement in the levels of inequality in Chile.  
 
These results are in line with the qualitative work of Araujo & Marticcelli (2011) who found that 
there is a ‘positional inconsistency’ shared by households in all positions in the income 
distribution, particularly in high income position. The authors define ‘positional inconsistency’ 
as the existence of a feeling that all income and class positions are permeable to change in Chile, 
which entails living with permanent insecurity. In advanced societies, this feeling of anxiety or 
stress among individuals due to economic problems in the future is known as economic 
insecurity, which has been studied with greater intensity since the economic crisis of 2007–2008 
(Hacker, 2018; Osberg, 2018; Rohde & Tang, 2018). An approach to measure economic 
insecurity in Chile is presented in the fourth chapter of the thesis. 
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2.5 The econometric strategy 
 
Modelling joint low-income and high-income persistence 
 
Poverty and affluence persistence of individuals in the income distribution can be explained not 
only by the characteristics of the population but also by the previous poverty/affluence state 
that they had. One of the objectives of my research is to test the presence of poverty traps and 
affluence traps.27 That is, I study whether and to what extent the earlier welfare state affects the 
current probability of being poor and affluent. In other words, I test whether persistence to low 
income and persistence to high income is explained by the true or genuine state dependence 
(known as own-state traps) and not by other observable and non-observable determinants.  
 
To model, simultaneously, the income persistence at the bottom and at the top of the income 
distribution I used random effect dynamic ordered probit (REDOP) models. Using REDOP 
models, it is possible to distinguish true state dependence captured by the impact of the lagged 
income position from spurious state dependence caused by the presence of time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, persistence may be partially due to individuals observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity rather than true state dependence. The general dynamic specification 
of the REDOP model is presented in Wooldridge(2005, p. 48). Applications of REDOP models 
to other outcomes such as health indicators and credit ratings are shown in Contoyannis, Jones 
and Rice (2004) and Mizen & Tsoukas (2009). 
 
As I pointed out in the previous section, I build the observed dependent variable in my model 
using both relative and absolute income cut-offs to identify low-income households and high-
income households along the income distribution in each round. In the case of the two relative 
thresholds, the outcome has three categories: the lowest income quintile group, the highest 
income quintile group and the other groups. For the two absolute thresholds, the dependent 
variable also has three categories: poor, middle-class and affluent. By doing so, I can specify a 
dynamic model of the position of an individual ! in the income distribution at the interview date 
at time " as follows: 
 
#!"
∗ = %(#!"$%, ℎ)!" , ℎ*!")           (1) 
 
27 See discussion in section 2 of  both poverty traps and affluence traps. 
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where #!"∗  is a latent variable of the individual position in the income distribution as a function 
of lagged observed annual income position (#!"$%), household composition (ℎ)!"), and household 
assets (ℎ*!"). 
 
I used REDOP models on both the balanced and unbalanced samples of the P-CASEN for the 
period 2006-2009. The REDOP considers categorical variables in which the order from the 
lowest to the highest is not indifferent. Therefore, the values for the lowest income quintile, the 
highest quintile group, and the other groups are 1, 3 and 2, respectively. For poor, middle-class 
and affluent, the values are 1, 2 and 3. Also, the REDOP allows for including among the 
regressors the position in the previous states in the model in order to capture the state 
dependence and the variables related to the individual that change (and do not change) over 
time. In this way, the model assumes that the positional persistence follows a first-order Markov 
model. In other words, positional persistence is identified by two consecutive years in the same 
position in the income distribution.  
 
The general dynamic model in equation (1) can be rewritten as a REDOP model: 
 
#!"
∗ = ,′#!"$% + /′0!" + 1!"           (2) 
 
#!" = 2					if						6&$% < #!"
∗ < 6& 										2 = 1,… ,:        (3) 
 
Here the subscript ! = 1,… ,;	denotes the individuals, the subscript " = 2,… , =! indicates the time 
period, =! is the number of time periods observed for the !th	individual.28 0!" are the observed 
explanatory variables, and #!"$% is an indicator of the position of the individual in the distribution 
of income in the previous year. , is the state dependence parameter to be estimated and 1!" is 
the unobservable error term. 
 
In equation (3), an individual is observed to be in one of the : position categories in the income 
distribution when the latent variable of the income position (#!"∗ ) is between 6&$%	and 6& . The 
threshold values 6	correspond to the cut-offs where an individual could move from one position 
category in the income distribution to another. This is because, even though the latent outcome, 
 




∗ , is not observed, it is known in which category the latent variable falls (#!"). These models 
include in their estimations the cut-offs that separate one category from another. 
 
Heckman and Borjas (1980) noted that equation (2), by not considering unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model, has the potential problem of biasing the estimates of the lagged 
variable, which might have a significant effect on the probability of the dependent variable. 
These authors propose that equation (2) should control for all observable and unobservable 
characteristics of individuals. In this way, the unobservable error term (1!") could be 
decomposed into two terms (1!" = @! + A!"), where @! is a time-invariant individual specific effect, 
and A!" is the remaining disturbance, which is assumed to follow a standard normal distribution 
with a zero mean and unit variance. Therefore, if I assume that A!" is not related to the 
independent variables, equation (2) can be modified in the following way: 
 
#!"
∗ = ,′#!"$% + /′0!" + @! + A!"          (4) 
 
Like the binary probit model, explanatory variables are introduced into the model by making 
the latent variable #!"∗  a linear function of the 0!", and adding a normally distributed error term. 
This means that the probability of an individual reporting a particular value of #!" = 2	is given by 
the difference between the probability of the respondent having a value of #!"∗  less than 6& and 
the probability of having a value of #!"∗   less than 6&$%. The probability that the observation ! will 
select income position 2 at time " (#!") conditioned to the independent variables and the 
individual effect can be expressed as follows: 
 
B!"& = B(#!" = 2) = Φ(6& − ,′#!"$% − /′0!" − @!) − Φ(6&$% − ,′#!"$% − /′0!" − @!)  (5) 
 
Where Φ(. ) is the standard normal distribution function, which assumes that its density is 
;(0, G'() and where 2) is taken as −	∞ and 2* is taken as +	∞. Using these probabilities, it is 
possible to use maximum probability estimation to estimate the parameters of the model. These 
include the /I (the coefficients on the 0 variables) and the unknown cut-off values (the 6I). 
 



















The integral included in expression (6) can be approximated with M-point Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature. I use the mean-variance adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the log 
likelihood. The REDOP models are estimated using the meoprobit command in Stata (Release 
15.0, Stata Corporation). This command calculates the standard deviation for each parameter 
clustered at the house level in wave 1. 
 
The initial conditions and correlated random effects problems in short-period panel data 
 
When estimating the degree of state dependence of a condition (poverty or affluence) it is crucial 
to distinguish between true state dependence due to genuine causal effects of the past on current 
outcomes, and spurious state dependence, caused by the presence of time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. This implies dealing with the initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The initial conditions problem appears when the observed start of the Markov model (#!%) does 
not necessarily coincide with the true start of the process (Heckman, 1981). Given that I am 
estimating dynamic models I need to take into account whether the panel data shows a 
correlation between the initial position of the individuals in the income distribution (#!%) and 
the individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity. If the initial condition is not exogenous the estimate 
of the parameter of interest ! is biased upwards because part of the effect of the unobserved 
heterogeneity is captured by the coefficient on the lag dependent variable (Stewart, 2007). 
 
I follow Wooldridge (2005) solution to solve the initial conditions problem.29 Wooldridge’s 
method allows individual effects to be correlated with explanatory variables, which partly 
controls for the endogeneity between the explanatory variables and the outcome. To do that, I 
model #!" at period " = 2,… , =	conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable (#!%) and 
exogenous variables (0!"). Then specify an approximation for the density of @! conditional on 
the initial value of the dependent variable (#!%) and the period-specific versions of the time-
varying explanatory variables starting from the second period of observations (0!-)  as: 
 
29 In Heckman’s solution, the initial conditions problem is solved by approximating the density function of the 
initial period using the same parametric form as conditional density for the rest of observations (Arulampalam & 
Stewart, 2009). Although the codes of its implementation are available, the computational implementation is hard 
because it requires separate programming owing to the absence of standard package. An alternative based on 
Heckman’s proposal is the method of Orme (2001). The problem with Orme’s solution is that it assumes a low 
correlation between the initial position of the individuals in the income distribution and individuals’ unobserved 




@! = @) + @%′#!% + @(′0!
- + _!          (7) 
 
Where 0!- = (`!(1 , … , `!+1 )  and _! 	is a normal distribution that assumes ;(0, G2(). 
 
The second problem is the correlated random effects of dynamic panel model.  Like the standard 
uncorrelated random effects probit models, so far, equation (4) is assuming that @!  is 
uncorrelated with 0!". If this assumption is not met, then the maximum likelihood estimates are 
inconsistent. In order to deal with this issue, I could relax the assumption adding within-means 
of the explanatory variables into the main equation (Chamberlain, 1984; Mundlak, 1978). This 
allows for correlating the unobserved heterogeneity and the means of the observed independent 
variables. Following Wooldridge’s approach, I could replace 0!- with the means of the time-
varying explanatory variables of all time periods (Stewart, 2007). 
 
However, this solution can present significant biases in longitudinal data with less than four 
rounds and a sample size of less than 800 cases per round (Akay, 2012; Arulampalam & Stewart, 
2009). Even though the P-CASEN does not fit this description, since it has 4 rounds and a 
sample size exceeding the minimum recommended, in order to be on the safe side, I follow 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal’s (2013) proposal to deal with a short panel using the Wooldridge 
approach for correlated random effects. To do that, I replace 0!- in equation (7) by the mean 
03-aaaa = (1 = − 1)∑ `!"
+
",(⁄  that does not include the initial period explanatory variables. 
 
Therefore, by parameterizing the unobserved heterogeneity distribution in this way, I address 
for short panels both the initial conditions problem and the correlated random effects problem. 
This assumes both the normality of @! and a zero-correlation between: i) the covariates, ii) the 




∗ = ,′#!"$% + /′0!" + @) + @%′#!% + @(′03-aaaa + _! + A!"       (8) 
 
 
30 These two strong assumptions require a certain amount of  caution at the moment of  interpreting the results of  
the REDOP models.  
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Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013)demonstrate that equation (8) will perform well as Heckman 
estimators for short-period of panel data. The parameters of equation (8) can be estimated 
following the process described in equations (5) and (6). The results from the implementation 
of this econometric strategy are presented in the next section. 
 
2.6 Estimation results 
 
Estimates of dynamic ordered probit models based on random effects specifications 
 
The dynamic ordered probit models with Wooldridge’s specification of correlated effects and 
initial conditions (Eq. 8) was estimated for the balanced sample. These models were estimated 
by maximum likelihood using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 evaluation points. The 
balanced sample models use longitudinal survey weights. The results of the REDOP models for 
both low-income and high-income probabilities are reported in Tables 2.3. In model 1, the low-
income position and high-income position refer to the lowest income quintile group (IQG 1) 
and the highest income quintile group (IQG 5), respectively. Both groups are defined using 
relative thresholds. For model 2, the ends of the income distribution are defined as poor and 
affluent using absolute cut-offs. 
 
The models were estimated for the household level to which the data on the characteristics of 
the head of household, head of household’ partner, and characteristics of the household was 
assigned. The equation covers the years 2007-2009, while the initial conditions of the equation 
refer to the year 2006. Among the independent variables of the model is the lagged dependent 
variable, which captures the dynamic component of income position. In estimating the model, 
the head of the household used as the reference point is assumed to be a man, who completed 
secondary school, has a formal job, owns his house, has a couple without children and lives in 
an urban area in the capital city in Chile (region 13th). 
 
Impact of explanatory variables 
 
The parameters obtained after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity and initial 
conditions in the REDOP models are contained in Table 2.3. Before discussing the main 
parameters of interest, ,′, which measures the extent of low-income persistence and high-
income persistence, I briefly consider the estimates of the other parameters in both models, 
those relating to the explanatory variables. 
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Table 2.3: Random effect dynamic ordered probit models for low-income/high-income probabilities 
         
Variables (1) Income quintile groups (IQGs) (2) Welfare level  
 (Relative thresholds)  (Absolute thresholds)  
 Coefficient Std. Dev.  Coefficient Std. Dev.  
Lagged dependent variable for models (1) and (2)        
  Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t-1         
         (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t-1 -0.254 *** (0.052)  -0.174 ** (0.082)  
         (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluent at t-1 0.358 *** (0.069)  0.803 *** (0.131)  
Initial conditions for models (1) and (2)        
  Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t1        
         (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t1 -0.555 *** (0.059)  -0.497 *** (0.096)  
         (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluent at t1 1.149 *** (0.088)  1.099 *** (0.179)  
Household head characteristics         
   Female -0.101 ** (0.047)  -0.037  (0.065)  
   Age 0.004 *** (0.002)  0.008 *** (0.002)  
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school -0.248 *** (0.037)  -0.229 *** (0.042)  
      Education: University degree 0.719 *** (0.095)  0.635 *** (0.124)  
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed         
      Labour status: Informal employed -0.116 * (0.064)  -0.132  (0.097)  
      Labour status: Unemployed -0.883 *** (0.188)  -0.902 *** (0.174)  
      Labour status: Inactive -0.424 *** (0.114)  -0.632 *** (0.151)  
HH head's partner characteristics         
   Age 0.002  (0.003)  -0.005  (0.003)  
   Ref. Education: Secondary school         
      Education: Primary school -0.295 *** (0.046)  -0.214 *** (0.057)  
      Education: University degree 0.328 *** (0.118)  0.350 *** (0.128)  
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed         
      Labour status: Informal employed -0.091  (0.092)  -0.045  (0.114)  
      Labour status: Unemployed -0.168  (0.135)  0.069  (0.151)  
      Labour status: Inactive -0.015  (0.068)  0.003  (0.096)  
Household characteristics         
   Ref. Household type: Couple without children        
      Household type: Single without children 0.049  (0.144)  0.339 ** (0.169)  
      Household type: Couple with children 0.113  (0.103)  0.076  (0.124)  
      Household type: Single with children 0.068  (0.174)  -0.110  (0.207)  
      Household type: Lone person -0.287  (0.205)  0.724 ** (0.235)  
   Number of persons 0.245 *** (0.028)  -0.338 *** (0.036)  
   Number of children < 15  -0.071  (0.058)  0.021  (0.071)  
   Number of workers 0.862 *** (0.034)  0.790 *** (0.049)  
   Ref. Housing: Own housing (no mortgage)        
      Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.126 ** (0.054)  0.169 *** (0.066)  
      Housing: Rent -0.140 ** (0.067)  -0.147 * (0.080)  
      Housing: Subsidized or rent free -0.194 *** (0.050)  -0.347 *** (0.060)  
   Rural -0.183 *** (0.045)  -0.165 *** (0.055)  
   Ref. Regions: 13th         
      Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.069  (0.055)  -0.011  (0.065)  
      Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th -0.168 *** (0.041)  -0.218 *** (0.053)  
      Regions: 11th and 12th  0.108  (0.096)  0.071  (0.112)  
Statistics         
   Cut 1 -1.189  (0.144)  -2.565  (0.228)  
   Cut 2 1.917  (0.145)  1.921  (0.195)  
   Variance unobservable heterogeneity 0.435  (0.061)  0.333  (0.096)  
Log pseudolikelihood -7,703,729.3  -4,745,448.4  
Number of household-years 13,920  13,920  
Number of households 4,640  4,640  
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights are used). 
Notes:  Coefficients for year dummies and within means of demographics not reports for brevity. Models estimated 
using observation for t > 1. *** significance at 10 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 2.3 shows the coefficient of the explanatory variables on the probability of being low-
income and high-income. Regarding the demographic characteristics of the head of household, 
age has a positive impact on the probability of being in the highest IQG and being affluent. 
While, a female head of household has a significant effect on the probability of being in the 
lowest IQG, and not on the probability of being poor. 
 
As suggested by the human capital theory, household members who have a larger endowment 
of formal education increase the probability of their households being high income. Although 
having completed university-level education for the head household and head household's 
partner are statistically significant, the coefficients for the head household is double than his/her 
partner in both models.31 
 
The head household labour status is also important to explain whether the household is located 
at the extremes of the income distribution. As expected, being unemployed is the highest 
coefficient among the observable variables explaining the increase in the probability of being in 
the lowest quintile or being poor. However, for the household head’s partner, it is not significant 
in either of the two models. The variable that does has the most significant positive effect on 
the probability of being in the highest IQG and being affluent is the number of workers. 
 
Household size is a variable sensitive to the income thresholds used to define low-income and 
high-income in the income distribution. While in Model 1, this variable increases the probability 
of being in the highest IQG in model 2, the impact is also significant but increases the 
probability of being poor. 
 
As to housing, those who do not own the house have a higher probability of low-income in 
both models. Regarding location, households that are both in rural areas and in intermediate 
regions (not including the metropolitan 13th Region) have a greater probability of being in the 
lowest quintile or being poor. 
 
Finally, both models 1 and 2 introduce explicit unobserved individual heterogeneity into the 
dynamic ordered probit model by specifying random effects (last row of Table 2.3). The latent 
 
31 It is worth mentioning that I imputed the head of  household partner variables’ mean value to run the 
econometric models for those without a household head’s partner. Models’ estimates do not show significant 
changes when the head’s partner variables are excluded. 
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error variance attributable to unobserved heterogeneity is 43.5 per cent for the Model 1 and 33 
per cent for the level of Model 2. This measure corresponds to the intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC). 
 
Initial conditions and state dependence in both low-income and high income 
 
As I explained above, the critical estimation problem of state dependence is the potential 
endogeneity of the initial conditions. Table 2.3 shows in rows (3) and (4) the parameter estimates 
for the initial condition variables are highly significant for both models (at 1 per cent or lower). 
The effect that is controlling for initial conditions has on the estimates of the magnitude of low-
income persistence and high-income persistence I will be discussed below in Table 2.4. 
 
The ,′ coefficients are presented in the first two rows of Table 2.3. These values correspond to 
the true state dependence for both low-income and high-income positions. It is clear that after 
controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, being low-income in period " − 1 has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of moving to a higher income 
position in period " while being in high-income in period " − 1	has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the probability of staying in the same income position.  There is, therefore, 
a genuine state dependence in both ends of the income distribution. However, the magnitude 
of the coefficients varies between both models. The affluence persistence coefficient is more 
than double that of the IQG5 persistence, while the poverty persistence coefficient is lower 
than the IQG1 persistence. 
 
Table 2.4: Alternative estimators of lagged dependent variable for IQG 1/poor and IQG 5/affluent 
    
Lagged dependent variable (1) Pooled ordered 
probit  
(2) Random effect 
dynamic ordered 
probit 
(3) REDOP with 
specifications of 
correlated effects and 
initial conditions 
Income quintile groups (IQGs)    
   IQG 1 (lowest) at t-1 -0.647 -0.522 -0.254 
   IQG 5 (highest) at t-1 1.102 0.971 0.358 
Welfare level    
   Poor at t-1 -0.572 -0.521 -0.174 
   Affluent at t-1 1.516 1.469 0.803 
    
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (balanced sample with longitudinal weights are used). 
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Notes:  All coefficients for pooled ordered probit model (1) and REDOP without specifications (2) are significant 
at 1 per cent. Models estimated using observation for t > 1. 
 
Table 2.4 provides further information on the extent of state dependence for low-income and 
high-income. The γ' coefficients from the first and second rows of Table 2.3 are reproduced in 
the third column while the first and second columns contain other measures of state 
dependence. There are coefficients on a lagged dependent variable for IQG 1/poor and IQG 
5/affluent in a pooled ordered probit model and a dynamic ordered probit model assuming 
exogenous initial conditions (Eq. 4). In other words, Table 2.4 shows how I control models for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity (column (2)) and heterogeneity and initial conditions 
(column (3)). 
 
When I move the columns from left to right in Table 2.4, it is clear that the estimated extent of 
low-income and high-income decline as I control for more factors. In the model (1), between 
columns (1) and (3), the reduction of the coefficients for both IGQ 1 persistence and IQG 5 
persistence is more than 60 per cent. In the model (3), the extent of poverty persistence 
coefficient estimated using REDOP with specifications of correlated effects and initial 
conditions is 70 per cent lower than from the pooled data. In the case of affluence persistence, 
it leads to a reduction of 47 per cent of the initial estimate. Therefore, controlling for 
heterogeneity and initial conditions is crucial when trying to establish the level of true state 
dependence in both low-income and high-income. 
 
Average partial effect of the state dependence 
 
The coefficients provided by the REDOP models for the previous income position (" − 1) are 
arbitrary. For this reason, they do not allow us to identify the magnitude of the state dependence 
on the conditional probability of staying in low-income/high-income. In order to have an 
indicator of the weight of the state dependence in absolute terms, it is necessary to calculate the 
average partial effects (APEs). The APE for the state dependence shows the impact of the 
previous income position (" − 1) in the current income position ("). The state dependence effect 
is calculated as the difference between the average probability of being in a certain income 
position at time " after being in the same income position at time " − 1 over the sample of those 
who were in other entry positions at " − 1 and the raw aggregate probability of being in that 




I compute APEs for each of the categories for both ends of the income quintile groups and 
welfare level measurements. The estimates in Table 2.5 indicate that the contribution of genuine 
state dependence in the estimated models is less than 10 per cent. When comparing the extremes 
of the income distribution for both measures, I found that 4.3 per cent of those in the lowest 
quintile group (IQG 1) and 5.4 per cent of those in the highest income quintile group (IQG 5) 
are explained by having been in the same income position at " − 1, thereby holding fixed 
characteristics. For the welfare measure, the state dependence effect is 5.8 per cent for the poor 
and 9.2 per cent for the rich. 
 
To put these results in context, it would be useful to compare them with those from other 
studies but, as I previously noted, there are no other studies of high-income persistence. 
Regarding research on low-income persistence, they use different definitions of low-income and 
different methodologies, and this should be taken into account when comparing with other 
countries. Giarda & Moroni (2018) exploits the longitudinal component of EU-SILC for the 
period 2009–2012 to estimate poverty persistence in four European countries using dynamic 
random effects probit models after controlling for individual heterogeneity and initial 
conditions. Their estimates show that Italy has the highest poverty persistence, with an APE of 
0.159 compared to 0.110 in France, 0.126 in Spain and 0.045 in the UK. In the case that I had 
applied the poverty line used by Giarda & Moroni (2018) to the P-CASEN 2006-2009, its value 
would be close to the relative cut-off to identify the lowest income quintile group.32 Therefore, 
it could be the case that being poor at time " − 1 in Chile has a lower impact on the probability 









Table 2.5: Average partial effects on probability of being on both low-income and high-income 
                
Variables Low-income  High income 
 (1) IQG 1 (lowest)  (2) Poor  (1) IQG 5 (highest)  (2) Affluent 
 dy/dx  Std. Dev.  dy/dx  Std. Dev.  dy/dx  Std. Dev.  dy/dx  Std. Dev. 
Lagged dependent variable for models (1) and (2)               
   Ref. (1) IQGs 2-3-4 / (2) Middle class at t-1                
      (1) IQG 1 (lowest) / (2) Poor at t-1 0.043 *** (0.010)  0.019 * (0.010)         
      (1) IQG 5 (highest) / (2) Affluence at t-1         0.058 *** (0.013)  0.092 *** (0.022) 
Household head characteristics                
   Female 0.016 ** (0.008)  0.004  (0.007)  -0.014 ** (0.007)  -0.003  (0.005) 
   Age -0.001 ** (0.000)  -0.001 *** (0.000)  0.001 ** (0.000)  0.001 *** (0.000) 
   Ref. Education: Secondary school                
      Education: Primary school 0.040 *** (0.006)  0.024 *** (0.004)  -0.035 *** (0.005)  -0.018 *** (0.003) 
      Education: University degree -0.095 *** (0.010)  -0.051 *** (0.007)  0.122 *** (0.017)  0.065 *** (0.014) 
   Ref. Labour status: Formal employed                
      Labour status: Informal employed 0.019 * (0.010)  0.014  (0.010)  -0.016 * (0.009)  -0.010  (0.007) 
      Labour status: Unemployed 0.165 *** (0.039)  0.128 *** (0.031)  -0.104 *** (0.017)  -0.053 *** (0.007) 
      Labour status: Inactive 0.071 *** (0.021)  0.076 *** (0.023)  -0.058 *** (0.015)  -0.045 *** (0.011) 
HH head's partner characteristics                
   Ref. Education: Secondary school                
      Education: Primary school 0.048 *** (0.008)  0.023 *** (0.006)  -0.041 *** (0.006)  -0.017 *** (0.004) 
      Education: University degree -0.048 *** (0.016)  -0.031 *** (0.010)  0.051 *** (0.020)  0.033 ** (0.014) 
Household characteristics                
   Number of persons -0.038 *** (0.004)  0.034 *** (0.003)  0.035 *** (0.004)  -0.028 *** (0.003) 
   Number of workers -0.136 *** (0.005)  -0.080 *** (0.004)  0.124 *** (0.004)  0.066 *** (0.003) 
   Ref. Housing: Own housing (no mortgage)                
      Housing: Own housing, mortgage -0.019 ** (0.008)  -0.016 *** (0.006)  0.019  (0.008)  0.015 ** (0.006) 
      Housing: Rent 0.023 ** (0.011)  0.015 * (0.009)  -0.020  (0.009)  -0.012 * (0.006) 
      Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.032 *** (0.008)  0.038 *** (0.007)  -0.027 *** (0.007)  -0.026 *** (0.004) 
   Rural 0.030 *** (0.008)  0.017 *** (0.006)  -0.026 *** (0.006)  -0.013 *** (0.004) 
   Ref. Regions: 13th                
      Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th -0.011  (0.008)  0.001  (0.007)  0.010  (0.008)  -0.001  (0.005) 
      Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.027 *** (0.006)  0.022 *** (0.005)  -0.024 *** (0.006)  -0.018 *** (0.004) 
      Regions: 11th and 12th  -0.017  (0.014)  -0.007  (0.011)  0.016  (0.015)  0.006  (0.010) 
                
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Models estimated using observation for t > 1. *** significance at 10 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent.
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Testing the attrition bias 
 
I analyse the extent to which the results are robust to the possibility of selection bias due to no-
random attrition from the household panel sample. The main problem associated with non-
random attrition in the sample is when the variables affecting attrition might be correlated with 
the outcome variable of interest. In this situation, econometric estimates of key relationships 
will be biased.33 In other words, attrition bias could occur if the error term in the equation of 
interest is correlated with the error term in the attrition equation (Wooldridge, 2002b). 
 
To get an idea of the potential importance of non-random sample drop out in P-CASEN 2006-
2009, Table A.2.1 (see appendix) reports the descriptive statistics for both balanced sample and 
unbalanced sample. The unbalanced sample contains all of the observations available in each 
round. The balanced sample uses all of the relevant variables that have information in the four 
rounds. When comparing the two samples, which do not use weights in the estimation of the 
means of the observable characteristics, it is possible to identify the impact of attrition. Results 
in Table A.2.1 suggest there is a relation between low-income/high-income and non-response. 
For example, small households, with less children and a higher level of schooling of its head 
−which on average are richer−, tended to be lost. The same is observed in households with 
better labour conditions and, accordingly, with higher incomes. Therefore, low-income 
households seem to be overrepresented and high-income ones underrepresented in the panel.34 
 
As I said before, the problem arising from non-random selection is that it might lead to biased 
estimators. Therefore, the next step is to identify whether the non-randomness of the attrition 
bias the REDOP models. Testing whether or not there is attrition bias is not straightforward 
because the variables related to attriters are not observable in the year in which households stop 
participating in the panel sample. However, information is available on the observable variables 
of previous years for households that leave the panel. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose 
including in the main equation of the model indicators describing individuals’ pattern of survey 
response (known as variable-addition tests). The intuition behind the test is that if the attrition 
is not random, the indicators of an individual’s pattern of survey responses should be associated 
 
33 This is closely related to the general case that Heckman (1979) called sample selection bias, arising in situations 
where a sample is not drawn randomly from the population of  interest. 
34 Nevertheless, when comparing the means of  the variables after using longitudinal weights in the balanced sample, 
they appear similar to the means of  the unbalanced sample. I will return to this point later. 
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with the dependent variables of the model after controlling for the independent variables. The 
test variables that I use are: a) an indicator summarising whether attrition occurred in the 
following wave (Next wave); b) the total number of waves in which the individual is observed 
(N waves); and c) an indicator of whether the individual is in the survey all the time (All waves). 
Each of these indicators is added to the dynamic correlated effects ordered probit model, given 
by equations (8) and estimated with the unbalanced sample. This gives three separate attrition 
bias tests. If the coefficients of the variables related to the test are zero (!!: # = 0), then there 
will be no selection bias explained by the attrition. 
 
Table 2.6: Variable-addition tests for attrition bias as proposed by Verbeek and Nijmand (1992) 
         
Attrition indicators REDOP with specifications of 
correlated effects and initial conditions 
 (1) Income quintile groups  (2) Welfare level  
 Coefficient  Std. Dev.  Coefficient  Std. Dev.  
Next wave 0.194 ** (0.091)  0.123  (0.114)  
N waves 0.036  (0.119)  -0.021  (0.141)  
All waves -0.197  (0.091)  -0.008  (0.124)  
         
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (unbalanced sample). 
Notes: Models estimated using observation for t > 1. ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
 
Table 2.6 shows the estimated coefficients on the additional variables using the dynamic ordered 
probit models for random effects specifications. I applied the tests for the two dependent 
variables: income quintile groups (1) and welfare measurement (2). In only one case of the model 
(1) the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level. In other cases, the variable-addition 
tests are insignificant, and the evidence suggests that bias due to non-random attrition may not 
be a major problem. It is worth noticing that adding attrition indicators on the models is not 
intended to correct the estimates for attrition. Similar to other studies that have used variable-
addition tests in their analyses, these are only informative for comparing estimates with the 
baseline models that do not include the test variable (Clark & Kanellopoulos, 2013; Contoyannis 
et al., 2004). Other limitations of these tests is that they may have low power, and also do not 
test selection on unobservable (correlation between the error terms), but only selection on 
observable (Nicoletti, 2006). 
 
I provide additional evidence about whether selectivity bias is a problem by focusing on the 
difference between estimates from models that use weights to adjust for attrition and estimates 
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from models without weights. To do the latter, I adopt an inverse probability weight (IPW) 
estimator for the unbalanced sample, and I use the longitudinal weights provided by the Chilean 
Ministry of Social Development for the balanced sample, which also adjusts for non-response 
over the period studied.  I apply both of them to Wooldridge’s pooled ordered probit model 
(2002b, 2002a).35  
 
The idea behind the IPW estimator is the following: the weight adjustment associated with each 
observation is inversely proportional to the propensity to respond in each wave (&"# 	= 	1 if 
observed; 0 otherwise) given a set of individual characteristics in the first wave ()"$). An estimate 
of the response probability (*̂"#% ) is derived from a statistical model (e.g., a probit regression). 
Therefore, individuals having characteristics such as a high *̂"#%  will have an adjustment factor 
close to 1, while individuals with characteristics associated with non-response (low *̂"#% ) will have 
a higher factor. This approach requires )"$ to include the initial values of all of the regressors, as 
well as the initial income position states. Further, variables that predict attrition and are 
correlated with the outcome of interest, are deliberately excluded from Eq. (8).  
 
I use as instrumental variables two dichotomous indicators related to the household’s dwelling 
(whether the households resided on in a flat, whether the rent is more than 25 percent of the 
total household income) and a health indicator of the head household (whether during the last 
year he/she has received some outpatient or hospital care for chronic disease).  
 
I estimate a probit model for response/non-response at each wave, from wave 2 to wave 4, 
using the full sample of households who are observed at wave 1. The inverse of the fitted 
probabilities from these models, 1/*̂"#% , are then used to weight observations in the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the pooled ordered probit model in the objective function as follow: 
 





,			4 = 2,… , 7 
 
 
35 The estimator cannot be applied to the log-likelihood function for the random effects specification because it is 




IPW works to identify attrition problem for a simple reason. Under the ignorability non-
response assumption, the conditional on observables in the first time period ()"$) is independent 
of &"#: 
 
8(&"# = 1|:"# , :"#)$, ;"#,	)"$) = 8(&"# = 1|	)"$),							4 = 2,… , 7      (10) 
 
Wooldridge (2002b) prove that the IPW produces a consistent √"- asymptotically normal 
estimator. Therefore, “the probability limit of the weighted objective function is identical to that 
of the unweighted function if we had no attrition problem” Wooldridge (2002a, p. 588). This 
IPW estimator is implemented for the unbalanced sample using the pweights option in Stata 
(Release 15.0, Stata Corporation). Also, longitudinal weights are used for the balance sample. 
The estimates from both weighted models are compared with the estimates from the 
unweighted models for both balanced and unbalanced samples to assess the attrition bias.  
 
Table 2.7: Weighted and unweighted estimates from pooled dynamic ordered probit models  
            
Lagged dependent and initial 
conditions variables for models 
(1) and (2) 
Unbalanced panel  Balanced panel 
Unweighted IPW  Unweighted Longitudinal weights 
Coeff. Std. Dev.  Coeff. Std. Dev.  Coeff. Std. Dev.  Coeff. Std. Dev. 
(1) Income quintile groups             
   Lagged dependent variable            
      IQG 1 (lowest) t-1 -0.576 (0.033)  -0.592 (0.039)  -0.575 (0.035)  -0.577 (0.036) 
      IQG 5 (highest) t-1 0.708 (0.045)  0.723 (0.059)  0.744 (0.048)  0.757 (0.054) 
   Initial conditions variable            
      IQG 1 (lowest) t1 -0.313 (0.033)  -0.331 (0.040)  -0.310 (0.034)  -0.301 (0.040) 
      IQG 5 (highest) t1 0.618 (0.047)  0.671 (0.059)  0.655 (0.050)  0.690 (0.054) 
(2) Welfare level            
   Lagged dependent variable            
      Poor t-1 -0.463 (0.047)  -0.500 (0.057)  -0.487 (0.050)  -0.479 (0.054) 
      Affluence t-1 1.023 (0.081)  1.057 (0.110)  1.084 (0.088)  1.142 (0.111) 
   Initial conditions            
      Poor t1 -0.303 (0.051)  -0.278 (0.065)  -0.309 (0.054)  -0.287 (0.069) 
      Affluence t1 0.759 (0.082)  0.737 (0.105)  0.836 (0.089)  0.679 (0.110) 
            
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009 
Notes:  Models estimated using observation for t > 1. All coefficients are significant at 1 per cent. Bold indicates 
coefficient significantly at 10 per cent different from unweighted regression in the unbalanced panel. 
 
Table 2.7 reports some summary results from unweighted and weighted estimates. Most of the 
coefficients, on the lagged variables and initial conditions, are stable across the balanced and 
unbalanced samples without weights, as well as samples with IPW and longitudinal weights. In 
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only one case – the affluents’ initial conditions on the balanced sample with longitudinal sample 
-, the coefficient turns out to be statistically significant at 10 per cent. This may suggest that 
longitudinal non-response does not play a significant role and, as a result, the attrition bias does 
not seem to lead to biased results of the effect of previous low-income/high-income position 
and initial conditions. Again, it is important to note that IPW does not correct for attrition 
driven by shocks between wave 4 − 1 and 4 that affect both low-income/high-income and survey 




This paper studies the income position persistence in the extreme of the income distribution in 
Chile for the period 2006-2009 using the data from the P-CASEN. The models I have 
implemented allow the joint estimation of state dependence for low-income and high-income 
groups along the income distribution. It is the first time that both poverty persistence and 
affluence persistence are measured in a Latin American country.  
 
The analysis I provide addresses all these limitations from previous studies that found that the 
unequal income distribution in Chile contrasts with a high mobility of all but those in the high-
end of the income ladder (e.g. Contreras et al., 2005; Sapelli, 2013). These research not only 
used panel data considering only three waves over a decade (P-CASEN 1996-2001-2006), but 
also the analyses used simple empirical models and income mobility measures which have not 
fully exploited the longitudinal dimension of the data. They also did not consider the sample 
attrition problems which could have biased some of the findings obtained.  
 
My analysis provides the following findings. First, the descriptive results show that the 
persistence at the two ends of the income distribution for the Chilean case exists but is lower 
than that found in previous research. The evidence to support the thesis of a sticky floor that 
prevents people from scaling the income ladder seems to be less convincing for Chile. The high 
mobility at the bottom of the income distribution is probably related to a right-skewed 
distribution. Since the boundaries between the income quintile groups 1 to 4 are close to each 
other, changes in the positions in the income distribution do not necessarily represent significant 




Likewise, the evidence to support the idea of affluence persistence, according to which high-
income individuals stay put in their positions with no risk of falling, does not seem to be 
sufficiently strong in Chile either. The glass floor in Chile is much permeable than one would 
have initially thought. The turnover of this group occurs mainly between the middle-class and 
the affluent category. Again, the explanation can be found in the shape of the income 
distribution. In Chile, the right tail of the income distribution is so stretched that those in the 
highest decile group may be either too close or too far from the income decile boundary. Those 
close to the income cut-off might be exposed to greater fluidity with the decile groups below. 
This suggests that a glass floor might be in a higher income cut-off (e.g. the affluent 5 per cent 
of the population). 
 
Second, the results from the econometric analysis suggest that both mechanisms true state 
dependence and heterogeneity (observable and unobservable) explain low-income persistence 
and high-income persistence. In the former mechanism, the contribution is more significant for 
the affluent than for the poor. While the poverty persistence has an APE of only 2 per cent, the 
APE in the affluence persistence is 9 percent. Therefore, past income position is more important 
in the richest groups than in the lowest part of the income distribution to explain current income 
position. 
 
Moreover, the true state dependence impact on the current income position for low-income 
households appears to be low when compared to other explanatory variables. According to the 
models’ outcomes, the unobservable heterogeneity accounts for between 33 and 44 per cent of 
the unexplained variation in income position changes. Furthermore, the models provide 
evidence that the effect of the observed characteristic in the current low-income position has a 
greater impact than the genuine state dependence.  
 
For example, I found that the households’ labour market conditions and the human capital of 
both the household head and the household head’s partner are the variables on the models that 
have a higher APE in explaining both the lowest income quintile group persistence and poverty 
persistence. Since the inability to exit low-income is not the result of genuine dependence but 
reflects differences between the productive skills of households members, there is scope for 




Third, while descriptive evidence shows that there is income-related attrition in the data, with 
those in the high-income initial position more likely to drop out, both the variable-addition tests 
and comparison of estimates based on unweighted and weighted unbalanced samples show no 
evidence of attrition bias. This is, it does not influence the magnitude of the estimated effects 
of state dependence and initial conditions.  
 
In summary, Chile appears to be a fluid society throughout its income distribution, even at both 
ends of the distribution. While all groups are likely to move upwards in the income ladder, this 
does not ensure the sustainability of those changes over time. This is because the income 
mobility is mostly bounded to short-range movements. It is thus evidencing that the entire 
population is vulnerable to experience a downward from their positions. In this scenario, 
income mobility seems to be more related to stress or anxiety generated by economic uncertainty 
than to an improvement in the well-being of individuals. 
 
Finally, my approach to understanding the joint low-income and high-income persistence could 
offer a guide to further empirical work to other countries that have access to short-period panel 
data. Thus, new research could analyse poverty persistence and affluence persistence from a 






Table A.2.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables for both unbalanced and balanced samples (average 
values 2006-2006) 
       
Variables Unbalanced sample Balanced sample Balanced sample 
 (Unweighted) (Unweighted) (Longitudinal weights) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics       
   Female 0.294 (0.002) 0.290 (0.003) 0.303 (0.007) 
   Age 47.8 (0.079) 48.9 (0.097) 48.3 (0.215) 
   Education: Primary school 0.309 (0.003) 0.373 (0.004) 0.311 (0.007) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.524 (0.003) 0.510 (0.004) 0.525 (0.008) 
   Education: University degree 0.143 (0.002) 0.087 (0.002) 0.140 (0.008) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.717 (0.002) 0.706 (0.003) 0.724 (0.006) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.110 (0.001) 0.112 (0.002) 0.107 (0.003) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.017 (0.001) 0.017 (0.001) 0.016 (0.001) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.156 (0.002) 0.166 (0.002) 0.153 (0.005) 
HH head's partner characteristics       
   Age 44.6 (0.085) 46.1 (0.106) 45.4 (0.236) 
   Education: Primary school 0.316 (0.003) 0.387 (0.005) 0.331 (0.009) 
   Education: Secondary school 0.567 (0.004) 0.530 (0.005) 0.552 (0.011) 
   Education: University degree 0.102 (0.002) 0.064 (0.002) 0.102 (0.008) 
   Labour status: Formal employed 0.312 (0.003) 0.272 (0.003) 0.310 (0.009) 
   Labour status: Informal employed 0.093 (0.002) 0.087 (0.002) 0.084 (0.004) 
   Labour status: Unemployed 0.044 (0.001) 0.041 (0.001) 0.042 (0.003) 
   Labour status: Inactive 0.551 (0.003) 0.600 (0.004) 0.564 (0.009) 
Household characteristics       
   Equivalised total household income 351,788 (2,190) 279,176 (1,564) 331,364 (8,261) 
   Household type: Couple without children 0.278 (0.002) 0.282 (0.003) 0.277 (0.007) 
   Household type: Single without children 0.127 (0.002) 0.117 (0.002) 0.127 (0.005) 
   Household type: Couple with children 0.397 (0.003) 0.411 (0.003) 0.400 (0.007) 
   Household type: Single with children 0.106 (0.002) 0.114 (0.002) 0.111 (0.004) 
   Household type: Lone person 0.093 (0.002) 0.075 (0.002) 0.085 (0.005) 
   Number of persons 3.7 (0.009) 3.9 (0.012) 3.8 (0.027) 
   Number of children < 15  0.824 (0.005) 0.864 (0.007) 0.831 (0.015) 
   Number of workers 1.357 (0.005) 1.336 (0.006) 1.346 (0.013) 
   Housing: Own housing (no mortgage) 0.543 (0.003) 0.605 (0.004) 0.544 (0.008) 
   Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.137 (0.002) 0.123 (0.002) 0.134 (0.006) 
   Housing: Rent 0.160 (0.002) 0.102 (0.002) 0.163 (0.008) 
   Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.159 (0.002) 0.170 (0.003) 0.159 (0.006) 
   Rural 0.122 (0.002) 0.161 (0.003) 0.127 (0.004) 
   Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.111 (0.002) 0.121 (0.002) 0.111 (0.005) 
   Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.471 (0.003) 0.526 (0.004) 0.477 (0.008) 
   Regions: 11th and 12th  0.038 (0.001) 0.031 (0.001) 0.016 (0.001) 
   Regions: 13th 0.381 (0.003) 0.322 (0.003) 0.396 (0.008) 
Nº individuals 30,196 18,076 18,076 
Nº households 8,079 4,693 4,693 
       
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  All results are rates (%) unless stated otherwise. The equivalized total household income is valued in terms 





Table A.2.2: Annual income position at t conditional of income position at t -1 for unbalanced 
and balanced samples 
 
(1) Income quintile groups (IQGs): relative thresholds  (2) Welfare level: absolute thresholds   
           
IQGs, 
year t -1  IQGs, year t (row %) 
 Welfare,  
year t -1  Welfare, year t (row %) 
 IQG 1 IQGs 2-3-4 IQG 5 Missing   Poor 
Middle 
Class Affluent Missing 
(1.a) Balanced sample    (2.a) Balanced sample    
   IQG 1 50.0 47.4 2.6 -     Poor 36.6 62.9 0.4 - 
   IQGs 2-3-4 15.5 74.6 10.0 -     Middle class 7.9 89.0 3.1 - 
   IQG 5 4.1 38.8 57.2 -     Affluent 1.1 47.5 51.4 - 
   Total 21.3 63.1 15.5      Total 10.9 83.9 5.3  
(1.b) Unbalanced sample    (2.b) Unbalanced sample   
   IQG 1 43.3 40.9 1.9 13.88     Poor 31.8 54.6 0.4 13.26 
   IQGs 2-3-4 13.1 63.9 7.8 15.23     Middle class 6.7 74.4 2.8 16.03 
   IQG 5 2.7 28.8 39.3 29.19     Affluent 0.9 27.8 33.6 37.79 
   Total 14.0 42.3 9.8 33.9     Total 7.1 55.0 4.0 33.9 
           
Source: Author’s calculations from the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 













I propose an empirical framework to identify different degrees of vulnerability to poverty using 
two vulnerability lines that classify currently non-poor people into risk groups: low, moderate 
and high risk of falling into poverty in the next period. My approach features two contributions. 
First, it extends earlier work on vulnerability to poverty by looking at degrees of vulnerability 
rather than a simple dichotomy of vulnerable versus non-vulnerable. Second, it uses two models 
to predict both poverty entry probability and household income as part of the estimation 
procedures. The former controls for initial conditions effects and attrition bias and the latter 
addresses the retransformation problem. I apply my approach to Chile using longitudinal data 
from the P-CASEN 2006–2009. My vulnerability lines differ significantly from those estimated 
in earlier research in Latin America, suggesting that the size of the vulnerable might be 





In the last decade, international agencies together with some governments in developing 
countries, have adopted a new forward-looking perspective in the design of social policies to 
identify those who, in spite of having exited poverty, are likely to fall back into it (see Birdsall et 
al. (2014) for Latin America, Klasen & Waibel (2015) for South-East Asia, and Dang & Dabalen 
(2018) for Africa). Knowing ex-ante which households are vulnerable to poverty makes it 
possible to develop effective anti-poverty protection strategies and improve risk-management 
policies such as risk insurance programs and incentives for self-protecting savings (Dercon, 
2005). However, although the vulnerability to poverty concept dates back to the seminal work 
of Morduch (1994), there is still no consensus concerning the operationalisation and 
measurement of vulnerability to poverty due to the difficulty of analysing unknown future 
distributions of poverty (Ceriani, 2018; Gallardo, 2018). 
 
My primary aim in this study is to derive income thresholds (vulnerability lines) to measure 
vulnerability to poverty.  I define vulnerability to poverty as the risk for non-poor people in the 
current year of falling into poverty next year based on the approach that considers vulnerability 
as expected poverty (e.g. Chaudhuri (2003) and Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005)). I achieve this 
by using a new vulnerability measure based on a first-order Markov model that allows me to 
move away from the vulnerable versus non-vulnerable dichotomic analysis identifying instead, 
different levels of vulnerability within the non-poor population. I apply my approach to Chile 
between 2006 and 2009. 
 
Until now, the vulnerability line most frequently used in comparative studies has classified non-
poor households other than the affluent group into two groups, the vulnerable and the middle 
class or non-vulnerable (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). This approach fails to acknowledge 
that, within the vulnerable group, households face different degrees of vulnerability; the 
vulnerability of a household close to the poverty line differs significantly from that of a 
household that is just below the income secure middle-class line. I address this issue by 
estimating two vulnerability lines to identify social groups with different degrees of vulnerability 
to poverty: the non-poor with a low, moderate and high probability of falling into poverty.  
 
Using two vulnerability lines makes it possible to design policy strategies tailored to each of the 
groups identified. This is particularly relevant in countries that have managed to reduce absolute 
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poverty yet show high income mobility explained by a precarious and unstable labour market 
and weak social safety net systems that fail to help households to cope with idiosyncratic shocks 
(OECD, 2018a; Torche, 2005).  
 
My research has three objectives. Overall, I aim to measure the degree of vulnerability to poverty 
for the currently non-poor population. To do this, I developed a model of falling below a 
poverty line for each non-poor household in a base year. My approach derives vulnerability lines 
to identify vulnerable sub-groups inside non-poor sub-populations that are associated with their 
predicted poverty entry rates. My second objective is to propose two specific vulnerability lines. 
A high vulnerability line that focuses on households that are located in the central part of the 
income distribution and a low vulnerability line that focuses on the upper part of the income 
distribution. The former identifies those with a high risk and those with a moderate risk of 
falling into poverty in the next period. The latter serves the dual purpose of identifying the lower 
income cut-off for the income-secure middle-class as well as the higher income cut-off for the 
moderately vulnerable. The third objective is to analyse the determinants of vulnerability to 
poverty in Chile.  
 
My approach builds upon three pieces of work that have made significant contributions to the 
study of vulnerability to poverty: López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) who estimate a 
vulnerability line based on household characteristics in three countries in Latin America36; Dang 
& Lanjouw (2017) who derive the income cut-off (vulnerability line) for India, USA and 
Vietnam applying a non-parametric approach; and Schotte et al. (2018) who use a poverty 
dynamic approach to identify the (non-poor) vulnerable group in South Africa. My approach 
addresses some of the weaknesses of these previous research (for reasons explained later) and 
generates new measures of vulnerability. 
 
My approach follows a three-step strategy. First, I estimate the probability of a currently non-
poor household being poor in the next period. Unlike López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014), who 
assume a logistic model to quantify the predicted household risk of poverty, I use the 
endogenous switching first-order Markov model developed by Cappellari & Jenkins (2004) to 
 
36 In April 2018, the World Bank updated the vulnerability line for upper-middle-income countries from $10.0 
dollars pppd in 2005 PPP (this cut-off  updates López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) work) to $13.0 dollars pppd 




estimate poverty entries for non-poor people. This model, also used by Schotte et al. (2018), 
allows one to simultaneously control for the potential endogeneity of unobserved heterogeneity, 
attrition and initial conditions. Second, I use a log-linear model between household income and 
household characteristics to predict households’ income. Unlike many applications that 
incorrectly does not address the retransformation problem (transforming the dependent variable 
by taking the natural logarithm complicates prediction (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006)), I avoid 
bias in the retransformation scale of the household income by following the method proposed 
by Duan (1983). Third, I define the vulnerability line as the average predicted income among 
households whose probability of falling into poverty is within ± 1 percentage-point of the 
poverty entry rate estimated for a non-poor population. The range that I propose is not a 
function of the sample size (or sample design), which is a desirable property, by comparison 
with to Schotte et al. (2018) who use a range equal to an estimated confidence interval (which 
is sample contingent). 
 
My approach, similar to Dang & Lanjouw (2017), calculates a vulnerability line and in doing so 
identifies vulnerable subpopulations. However, while their approach allows calculation of only 
one vulnerability line to identify a vulnerable subset of the population, my approach can be 
extended to derive more than one vulnerability line, and hence to also identify subgroups with 
different degrees of vulnerability.  
 
Using my approach, I derive two vulnerability lines for Chile using four waves of panel data 
from the CASEN survey covering the period between 2006 and 2009.37 The Panel CASEN is a 
national survey of households that is unique in Latin America since, despite being a short panel 
(four waves), it provides annual information on household income as well as on education, 
health, labour market, housing, and social benefits.  
 
The income threshold I estimate to identify an income-secure middle-class differs significantly 
from the threshold suggested by the World Bank to measure the middle-class in upper-middle 
income countries set at $13 dollars pppd (2011 PPP). I estimate a $20.0 dollars pppd (2011 PPP) 
threshold for the low vulnerability line (middle-class) and $9.9 dollars pppd (2011 PPP) for the 
 
37 This Panel CASEN replaced the ‘old’ Panel CASEN 2001-2006 used by López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014), 
which collected longitudinal data over a five year interval of  a sample representative of  4 out of  the 15 regions in 
the country. The ‘new’ Panel CASEN 2006-2009 was designed and implemented by the Ministry of  Planning of  
Chile and the Social Observatory of  the Alberto Hurtado University (for more details see OSUAH (2011a)). 
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high vulnerability line. Using my two vulnerability lines in countries similar to Chile allows to 
open the discussion on the design and target of anti-poverty protection policies focus on the 
current distinction of vulnerable versus non vulnerable. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, I discuss the importance of vulnerability lines 
for understanding the implications of the systematic reduction in absolute poverty rates in Latin 
America. In Section 3, I review the literature on vulnerability to poverty and middle-class 
identification and discuss the main approaches to calculating vulnerability lines. In section 4, I 
explain how I identify degrees of vulnerability to poverty. In Section 5, I describe data and 
definitions. Also, I present the descriptive statistics of poverty dynamics. In section 6, I apply 





3.2 Poverty reduction in Latin America: the emergence of the middle-class or the rising 
of the vulnerable? 
 
In Latin America, cross-sectional surveys show that between 2002 and 2015 more than 75 
million people exited poverty (see Panel B in Figure 3.1). This is explained by a reduction in the 
wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers, as well as the increase in cash transfers 
to the most deprived groups (Lustig, López-Calva, Ortiz-Juarez, & Monga, 2016). Also, 
although Latin America is one of the regions with the highest income inequality in the world, 
since the 2000s, the level of inequality has decreased slightly. The Gini coefficient declined from 
an average of 0.550 in 2002-2003 to 0.467 in 2015-16, due to a faster increase in the income of 
the lower quintile groups compared to the rest of the population (ECLAC, 2017).  
 








Sources: Figure of panel A appears on page 17 in Social Panorama of Latin America, 2016. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 
UN. In panel B, data from database: Poverty and Equity, World Bank, Development Research Group.  
Note: In panel B, I used the cut-off of 5.50 dollars a day (2011 PPP) to define poverty. This poverty line is suggested 
for upper-middle-income countries (World Bank, 2018a). 
 
This new reality led to a new wave of studies on the implications of the systematic reduction in 
absolute poverty rates in Latin America (Birdsall et al., 2014; Ferreira et al., 2013; Stampini, 
Robles, Sáenz, Ibarrarán, & Medellín, 2016a). These studies all use both the World Bank poverty 
line and López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) vulnerability line to distinguish the vulnerable group 
from the poor and the middle class. Those vulnerable to poverty are individuals living in a 
household with a daily income per capita that falls between the lines of poverty and vulnerability 
($4 and $10, respectively, at 2005 constant purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars). The rationale 
behind this classification is that people with incomes between the poverty line and the 
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who are above the vulnerability line have achieved a level of economic stability that reduces 
their poverty risk, i.e. are middle-class (Birdsall, 2015; Torche & López-Calva, 2013).  
 
Ferreira et al. (2013) analysed household surveys from 19 countries in Latin America. These 
authors identify the year 2009 as the turning point in the region, since it marked the first time 
that a third of the population fell into the middle-class. According to the authors, the emerging 
middle-class group shared five features: i) they are more educated than those who remain in 
poverty; ii) live in urban areas; iii) work in the formal sector of the economy; iv) women 
participate more in the labour force; and v)  have fewer children than those in poor or vulnerable 
households. Ferreira et al. (2013) stated that Latin America is a middle-income region that is on 
its way to becoming a middle-class society.  
 
However, these trends reflecting improved living standards of those at the bottom of the income 
distribution need to be reassessed. Data from 2011 show that almost 40 per cent of the non-
poor population in the region was vulnerable to poverty (Panel A in Figure 3.2) and, since 2012, 
despite a reduction in absolute poverty, the rate of growth of the middle-class has slowed down 
(Panel B in Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Evolution of poverty, vulnerability and middle class in Latin America, 2002-2016 
 
Source: In both panel A and panel B, author’s calculation from Socio-Economic database for LAC (CEDLAS and 
LAC Equity Lab, the World Bank). 
Note: The income thresholds I use to classify the poor, vulnerable and middle class taken from López-Calva & 
Ortiz-Juárez (2014). 
 
Birdsall et al. (2014), using  López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) approach, identify the vulnerable 
group in 16 countries in Latin America portraying it as the ‘strugglers’ for the continuous effort 
made by this type of household to keep up their level of income and to not enter poverty again. 
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work in the informal sector; (ii) paying high consumption taxes; and (iii) despite having 
improved their income, manifest a general discontent with their living conditions. 
 
Stampini et al. (2016a), using synthetic panels constructed from cross-sectional household 
surveys, show that the middle-class in Latin America is also substantially affected by the risk of 
falling into poverty. These authors found for 12 Latin American countries that 65 per cent of 
those with a pppd income between $4 and $10 dollars in 2005 PPP terms, and 14 per cent of 
those in the middle-class had experienced poverty at least once over a 10-year period. These 
results suggest that the vulnerability line that they use to identify the middle-class does not reflect 
the idea that middle-class households enjoy economic security. A more demanding vulnerability 
line that adequately measures the middle class would make the size of the vulnerable group in 
Latin-America larger than official figures from the World Bank show (Birdsall et al., 2014; 
Ferreira et al., 2013). 
 
The findings of this literature change the initially optimistic reading of poverty reduction seen 
as an expansion of the middle class in developing countries (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008; Ravallion, 
2010). This new approach to measure vulnerability shows that being non-poor does not 
necessarily entail becoming non-vulnerable and therefore part of the middle-class (Birdsall et 
al., 2014). Based on this approach, poverty reduction can be related to an increase in either the 
middle class or those who are vulnerable to poverty (Wietzke & Sumner, 2018). In the case of 
Latin America, the evidence collected suggests that the emerging group in the region rather than 
being the middle-class is the vulnerable. 
 
This new reality marked by poverty reduction across regions in the last two decades turned the 
attention towards the new low middle-class, opening a debate about the most appropriate way 
to measure the middle-class (Atkinson & Brandolini, 2013; Reeves, Guyot, & Krause, 2018), as 
well as the economic, social and political implications of an increase in the size of the vulnerable 







3.3 Vulnerability-to-poverty and middle-income class identification: from divergent to 
convergent approaches 
 
Until very recently, the economic research focused on the middle-class (e.g. Atkinson & 
Brandolini (2013)) advanced in parallel to research on the vulnerable group (e.g. Chaudhuri et 
al., (2002)), showing no relevant connection or dialogue although the research studies two sides 
of the same coin.  
 
Measures to identify middle class: income as the main indicator 
 
The research that focuses on defining the middle-class uses economic resources as the primary 
indicator, especially, household income (Gornick & Jäntti, 2014). Indeed, the middle-class is 
commonly analysed as the middle group within the income distribution, for which several 
strategies to define income thresholds, either relative or absolute, have been implemented. 
 
Relative measures define the middle-class using household income to find a threshold that is 
anchored to the information provided by the income distribution of each country. See Estache 
& Leipziger (2009) and Atkinson & Brandolini (2013).38 However, these measures fail to 
adequately compare the middle-class between countries with different income distributions. In 
developing countries, the income of middle-class individuals is significantly modest compared 
to the middle-class income of developed countries. Only a minority of the population of low- 
and middle-income economies qualify as middle-class if the economic welfare of developed 
countries is used as a reference (Milanovic & Yitzhaki, 2002; Ravallion, 2010). 
 
By contrast to the relative measures, absolute measures of the middle-class use thresholds based 
on a particular level of income or expenditure. Early research suggested that the lower cut-off 
of the middle-class was $2 dollars pppd and the upper limit was $10 dollars or $13 dollars pppd 
 
38 Among these measures, there are three main definitions: i) distance from the median income, e.g. those whose 
income falls between 75 and 125 per cent of  the median income are considered middle-class (Birdsall, Graham, & 
Pettinato, 2000; Davis & Huston, 1992); ii) a range in the distribution of  income, e.g. those whose income falls 
within the 3rd and 4th quintile groups are considered middle-class (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Barro, 2000; Easterly, 
2001); and iii) a specific distance from the poverty line, e.g.  those whose income is above 130 per cent of  the 
country’s official poverty line are considered middle-class (World Bank, 2012). 
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(Banerjee & Duflo, 2008; Ravallion, 2010).39 The income cut-off used by these authors to define 
middle-class has been highly contested since the vulnerable group above the $2 dollars income 
cut-off lack the core characteristics of the middle-class, namely, income stability, access to social 
security benefits and being contributors to the social security system through tax payments 
(Birdsall, 2015). In recent years, the absolute purchasing power approach has been highlighted 
as a strategy to compare the middle-class between different countries at a global level (e.g. $11 
to $110 dollars pppd in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms (Kharas, 2017)). 
 
Vulnerability-to-poverty approach: measuring downward mobility 
 
The economic work that focuses on the vulnerable group has developed a conceptual 
framework known as vulnerability-to-poverty (Hoddinott & Quisumbing, 2010). This literature 
can be sorted into three groups: i) papers that emphasise the element of expected poverty, that 
is, that consider as vulnerability the probability of a household falling into poverty in a future 
period (e.g. Pritchett et al., (2000); Chaudhuri et al., (2002)); ii) papers that stress the element of 
exposure to risk, for example, to indicate, retrospectively, whether an observed economic shock 
produced a loss of well-being in a household (e.g. Skoufias & Quisumbing (2005)); and iii) 
papers that define vulnerability as the difference between a household’s utility derived from 
certainty equivalent consumption and its expected utility derived from actual consumption (e.g. 
Ligon & Schechter (2003)). 
 
The most commonly used is the vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP). It has the advantage 
of being not only a relatively simple to implement with data that is widely available or can easily 
be collected, but also a forward-looking concept easier to comprehend and interpret by 
policymakers than the other two definitions (Hohberg, Landau, Kneib, Klasen, & Zucchini, 
2018). 
 
To develop measures based on these definitions, the same steps are followed. First, quantify 
vulnerability. This step requires a decision about the welfare indicator to be used in the analysis. 
Because a large number of these studies have been carried out in Global South countries (where  
household surveys track consumption expenditure instead of income), consumption is the 
 
39 The lower limit is equivalent to the World Bank’s poverty line for developing countries and the $13 dollars upper 
threshold proposed by Ravallion (2010) is equivalent to the poverty line in the United States. 
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indicator most commonly used (Ligon & Schechter, 2003; Pritchett et al., 2000; Skoufias & 
Quisumbing, 2005). However, studies have also been conducted using earnings (Bourguignon, 
Goh, & Kim, 2004) and income   when these measures of welfare are available. 
 
The second step in measuring vulnerability to poverty is to estimate the future distribution of 
the chosen indicator (e.g. household income) in order to determine vulnerability status. The 
different parametric methods used to estimate both expected income and the variance of 
income for each household vary according to the types of data available. The best scenario is to 
have panel data, as is the case in this study, to estimate the income variance and also to 
incorporate more information in the model such as prior-period income (Hohberg et al., 2018; 
Skoufias & Quisumbing, 2005; Suryahadi & Sumarto, 2003). The shortage of longitudinal data 
in countries in the Global South has made it necessary to develop methodologies for estimating 
household’s income variance from cross-section datasets (Chaudhuri et al., 2002; Günther & 
Harttgen, 2009) as well as for repeated cross-sections and synthetic panels (Bourguignon et al., 
2004). For a detailed review of these methods, see Ceriani (2018), Calvo (2018) and Gallardo 
(2018). 
 
The first definition of VEP needs a third step to estimate the vulnerability threshold.  Once the 
threshold is estimated, all the currently households (poor and non-poor) whose probability of 
being poor in the next period is above the threshold are classified as vulnerable. A probability 
of 0.5 is used in most studies (e.g. Pritchett et al. (2000); Suryahadi & Sumarto (2003); 
Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005); Chiwaula et al. (2011)).40 Pritchett et al. (2000) argue that this 
cut-point has two appealing features. First, it is the point where the expected consumption (or 
income) coincides with the poverty line. Second, it accords with common sense to say that a 
household is vulnerable if faces at least 50 per cent probability of being poor in the future. 
 
The simplest approach to define VEP supposes that the outcome is determined by the following 
stochastic process:  
 
>?	:" = β;" + B" (1) 
 
 
40 A recent study determines the vulnerability cut-off  endogenously (Hohberg, Landau, Kneib, Klasen, & Zucchini, 




where >?	:" 		is the logarithm of household income C (or household consumption), ;" is a vector 
of household characteristics, β is a vector of parameters, and B" and is a disturbance term with 
mean zero. Then, both the expected log outcome and the outcome variance are calculated as 
follows: 
 
D[>?	:"|;"] = ;"#G  (2) 
HI&[>?	 :"|;"] = JK*!
+  (3) 
 
Then the probability of a household with characteristics ;" being poor is: 
 
L,M = 8&N(>?	 :" <	 >?	 Z | ;") = ΦR





Assuming that :",#	is log-normally distributed, the probability that a given a household’s income 
(:") is lower than the poverty line (Z) conditional on household characteristics (;") is denoted 
vulnerability to poverty (L"). Finally, a household is considered vulnerable if its	L,M  is above an 
established threshold probability value (e.g. L,M ≥ 0.5). 
 
The VEP approach has two drawbacks. First, although vulnerability measures have a good 
performance as predictors of poverty at aggregate levels, face significant problems of precision 
in the identification at micro-level (Celidoni, 2013). For example, Bérgolo et al. (2012) assess 
the predictive power of vulnerability measures using panel data from Argentina and Chile. They 
find a relatively high level of misclassification at the household level, although these errors are 
substantially lower among households in the bottom of the income distribution. Second, VEP 
methods that use panel data do not take into account important methodological issues widely 
studied in the poverty dynamics literature about developing countries contexts such as bias 
estimates caused by non-random sample drop-out (e.g. Alderman, Behrman, Watkins, Kohler, 
& Maluccio, 2001; Falaris, 2003; Maitra & Vahid, 2006; Rosenzweig, 2003). 
 
Using vulnerability line to identify both the vulnerable and middle-class 
 
While the economic literature has used income cuts-off to identify the middle-class, most of the 
VEP studies define vulnerability thresholds in terms of a specific probability of falling into 
poverty. However, three new methods based on the VEP approach have linked the vulnerability 
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threshold (risk) to household income levels namely those developed by López-Calva & Ortiz-
Juarez (2014); Dang & Lanjouw (2017); and Schotte et al. (2018). This income threshold, known 
as the vulnerability line, allows identification of the vulnerable and non-vulnerable in the same 
way the economic research on middle-class does, as discussed above. Households are 
considered vulnerable to poverty if their income is below the vulnerability line, and middle-class 
if their income is just above the vulnerability line.  
 
These methods (including my approach explained later) assume that there is a monotonic 
relationship between the predicted poverty entry probability and the household income. 
Although this assumption is plausible, it does not guarantee that higher base period income 
(among the non-poor) implies a lower probability of falling into poverty. The implication of this 
assumption in the identification of both the vulnerable and middle-class households will be 
discussed later. 
 
The vulnerability line is defined as the income (H#) such that having an income (:#) below H# at t 
(but above the poverty line (W) at t) means that the risk of being poor at t+1 (Pr	(:#.$ < W)) is 
greater than or equal to some critical probability level know as risk threshold. The vulnerability 
line H# distinguishes households that are still vulnerable to poverty from those groups that are 
economically more secure. This definition is closely related to the Weberian notion that 
households should enjoy a certain minimum of economic security to be considered middle-class 
(Goldthorpe & McKnight, 2006; López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). This vulnerability line has 
served the purpose of closing the gap between the research on the income-secure middle class 
and the vulnerable group (Schotte et al., 2018). 
 
López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) derive a vulnerability line related to households’ 
characteristics. Using longitudinal household surveys from Chile, Mexico and Peru, these 
authors fitted to a sample of non-poor two models i) a logistic model to estimate the probability 
of being poor at 4 + Z (*",#./) given household characteristics at 4 (;",#); and ii) a log-linear 
regression model estimating household per capita income at 4	to the same explanatory variables 
measured at 4 (;",#). The equations are as follows: 
 








>?	:",# = γ;",# + B",# (6) 
 
where :",#./ is the household per capita income in year t + s, and # and _ are the parameters for 
each model.41  
 
Then they calculate “the average of the independent variables for an array of estimated 
probabilities of falling into poverty. The resulting coefficients from Eq. [6] are thus used to 
produce the predicted income associated to each probability. […] As the middle class, ideally, 
should consist of those households facing a low risk of falling into poverty over time we use a 
10 % probability of falling into poverty as a dividing line between economic security and 
vulnerability, and define the predicted income associated to that probability as the lower-
threshold that depicts the lower bound of the middle class” (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014, 
p. 33).  
 
Another way to explain López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) procedure is in terms of a 




= #! + #;",# , (7) 
 











For simplicity, I assume that ;",# refers to one variable. The next step López-Calva & Ortiz-
Juarez (2014) follow is to calculate the mean of the observable variable (;5,6####) of all non-poor 
households (b)	 at time 4 whose probability of falling into poverty (*7,#./) lies in the range 
between 9 and 11 per cent. They used this level of poverty risk based on the annual poverty 
entry rate of 10 per cent estimated by Cruces et al. (2011) from synthetic panels for Chile, 
Nicaragua and Peru. 
 
 




Finally, López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) assume that the re-transformation of the income 
variable is: 
D(:",#c;",#d = exp	{D(>?	:",#|;",#)} , (9) 
 
and they calculate the vulnerability line using _ (parameters estimated in Eq. 2) and ;5,6#### as follow: 
 
H7,#N = D(:",#c;7,#jjjjjd = exp	(_K;7,#jjjjj) (10) 
 
One of the main advantages of the López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) approach is that it 
provides a vulnerability line that can be used to compare upper-middle-income countries since 
it is based in the World Bank poverty line for these countries. This explains its extensive use to 
identify and measure those who are vulnerable to poverty and also those who qualify as middle-
class in contexts of absolute poverty reduction (e.g. Birdsall et al., 2014; Ferreira et al., 2013; 
Stampini et al., 2016; Wietzke & Sumner, 2018).  
 
However, the López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) approach does not address important issues 
that may bias their results. First, their model assumes a logit relationship between the poverty 
entry probability for the non-poor and observable variables without taking into consideration 
panel attrition, which is significant for the data they used. In the case of Chile, the panel data at 
4 + Z	analysed by  López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) is non-randomly selected (Bendezú, Denis, 
& Zubizarreta, 2007), and it biases estimates of some measures such as income mobility 
(Paredes, Prieto, & Zubizarreta, 2006).  
 
Second, the López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) model for predicting household income (Eq. 6) 
neglects the retransformation problem (Duan, 1983). They obtain the vulnerability line 
(D(:",#|;",#)) in Equation (9) assuming a straightforward retransforming of the income scale. 
However, they predict Dk>?	:",#c;",#d and take the exponent as result, which is incorrect because 
the expected value of the logarithm of the variable of interest is different from the logarithm of 
its expected value (D(:",#c;",#d ≠ expmDk>?	:",#c;",#dn) (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). Thus, it 
biases estimates of household income. 
 
Schotte et al. (2018) use the observed average rate of poverty entry for the non-poor population 
as a probability cut-off to separate the vulnerable from the middle class in South Africa. They 
calculate the vulnerability line as “the average monthly per capita household expenditure of 
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those respondents whose predicted poverty transition probability falls within the 95 percent 
confidence interval around [this] probability threshold” (Schotte et al., 2018, p. 95). Importantly, 
they use the Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) poverty dynamics model to estimate the poverty entry 
probability for non-poor people. Unlike the López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez (2014) poverty risk 
model, the Schotte et al. (2018) model estimates poverty transitions probabilities while 
simultaneously controlling for attrition and for initial conditions effects (whether a household 
is poor or non-poor in the base year is a non-random event).  
 
Schotte et al. (2018) use the probability cut-off and a vulnerability line to distinguish between 
people who are non-poor but vulnerable and people who are middle class. They show there is 
a high level of misclassification error: i) 40 per cent of those classified as vulnerable by their 
observed income position would be classified as middle class using their risk of falling into 
poverty; and ii) 20 per cent of those who would be classified as middle class based on their 
observed income position would be identified as vulnerable given their poverty risk. “We show 
that class divisions based on monetary thresholds inadequately capture a household’s chances 
[…] of downward mobility and would lead to non-negligible misclassification errors” (Schotte 
et al., 2018, p. 102).42  
 
Schotte et al.’s (2018) approach has three weakness: i) the use of the confidence interval to 
estimate the vulnerability line is undesirable because the poverty risk range is a function of 
sample size and design; ii) how to obtain a vulnerability line if no sample observation falls in the 
confidence interval estimated is unclear; and iii) the use of observed household expenditure to 
estimate the vulnerability line could make it more volatile than other alternatives such as the 
predicted household expenditure. 
 
Finally, Dang & Lanjouw’s (2017) approach differs from those of López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez 
(2014) and Schotte et al. (2018) because they use a non-parametric estimation method to 
estimate vulnerability lines as a function household consumption or income. Thus, information 
about households’ characteristics is not used in their approach. Dang & Lanjouw (2017) derive 
income cut-offs (vulnerability lines) that enable them to differentiate between the population 
that is not currently poor but that is vulnerable to poverty. They define H! “as the vulnerability 
 
42 Yet, the authors do not mention that their results show that the poverty dynamic model used for estimating the 




line such that a specified proportion of the population with a consumption level above this line 
in time 0 will fall below the poverty line Z$ in time 1” (Dang & Lanjouw, 2017, p. 637).  They 
refer to this proportion as the “insecurity” index 8$, where H! satisfies the following expression: 
 
8$ = 8(:$ ≤ W$ |:8 > H!) (11) 
 
They also propose a second definition “that focuses on those with a consumption level higher 
than the poverty line but still below the vulnerability line in period 0” (Dang & Lanjouw, 2017, 
p. 639). The proportion of this population of falling into poverty in period 1 is designated as 
the “vulnerability” index 8+, where H! satisfies the following equality: 
 
8+ = 8(:$ ≤ W$ |W! < :! < H!) (12) 
 
In other words, to get a three by three transition matrix (poor, vulnerable and middle class) 
requires a poverty line (W) and vulnerability line (H!), where the vulnerability threshold is such 
that a specified proportion of the population (8+)	above W and below H! will be poor in the 
future. For example, Dang & Lanjouw (2017) employ a vulnerability index (8+)	of 10 per cent 
for their analysis of Vietnam and USA, and a vulnerability index of 15 per cent for India. They 
solve the equality (12) for the vulnerability line (H!) in each country iterating from the poverty 
line upward until they reach a value for H! that provides 8+. 
 
The main advantages of the Dang & Lanjouw (2017) approach are: i) unlike studies that fix the 
vulnerability index at 50 per cent (e.g. Chiwaula et al. (2011)), their vulnerability index is flexible; 
it can change or adapt based on practical complexities related to the design of social programs 
such as budgetary planning or targeting issues; and ii) the implementation of this approach is 
simple, and of intuitive understanding for policymakers. 
 
Dang & Lanjouw (2017) approach has a crucial supposition. It relies on a key monotonicity 
assumption to derive H! in equalities (11) and (12). “…, since P$ (P+) is a decreasing function of  
V!, we can iterate from the poverty line upward until we reach a value for V! that provides the 
specified insecurity (vulnerability) index” (Dang & Lanjouw, 2017, p. 604). This assumption 
implies that households are lined up in the same order in both period 0 and period 1. However, 
longitudinal studies in developed countries show the importance of addressing the re-ranking 
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of households across years (Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2016).43 
 
3.4 A low-income dynamics approach to identify degrees of vulnerability to poverty  
 
In this section I discuss the three steps I follow to identify degrees of vulnerability to poverty. 
First, I explain the econometric approach to modelling poverty transitions probabilities (same 
model used by Schotte et al. (2018)). Second, I describe my proposal to derive a vulnerability 
line from poverty entry rates for non-poor in the base year, and third, I show how to extend my 
approach to have two vulnerability lines, not only one. 
 
First step: A first-order Markov approach to modelling poverty entries 
 
In the initial step, I employ the endogenous switching model proposed by Cappellari & Jenkins 
(2004) to identify the relationship between household characteristics at 4	and poverty transitions 
probabilities, and specifically the probability of falling into poverty between 4 and 4 + 1 for non-
poor people. This model is a Markovian transition model approach and provides estimates that 
address two important sources of bias.44  
 
First, there is the bias that arises from ignoring the problem of initial conditions. This refers to 
the fact that the group who are poor in the base period may be a non-random sample of the 
population. Ignoring this may bias poverty transition estimates because it is difficult to assume 
that being poor in the base year is exogenous and uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics 
(Jenkins, 2011). For example, unobservables can make individuals more likely to be at the lowest 
extreme of income distribution in a given year. Second, there is potential bias resulting from 
non-random survey attrition. If the attrition process is not random and is correlated with the 
probability of poverty entry, estimates of the relation between poverty entries and covariables 
may be biased as a result of endogenous selection. For example, individuals that are more likely 
to be observed successively in the panel can be less likely to fall into poverty compared to those 
that attrit. 
 
43 Since the mean consumption in period 1 does not necessarily imply there was a far and wide increase in 
consumption in period 0, new research using panel data is needed to understand the implications of  assuming no 
re-ranking of  households between periods to derive H!. 
44 See Jenkins (2011) for a detailed review of  the standard approaches used to model poverty transitions such as 




In order to address the initial conditions problem and non-random panel attrition, I employ the 
Cappellari & Jenkins (2004) model. The model accounts for the endogeneity of both processes 
to poverty transitions probabilities by freely estimating the correlations between unobservables 
affecting. Thus, the model consists of three equations: i) the main equation of interest for 
conditional poverty status in year 4 + 1 for all of the pooled annual transitions; ii) an equation 
for the poverty status in the base year 4 (in order to account for the initial conditions problem); 
and iii) an equation for sample retention from one wave to the next (to account for non-random 
attrition bias).  
 
The latent propensities for these equations are represented by 8",#.$∗  (conditional poverty status 
in period 4 + 1), 8",#∗  (poverty status in the base period t), and r",#.$∗  (retention in the sample 
between 4 and 4	 + 1), and modelled using the following linear specifications: 
 
8",#.$∗ = s(8",#)_$: + k1 − 8",#d_+: tX",# + v",#.$ with   v",#.$ = w" + x",#.$~z(0,1) (13) 
8",#∗ = #:Z",# + L",# with   L",# = {" + |",#~z(0,1) (14) 
r",#.$∗ = }:Z",# + B",#.$ with   B",#.$ = ~" + ",#.$~z(0,1) (15) 
 
where X",# is a vector of covariates that has an impact on the conditional poverty status in the 
next period (4 + 1). The vector of covariates for the initial poverty equation Z",# is the same as 
X",# with additional exclusion restrictions, and similarly, W",# is vector of the variables that 
determine retention, including those in X",#, plus a number of exclusion restrictions. The 
inclusion of a retention equation allows for using an unbalanced panel and therefore for drawing 
on all the information available in the panel.   
 
The error term in each equation (v",#.$, L",# , B",#.$) is defined as the sum of a normal individual-
specific effect (w" , {" , ~") plus a normal orthogonal white noise error (x",#.$, |",# , ",#.$) where the 
latter follows a standard normal distribution. I estimate the model assuming that the joint 
distribution of these error terms is trivariate standard normal. The unobserved heterogeneity, 
that is, the individual-specific component of the error term, can be summarised by the following 
three correlation coefficients:  
 
Å$ 	≡ corrkv",#.$, L",#d = cov(w" , {") (16) 
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Å+ 	≡ 	corrkL",# , B",#.$d = cov({" , ~") (17) 
Å; 	≡ 	corrkv",#.$, B",#.$d = cov(w" , ~") (18) 
 
The identification of the correlation coefficients requires exclusion restrictions. Therefore, in 
order to allow the identification of equations (13), (14) and (15), Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) 
suggest using instrumental variables for both endogenous selection mechanisms that are 
correlated with the initial poverty status and with the attrition of the sample in the base year (4) 
but that are not correlated with the poverty status in time 4 + 1. 
 
Following other studies (e.g. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004), Ayllon (2013), and Schotte et al. 
(2018)) I use two types of exclusion restrictions. First, as an instrumental variable for the 
retention of the sample I use a dichotomous variable that identifies, among all the survey 
respondents, those individuals who were original members of the sample (interviewed in the 
first round), distinguishing them from those temporarily integrated into the panel sample 
because they were part of a household with an original member. The rationale behind this 
variable is that the original sample members have a higher probability of continuing in the 
sample than the temporary members regardless of the income level of their households. 
 
Second, I use retrospective recall data as instrumental variables for the initial condition of 
poverty: i) the levels of education of the mother and father of each respondent; as well as ii) the 
type of work of both parents. The assumption behind these variables is that both the level of 
education of the parents and the work they did in the past affects the initial condition of poverty 
in the base year for the individual that belongs to the panel sample but does not directly affect 
transitions of poverty of the individual from one year to another. 
 
Using the estimated parameter values of my model, I derive the poverty entry probabilities for 
every non-poor household in the base year (4). This probability is the proportion of households 
who are non-poor in period 4 that become poor in 4 + 1. Specifically, the poverty entry 
probability ([",#.$) as a function of households’ characteristics (X",#) can be written: 
 
[",#.$ = Prk8",#.$ = 1|8",# = 0d =
<'=>'(?!,$;)1(A!,$;)B)C
<=)1(A!,$C




where Φ+(∙) and Φ(∙) denote respectively the cumulative density functions of the trivariate and 
bivariate standard normal distribution (for details refer to section 2 in Cappellari & Jenkins, 
2004). 
 
Finally, I estimate the poverty entry rate between 4 and 4 + 1	([̅",#.$) as the average probability 
(N)$∑ [,,#.$âD"'$ ) of falling into poverty for a non-poor household. 
 
Cappellari and Jenkins’s model (2004) has two additional advantages related to the use of panel 
data. It can be applied to relatively short panels because it only requires two waves of data, and 
the model can accommodate left-censored poverty spells because of its first-order Markov 
assumption. Individuals who remain in the same state at each wave (i.e. are always poor or never 
poor) are included in the estimation sample.45  
 
However, I do not control for duration dependence in poverty status. As Jenkins (2011, p. 332) 
explains: “Markovian models assume that the accumulated impact of a person’s history of 
poverty (and non-poverty) is expressed entirely by last year’s poverty status”. Arranz & Canto 
(2012b) show that poverty transitions vary not only with individual or household characteristics 
but also with spell accumulation and the duration of current and past spells. Though, there is 
evidence that the duration of spells might be showing a spurious effect rather than a duration 
dependence effect when models control by unobserved characteristics (Devicienti, 2011; Kiefer, 
1988), which is what the endogenous switching model does. 
 
Second step: Strategy to associate predicted poverty entry rates with a household’s per capita income level 
 
The predicted poverty entry rate ([̅",#.$) is a probability threshold that allows me to distinguish 
between those who face an above average risk of being poor next year and those who face a 
below average risk of falling into poverty (the more secure). However, as I explain below, my 
objective is to derive a vulnerability threshold expressed in terms of income. Therefore, I derive 
the vulnerability line by calculating the incomes associates with the relevant poverty entry risks. 
 
My approach, like that of López-Calva & Ortiz-Juárez (2014), Dang & Lanjouw (2017) and 
 
45 Other poverty transition models without a first-order Markov assumption such as hazard models can control for 
duration dependence. But the price paid is they cannot accommodate left-censored poverty spells. This may bias 




Schotte et al. (2018), has an implicit monotonicity assumption: the higher the income -above 
the poverty line- the lower the poverty entry probability. 
 
There are two reasons to propose a vulnerability threshold in terms of household income even 
though a monotonic relationship assumption may not always apply. First, using vulnerability 
line instead of the probability threshold estimated in the first step facilitates its interpretation 
for social protection and poverty reduction policies because it has a natural compatibility with 
the poverty line used in its calculation (Dang & Lanjouw, 2017). Second, as it happens with 
poverty measures, where theory supports the selection of the poverty line cut-off criterion (e.g. 
basic needs approach), the vulnerability line measures connect with the well-defined notion of 
vulnerability to poverty approach (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014), which sets a criterion to 
estimate the lower-threshold of the middle class. By doing so, my measures deal with the 
economic literature that uses income thresholds to define the middle class (e.g. Banerjee & 
Duflo (2008); Birdsall (2010)). 
 
Furthermore, following López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez’s (2014) argument, I believe it is important 
to use predicted income rather than observed average income because the outcome of a 
parameterised model is less volatile than the observed values. Therefore, I can assume that a 
predicted household income better reflects the household income generation capacity because 
it is related to its composition, the types of assets owned by the household, and its environment 
(location of the house).  
 
I calculate a vulnerability line for a non-poor sample as follows: 
 
I use a log-linear regression model to estimate a cross-sectional household income equation for 
the base year at the household level. I use the same time-fixed predictor variables as in the 
endogenous switching model in the following expression: 
 
>?	:",# = βX",# + B",# (20) 
 
where ln	:",# is the log of household per capita income for year 4. I predict household per capita 
income for year 4, for each non-poor household C, based on the coefficient estimates from 




As seen above, some authors predict ln	:",# and take the exponent as outcome (exp	{βX",#}). 
However, that procedure is incorrect because the expected value of the logarithm of a random 
variable is different from the logarithm of its expected value. See Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) 
for more details about the retransformation problem of ln	:",#. 
 
I take into consideration the fact that D(:",#cX",#d ≠ exp	{D(ln	 :",#)}. I address the problem by 
applying Duan’s (1983) solution. I fit the log-linear regression using Poison regressions methods 
as a way of obtaining estimates of :",#, namely: 
 
:",# = exp	(βX",# + B",#) 
 
(21) 
That is, instead of taking the expectation of ln	 :",#, I estimate the expected value of :",# . 
 
D(:",#) = exp	(βX",#)DmexpkB",#dn 
 
(22) 
Assuming that B",# is independent and identically distributed, I estimate D{exp	(B",#)} by the sample 
average N)$ ∑ exp	(B,,#ä)D"'$ .46  
 
At the final, third step, I calculate the vulnerability line (H#) as the mean predicted per capita 
income at 4 for non-poor households (b) with a predicted households’ probability to enter into 
poverty in 4 that falls ± 1 percentage points probability around the poverty entry rate ([̅#.$ ±
0.01). That is: 
 
$! = D(:7,#cx7,#d = exp	(βx7,#)DmexpkB7,#dn 
 
(23) 
  for all [7,#.$|x7,# (as defined in equation (19)) such that: 
 
[̅#.$ − 0.01 ≤ [7,#.$|x7,# ≤ [̅#.$ + 0.01 . 
 
The vulnerability line ($") obtained using a range around the poverty entry rate allows me to 
 
46 When comparing the average of  the observed income of  the household using the base year 4 of  the survey Panel 
CASEN with a simple prediction, we obtain a difference of  15.2 per cent between the two values (CL $158,215, 
and CL $134,126, respectively). When using Duan’s (1983) method to address the retransformation problem, the 
prediction of  the average is CL $159,300. This value differs by less than 0.01 per cent from the sample mean value, 
thus showing that ignoring the retransformation bias leads to a poor prediction of  household income. 
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reduce the volatility of the risk cut-off point and to provide enough observations to get a robust 
estimate of D(ã7,#cx7,#d in Eq. 23.  This strategy is both independent of the size and design of the 
panel sample and it provides similar vulnerability thresholds when I use narrower or wider 
percentage points probability bands. It is worth mentioning that vulnerability lines are sensitive 
to the household income used in their calculation (observed income, predicted income, and 
predicted income addressing the retransformation bias). See Table 3.8 in section 3.6 for both 
sensitive analyses. 
 
Extension: Using more than one vulnerability line to classify social groups according to their degrees of 
vulnerability to poverty 
 
López-Calva & Ortiz-Juárez (2014), Dang & Lanjouw (2017) and Schotte et al. (2018) apply 
their approach to countries sharing two characteristics. They have reduced income poverty rates 
in the last two decades and the median income is not far from the poverty line. This means that 
a considerable proportion of the non-poor population in these countries is vulnerable to falling 
into poverty. In these contexts, classifying non-poor households as vulnerable versus non-
vulnerable (or middle class) using one vulnerability line has three disadvantages depending on 
the chosen poverty risk criterion.  First, if the vulnerability line is associated with a single average 
risk of falling into poverty, the likelihood of misclassification increases. For instance, those with 
a moderate risk of falling into poverty (i.e. with household income close to the vulnerability line) 
might be classified either as vulnerable or middle class. 
 
Second, if the vulnerability line is associated with a low risk of falling into poverty while it 
enables a better identification of the middle class based on economic security, it makes it 
challenging to implement social policies that efficiently use public resources. For instance, a cash 
transfer program targeting all vulnerable households that fall under this cut-off, may inefficiently 
allocate public resources since several households would continue to be non-poor vulnerable 
regardless of whether or not they received monetary transfers from the social program. 
 
Third, if the vulnerability line is associated with a high risk of falling into poverty the line would 
identify a smaller vulnerable group (number) for whom a cash transfer would likely have a 
greater impact since it would be targeting households that show high vulnerability to poverty. 
However, those who are just above this vulnerability line might not find themselves in a situation 
of economic stability either. These households would likely require a set of social protection 
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policies tailored to their degree of vulnerability to poverty.  Yet, using a high vulnerability line 
would classify this group as middle class, misguidedly assuming they have reached a reasonable 
degree of economic security. 
 
To address these shortcomings, I propose to classify non-poor households according to degrees 
of vulnerability using more than one vulnerability line simultaneously. This strategy has two 
advantages. On the one hand, it allows for the design of more efficient social protection 
programs using different vulnerability lines for targeting non-poor sub-populations (e.g. income 
decile groups). On the other hand, improves the identification of the middle class since it uses 
a vulnerability line derived from a low risk of falling into poverty instead of the average risk of 
being poor in the future.  
 
Although my approach allows for calculating several vulnerabilities lines, I derive only two since 
this is the minimum number of cut-offs that enables me to address all the disadvantages of using 
one vulnerability line while keeping the number of income groups identified handy for policy 
purposes. The two vulnerability lines allow me to distinguish within the non-poor population 
groups with three levels of risk of falling into poverty: high, moderate and low.  
 




One vulnerability line focuses on households that are located in the central part of the income 
distribution (sample å), and the other line focuses on the upper part of the income distribution 
(sample v). The mobility matrix in Figure 3.3. describes how I identify three degrees of 
b) Using two vulnerability lines (Vh  & Vl ) to  
identify three degrees of vulnerability
Vls,t
Low vulnerability t  
(Middle class) 
Poor t+1 Non-poor t+1
Zt+1
Poor t
P l → low risk
P m→ moderate risk





a) Using a vulnerability line (Vm) to identify 









(sample c ) P
1  → more risk
P2  → less risk
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vulnerability to poverty using two vulnerability lines. 
 
First, I calculate a moderate (ç) vulnerability line (H(,#E ) for all non-poor households in the base 
year (sample ?, which does not include the rich) using Eq. 23. This moderate vulnerability line 
is associated with the poverty entry rate ([̅(,#.$) and it allows me to split sample ? in two sub-
samples in time 4: i) sample å with households with their income between the poverty line (W#) 
and H(,#E ; and ii) sample v with households with their income above H(,#E . Assuming that increase 
in income can lower the probability of poverty entry, the probability of falling into poverty for 
all households in sample % is higher than [̅(,#.$, and for all households in sample v is lower than 
[̅(,#.$. 
 
Including the moderate vulnerability line allows me to estimate two vulnerability indexes or 
transition proportions shown in the mobility matrix of Panel A in Figure 3.3. One is the 
vulnerable index (8$) and the other is the insecurity index (8+). 8$ and 8+ correspond to the 
expected proportions of those falling into poverty at more and less risk than the average, orange 
cell and green cell, respectively. 
 
8$ = 8(:#.$ ≤ W#.$|W# < :# ≤ H(,#E )  (24) 
 
8+ = 8(:#.$ ≤ W#.$|H(,#E < :#)  (25) 
 
8$ and 8+ are transition proportions in a mobility matrix similar to Dang & Lanjouw’s (2017) 
vulnerability indexes.47 However, unlike their approach in which the proportions in the matrix 
are given, and the vulnerability line is derived, I estimate both vulnerability indexes from my 
moderate vulnerability line (H(,#E ). 
 
Second, since my approach (step 1 and 2) makes it possible to obtain vulnerability lines for 
different non-poor populations in the base year, I can simultaneously obtain a high vulnerability 
line (HF,#G ) associated with the poverty entry rate ([̅F,#.$) for households in the central part of the 
 
47 Dang & Lanjouw (2017) provide two measures of  vulnerability to poverty: the “insecurity index” and 
“vulnerability index”, “but the insecurity index focuses on households in the top part of  the consumption 
distribution while the vulnerability index focuses instead on those located in the middle” (Dang & Lanjouw, 2017, 
p. 639). These authors approach offers greater flexibility in defining vulnerability to poverty, yet, in practice, they 
use a single income threshold. 
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income distribution (sample %), and a low vulnerability line (HH,#I ) associated with the poverty 
entry rate ([̅H,#.$) for those in the upper part of the income distribution (sample v).  
 
The mobility matrix of Panel B in Figure 3.3 shows how the high vulnerability line and low 
vulnerability line allow me to estimate three vulnerability indexes: the high vulnerability index 
8G (orange cell); the moderate vulnerability index 8E (yellow cell); and the low vulnerability index 
8I (green cell). 
 
8G corresponds to the expected proportion of falling into poverty in 4 + 1	of those at high risk 
([̅F,#.$ ≤ [",#.$, assuming a monotonic relationship between poverty risk predicted and income). 
 
8G = 8(:#.$ ≤ W#.$|W# < :# ≤ HF,#G )  (26) 
 
8E is the transition probability for non-poor people with a moderate risk of falling into poverty 
([̅H,#.$ ≤ [",#.$ < [̅F,#.$, ditto). 
 
8E = 8(:#.$ ≤ W#.$ |HF,#G < :# ≤ HH,#I )  (27) 
 
Finally, 8I corresponds to the expected probability of being poor in 4 + 1	for those with a low 
risk ([",#.$ < [̅H,#.$, ditto). 
 
8I = 8(:#.$ ≤ W#.$ |HH,#I < :#)  (28) 
 
My approach can be easily adapted to derive more than two vulnerability lines (e.g. for income 
quintile or decile groups). This feature might suggest that if, in the limit, I end up using the 
poverty risk (or corresponding income) information as a continuous, my approach would not 
be different from a VEP approach. However, this is not the case. In the VEP approach (see Eq. 
4 in the simplest approach to defining VEP) the probability of a household being poor refers 
to all current poor and non-poor households in its estimation. In my approach, the relevant 






3.5 The case of Chile: data, definitions and poverty dynamics  
 
I apply the framework described above to Chile. This country shows some specific 
characteristics that makes it a compelling case to derive the vulnerability lines. First, in 2013 
Chile was classified by the World Bank as a high-income country, reaching a Gross National 
Income per capita of around US$13,000 adjusted by international inflation (Tezanos & Sumner, 
2016). As a consequence of this economic progress and its highly focused social policies, Chile 
has experienced a remarkable decline in poverty over the last decades (Cingano, 2014; Larrañaga 
& Rodríguez, 2015).48 However, several studies reported that the improvement of this measure 
of economic well-being was accompanied by a generalised social discontent with the economic 
and political model (e.g. PNUD (2017)). This was evidenced by the massive protests that started 
in October 2019 when an increase in the public transport fare was announced (Pons, Mullins, 
Masko, Lobb, & Tella, 2020). 
 
Second, the progress of the Chilean society towards higher levels of social inclusion has been 
limited. Based on post-transfer and post-tax household income per capita, official data from 
Chile show that the Gini coefficient decreased only two points between 1990 and 2017, from 
0.521 to 0.502 (MDS, 2018). These figures are among the highest among OECD countries 
(OECD, 2018c). The high level of inequality reflects a large gap between the top and mean 
incomes (Chauvel, 2018). As a result of this gap, the income distribution is narrower in the 
lowest decile groups with a high turnover of many households around the absolute poverty line 
(Denis, Prieto, & Zubizarreta, 2007; Larrañaga, 2009). This characteristic of the Chilean income 
distribution suggests that many households are extremely vulnerable to falling into poverty 
(Maldonado, Prieto, & Lay, 2016; Neilson et al., 2008). 
 
Third, Chile conducted a household panel survey between 2006-2009. It is the only household 
survey in Latin America that collected data each year over a period of four years, providing a 
great opportunity to study the dynamics of poverty in Chile in order to propose vulnerability 




48 According to the official poverty measure used by the Chilean government during this period, the share of  




Data and definition of income poverty 
 
For the analysis presented in this chapter, I exploit the rich data set of the Chilean 
Socioeconomic Household Panel Survey (P-CASEN) for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.49 
The P-CASEN is a household-based panel study that collected information related to income, 
education, employment, health, household composition, and housing (Observatorio Social, 
2011c). The interviews were conducted annually with all members of each household (adults 
and children). The target population consisted of all private households throughout the national 
territory. For the selection of cases, the National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey 
(CASEN) 2006 was used as the sampling frame. The first round of the P-CASEN in 2006 
consisted of 8,079 households, comprising a total of 30,104 individuals (Lynn et al., 2007). The 
main advantage of this dataset is that it follows individuals and households over time. For more 
details of the P-CASEN see data section in Chapter 1. 
 
Although the household is the unit of measurement for income, I study the dynamics of poverty 
at the individual level. The reasons for this decision are threefold. First, it offers the 
methodological advantage of giving greater weight to households with more members. Second, 
it allows for following the level of well-being of the individual when changes in the structure of 
the family occur due to divorce, marriage, children no longer living with their parents, or the 
birth or death of a family member. See OECD (2001) for both arguments. Third, the variables 
I use to control the endogeneity of both poverty status in the initial period and non-random 
attrition are at the individual level and not at the household level. 
 
A relevant methodological decision is whether or not to work with a sample restricted to the 
adult population. In most studies of the dynamics of poverty, the analysis is limited to the 
population aged between 25 and 64 years (Ayllón, 2013; Buddelmeyer & Verick, 2008; 
Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). The justification for this is that children and young people under 
26 do not have an impact on decisions related to the income of the household. Also, by not 
including individuals over 64 years of age, researchers aim to avoid the impact of retirement on 
poverty dynamics transitions, particularly the impacts of pensions on income levels. Yet, the 
studies that propose vulnerability lines generally do not limit the age of adults for their analysis 
 




(Dang & Lanjouw, 2017, 2017; López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014; Zizzamia, Schotte, 
Leibbrandt, & Vimal Ranchhod, 2016). Therefore, given that one of the objectives of this 
research is to compare the results obtained with these types of works, I consider all of the adult 
population. 
 
In this research, the welfare of individuals is named in terms of monthly income. Specifically, 
the income corresponds to the sum of the income of the household (mainly salaries, wages and 
earnings from independent work), cash transfers received from social programmes, and the 
imputation of the rent when the house is inhabited by its owners. November was the reference 
month for questions about net income (after taxes). Questions without answers and values lost 
in the components that form the income have been solved by using imputation procedures 
(Observatorio Social, 2011b). 
 
To identify the low-income population, I use two absolute poverty lines. This procedure implies 
identifying the poor using the same income cut-off for each round. The first absolute cut-off is 
the official line of urban poverty in Chile in 2009, which in Chilean pesos (CL$) corresponds to 
a monthly income of CL$ 64,134 ($6.41 dollars per person per day (pppd) in 2011 purchasing 
power parity (PPP)). This poverty line was defined according to the minimum monthly income 
established per person to satisfy basic needs, which was calculated by ECLAC (Mideplan, 2010).  
 
The second income cut-off corresponds to the international poverty line recommended by the 
World Bank to compare levels of poverty in countries in Latin America that are considered 
upper-middle income. Even though Chile is a high-income country according to the World 
Bank, I do not use the poverty line for this group of countries because it is too high to be applied 
to Chile. Instead, I use the poverty line for upper-middle-income countries, which better fits the 
Chilean context. This value is $5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP terms. This threshold is based on 
the work of Jolliffe & Prydz (2016), who linked the poverty lines of 115 countries that are close 
to the 2011 PPP reference period with the income levels of each country, proposing four 
international poverty lines for four country categories: low income, lower-middle income, 







Poverty dynamics in Chile: a description 
 
As mentioned before, in the Latin American context, cross-sectional data show that Chile has 
been particularly successful in reducing poverty. However, behind these gross changes between 
one period and another, the net changes remain hidden. Table 3.1 shows the transition rates of 
poverty entry and exit in Chile from one year to the next for two measures during the period 
analysed. The first part of the table shows the results of the balanced panel, which considers the 
cases that were interviewed in the four rounds, and the second part of the table corresponds to 
the unbalanced panel, which includes all of the cases interviewed for all of the rounds.  
 
Table 3.1: Annual rates of entry and exit into poverty in Chile for the balanced and unbalanced panels 
              
Poverty status, year t Poverty status, year t+1  
 Balanced sample  Unbalanced sample 
  Non-poor Poor   Non-poor Poor Missing 
Upper middle-income countries poverty line        
($5.5 per person per day in 2011 PPPP)       
Non-poor 88.6 11.4  73.1 9.5 17.4 
Poor 53.5 46.5  46.7 40.6 12.6 
All 81.7 18.3  68.3 15.2 16.6 
Chilean official poverty line       
($6.41 per person per day in 2011 PPPP)       
Non-poor 85.8 14.2  70.4 11.7 17.9 
Poor 46.6 53.5  40.7 46.8 12.5 
All 75.5 24.5   63.1 20.3 16.6 
       
Source: Author’s calculations based on the P-CASEN 2006-2009 (pooled data). 
 
Table 3.1 shows that using the balanced panel, the probability of being poor depends on whether 
or not the individual was poor in the previous year. Using the official Chilean poverty line, only 
14.2 per cent of people living in non-poor households entered poverty in the following period. 
In contrast, the probability of staying poor is 53.5 per cent. 
 
The unbalanced panel gives us information about the transition patterns of the missing cases. 
Table 3.1 shows that 17.9 per cent of the individuals who were non-poor exited the sample in 
the next period. Among those observed to be poor, the percentage is 12.5. At first glance it 
would seem that the sample that remains during the four measurements is endogenous to the 
poverty condition of the previous period. In other words, the results suggest that the process 
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of attrition is non-random and possibly correlated with the probability of being poor. This 
potential non-random selection of the sample, which could bias the estimates, is addressed in 
the econometric methodology that I use in this study, as will be explained in the next section. 
 
Table 3.2: Poverty transition rates in Chile over period 2006-2009 
               
Initial year  Income poverty for different poverty lines    
  Upper middle-income  
countries poverty lines 
 Chilean official poverty line 
  ($5.5 per person  
per day in 2011 PPPP) 
 ($6.41 per person  
per day in 2011 PPPP) 
    Non-poor Poor  Non-poor Poor 
 Final year: 2007      
2006 Non-poor 89.9 10.1  88.0 12.0 
 Poor 49.8 50.2  44.0 56.0 
 All 83.2 16.8  77.9 22.1 
 Final year: 2008      
2007 Non-poor 88.5 11.5  86.1 13.9 
 Poor 49.7 50.3  43.6 56.4 
 All 82.0 18.0  76.5 23.5 
 Final year: 2009      
2008 Non-poor 89.5 10.5  86.9 13.1 
 Poor 56.0 44.0  48.5 51.5 
 All 83.4 16.6  77.8 22.3 
 Final year: 2009      
2006 Non-poor 92.0 8.0  89.6 10.4 
 Poor 61.5 38.5  53.2 46.8 
  All 86.0 14.0   80.4 19.6 
       
Source: Author’s calculations based on the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes: Based on balance data using all individuals and survey longitudinal weights. 
 
Table 3.2 provides information on the different probabilities of transition from one year to the 
next for two different poverty lines. It also includes the rates of transitions between 2006 and 
2009 (without considering the years 2007 and 2008). For the official poverty cut-off, it is 
observed that the annual entry rate fluctuates between 12.0 and 13.1 per cent while the annual 
exit rate ranges between 44.0 and 48.5 per cent. Using the poverty line of $5.5 dollars pppd in 
2011 PPP, the poverty entry rate between 2006 and 2009 is 8.0 per cent. If the $5.5 dollars pppd 
in 2011 PPP were transformed into the $4 dollars pppd in 2005 PPP, this would be 6.5 per cent. 
This percentage is similar to the poverty entry rate of 6.4 per cent estimated by López-Calva & 
Ortiz-Juárez (2014) for the period between 2001 and 2006. This suggests that the probability of 
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falling into poverty for those who were poor in the year 2001 was higher than that found by 
these authors, since they had only two measurements of income four years apart. 
 
Table 3.3 confirms there is a high dynamism in households’ income around the poverty line 
during a given period. The balanced sample with its longitudinal weights shows that 18 per cent 
were poor for at least one year, using the new World Bank income cut-off for upper-middle-
income countries; 9.7 and 6.0 per cent were poor for two and three years, respectively, while 2.7 
per cent remained in poverty from 2006 to 2009. Most important is the fact that a third of the 
Chilean population experienced at least one episode of poverty during the four years analysed 
(poverty prevalence rate). This percentage rises to 44.3 per cent when using the official poverty 
line in Chile. 
 
Table 3.3: Percentage of poor in Chile by years in poverty over period 2006-2009 
        
Number of years in poverty Income poverty for different poverty lines 
Upper middle-income countries 
poverty line 
 
Chilean official poverty  
line 
($5.5 per person  
per day in 2011 PPP) 
 
($6.41 per person  
per day in 2011 PPP) 
0 of 4 years 63.6 
 
55.7 
1 of 4 years 18.0 
 
18.8 
2 of 4 years 9.7 
 
12.0 
3 of 4 years 6.0 
 
8.3 
4 of 4 years 2.7 
 
5.2 
Poverty prevalence rate 36.4   44.3 
    
Source: Author’s calculations based on the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes: Based on balanced data using all individuals and survey longitudinal weights. The poverty prevalence rate is 
the proportion of individuals that experienced poverty at least once over the period analysed. 
 
These descriptive results demonstrate the importance of understanding the nature of the 
dynamics of poverty in the process of distinguishing the poor from the non-poor who are 
vulnerable versus the non-poor who are middle-class. Given that the main contribution of this 
study is to propose a definition of vulnerability to poverty lines to identify these two groups that 
are non-poor, it is crucial to understand what factors drive the poverty dynamics, particularly 





Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics by poverty status (average values 2006-2009) 
              
Variables All population At least once poor Never poor 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics       
Female 0.39 (0.006) 0.38 (0.010) 0.39 (0.008) 
Age 46.3 (0.201) 44.4 (0.295) 47.2 (0.260) 
Education: Primary school 0.30 (0.005) 0.39 (0.009) 0.25 (0.006) 
Education: Secondary school 0.5 (0.006) 0.51 (0.009) 0.52 (0.008) 
Education: University degree 0.12 (0.005) 0.03 (0.004) 0.16 (0.007) 
Labour status: Formal employed 0.70 (0.005) 0.61 (0.009) 0.74 (0.006) 
Labour status: Informal employed 0.12 (0.004) 0.17 (0.006) 0.10 (0.004) 
Labour status: Unemployed 0.02 (0.001) 0.04 (0.003) 0.01 (0.001) 
Labour status: Inactive 0.16 (0.004) 0.19 (0.007) 0.15 (0.005) 
HH head’s partner characteristics       
Age 44.7 (0.214) 41.7 (0.306) 46.3 (0.282) 
Education: Primary school 0.31 (0.007) 0.42 (0.012) 0.25 (0.008) 
Education: Secondary school 0.53 (0.008) 0.50 (0.013) 0.54 (0.011) 
Education: University degree 0.10 (0.007) 0.02 (0.004) 0.13 (0.009) 
Labour status: Formal employed 0.37 (0.008) 0.19 (0.009) 0.46 (0.011) 
Labour status: Informal employed 0.09 (0.004) 0.10 (0.006) 0.08 (0.005) 
Labour status: Unemployed 0.05 (0.003) 0.07 (0.006) 0.04 (0.004) 
Labour status: Inactive 0.50 (0.008) 0.65 (0.011) 0.42 (0.010) 
Household characteristics       
Household type: Couple without children 0.27 (0.005) 0.17 (0.007) 0.31 (0.007) 
Household type: Single without children 0.15 (0.005) 0.10 (0.006) 0.18 (0.006) 
Household type: Couple with children 0.37 (0.006) 0.49 (0.010) 0.31 (0.007) 
Household type: Single with children 0.14 (0.004) 0.20 (0.008) 0.11 (0.005) 
Household type: Lone person 0.08 (0.004) 0.05 (0.005) 0.09 (0.005) 
Number of persons 3.8 (0.022) 4.2 (0.038) 3.6 (0.026) 
Number of children < 15  0.8 (0.012) 1.2 (0.023) 0.6 (0.013) 
Number of workers 1.4 (0.011) 1.0 (0.014) 1.5 (0.014) 
Housing: Own housing (no mortgage) 0.57 (0.006) 0.50 (0.009) 0.59 (0.008) 
Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.12 (0.004) 0.06 (0.005) 0.15 (0.005) 
Housing: Rent 0.16 (0.006) 0.16 (0.008) 0.15 (0.008) 
Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.15 (0.004) 0.25 (0.007) 0.10 (0.004) 
Rural 0.11 (0.003) 0.17 (0.007) 0.09 (0.004) 
Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.11 (0.004) 0.12 (0.006) 0.10 (0.004) 
Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.47 (0.006) 0.56 (0.010) 0.43 (0.008) 
Regions: 11th and 12th  0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.002) 
Regions: 13th 0.41 (0.007) 0.31 (0.010) 0.45 (0.008) 
Nº household year-observations 26,463 9,052 17,411        
Source: Author’s calculations based on the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes: Balanced sample with longitudinal weights are used. All results are rates (%) unless stated otherwise. For 




Table 3.4 compares those households that experienced poverty at least once with those 
households that were never poor. The first sample corresponds to all of the households 
interviewed in the four waves of the panel survey. The second sample considers those 
households that were poor for at least one year. The third sample corresponds to households 
that never experienced poverty during the four years. 
 
A systematic difference is observed between the variables that describe the characteristics of the 
head of the household, his/her partner and the household in general.50 As expected, the head 
of the household in non-poor households tends to be older, and show higher educational 
attainment, as well as a higher proportion of formal work compared to the heads of households 
that were poor during the period studied. For household head’s partner in non-poor household, 
the average age is 46.3 years old while in households at least once poor the age is 41.7. Similar 
differences are observed in educational achievement and employment status. In non-poor 
households, 13 per cent have a university education and 46 per cent had a formal job, while in 
households that fell into poverty at least once, only 2 per cent have a university education, and 
19 per cent had a formal job. 
 
Regarding the characteristics of households, the presence of children increases the likelihood of 
experiencing poverty, regardless of the type of household (single-parent or head of a household 
with a partner). In non-poor households, the average number of children is 0.6 children while 
in poor households the average is 1.2 children. The size of the household together with the 
number of people working also shows important differences. In households that experienced 
poverty, on average only one member worked, and the average household size was 4.2 people. 
In contrast, in non-poor households, on average 1.5 members worked, and the average 
household size was 3.6 people. As for housing tenure and its location, those who owned their 
house and lived in an urban area, particularly in the city of Santiago (Region 13), were more 





50 I define the head of  the household as the member of  the household who contributes the highest earnings to the 
household income. In the case of  a workless household, the self-reported household head is considered. 
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3.6 Predicting vulnerability lines using the low-income dynamic model estimates 
 
In this section, I present the results of the poverty dynamic approach to identifying the degrees 
of vulnerability to poverty in the distribution of income in Chile. The discussion of these results 
is presented in the following four sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I test the specifications 
of the model that will allow me to estimate the probability of falling into poverty for non-poor 
households. For that, I compare the estimates of the model with the data, estimate the 
correlation between unobservables, and perform several tests to determine the ignorability of 
both initial conditions and attrition. In the following sub-section, I present the results of the 
estimates for the conditional poverty equation using the poverty line recommended by the 
World Bank for upper middle-income countries. In the third sub-section, I show the 
vulnerability lines associated with the risk of falling into poverty for each sample of households 
specified in the three stages of my proposal. Finally, I use the low and high vulnerability lines to 
classify currently non-poor people into three risk groups: low, moderate and high risk of falling 
into poverty in the next period. 
 
Testing model specification 
 
First, I present an assessment of the degree of fit of the model to the CASEN data panel. Panel 
1 in Table 3.5 presents the predictions that the model calculates from equation (13) for the 
official poverty line in Chile. The overall average of individuals that enter poverty in period 4 +
1 (since they were not poor in period 4) is 0.146, which is close to the 0.142 from the matrix of 
annual poverty transitions in Table 3.1. For the proportion of individuals that remain in the 
panel sample, the value of the predicted probability and the raw value are both 0.834. The same 
is true for the initial poverty ratio (0.257). These predictions show that the specified model 
replicates the sample averages closely. 
 
One of the advantages of using a first-order Markov approach is that it takes into account the 
initial conditions and non-random survey attrition. In order to evaluate the possible ignorability 
of these two selection mechanisms in the model, I test for the separate and joint significance of 
the correlation coefficients associated with the selections in equations (14) and (15). The term 
ignorability here means that the different equations of the model can be estimated separately 




Table 3.5: Predicted probabilities, estimates of the model correlations and statistics tests 
        
1. Predicted probabilities Estimate   Std. Dev. 
Poverty entry 0.146 
 
(0.106) 
Initially poor 0.257 
 
(0.206) 
Survey retention 0.834 
 
(0.183) 
2. Correlations between unobservable components 
   
ρ1: Initial and conditional poverty  0.043 
 
(0.044) 
ρ2: Survey retention and initial poverty 0.025 **  (0.012) 
ρ3: Survey retention and conditional poverty 0.032 ** (0.013) 
3. Wald test of correlations (null hypotheses for tests) Test statistic 
 
p-value 
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0: No evidence of initial conditions 6.48 ** 0.0391  
ρ1 = ρ3 = 0: No evidence of non-random attrition 10.12 *** 0.0064  
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 = 0: Joint exogeneity 10.71 ** 0.0134  
    
Source: Author’s calculations based on the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Simulated pseudo maximum likelihood estimation 
with 250 random draws. *** significance at 1 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 10 percent. 
 
As illustrated in Panel 2 in Table 3.5, there is no significant evidence of an unobserved 
correlation &# between initial and conditional poverty in the P-CASEN data. However, there is 
strong statistical evidence that the unobservable factors of non-random attrition are positively 
correlated with both the initial poverty in the base year &$ and with the conditional poverty 
status &%.  
 
These results should not be surprising because they confirm what is described in Table 3.1; that 
is, a greater retention in the panel sample of those who were poor initially compared with those 
who were non-poor and also those who were poor in the next period compared to those who 
were above the poverty line. This result implies that the sample panel contains a non-random 
attrition problem. The exogeneity tests of the two selection processes considered could be 
rejected by the Wald tests conducted. Thus, both initial condition of poverty status and survey 
retention could be regarded as endogenous to the model (see panel 3 in Table 3.5). 
 
In summary, the tests in the correlations of the unobservable factors indicate that the initial 
condition and the attrition of the sample are endogenous. Therefore, it is necessary to use the 
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three equations (13, 14 and 15) of the endogenous switching framework to estimate the entry 
rates into poverty. 
 
The drivers of poverty entry 
 
Table 3.6 shows the coefficients for the probability of entering poverty from equation (19) using 
the poverty line of $5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP terms, which corresponds to the cut-off 
suggested by the World Bank to compare upper-middle income countries.51  
 
In terms of the characteristics of the household head, those who are less likely to fall into 
poverty are older males with a university education. Work wise, for heads of households in both 
informal jobs and for the unemployed the conditional probability of poverty entry is higher.  
 
The characteristics of the partner of the household head that affect poverty entry differ in some 
respects from the characteristics of the heads of households. In this regard, when the partner 
has a university degree has a greater impact on reducing the risk of the household of entering 
into poverty than when the head of household has a university degree. When the partner is 
inactive it has a significant impact on increasing the household's likelihood of entering poverty. 
On the contrary, although working in an informal job and unemployment are both statistically 
significant, they have a lower weight in explaining falls in poverty than in the case of the head 
of the household. These results confirm the findings found in other studies on poverty dynamics 
carried out in Chile (e.g. Denis et al., 2007; Maldonado et al., 2016). 
 
Finally, regarding the characteristics of the household, singles with children have a higher risk 
of falling into poverty. The same counts for larger families with more children. The attributes 
that reduce the risk of falling into poverty are: (i) the number of working household members, 
(ii) owning the house where they live (or paying a mortgage) and, in terms of location, (iii) living 
in urban areas and regions 11 and 12. Similar results are found in the works of Neilson et al. 
(2008) and Maldonado & Prieto (2015). 
 
As I have already explained, the model controls for the endogeneity of poverty status in the 
 
51 In the Appendix Table A1 shows the coefficients using the official line of  urban poverty in Chile. 
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initial period (equation 14) and non-random attrition (equation 15). When looking at column of 
poverty entry in Table 3.5, it can be seen that most of the covariates that are statistically 
significant in the association with initial poverty in time (4) are also significant in the case of 
conditional poverty status. It should be mentioned that covariates, such as having a university 
degree or the number of individuals working in the household, have a larger impact on the 
increase and decrease in the risk of being poor in the base year, than in the case of the equation 
to estimate the chances of falling into poverty.  
 
As to the exclusion restrictions used in this equation, it stands out that when the mother of the 
individual surveyed works as a salaried employee this increases the probability of being poor in 
the base year, whereas when the father also works as a salaried employee the likelihood of 
entering poverty decreases. In the case of the education levels of the parents of the interviewee, 
both parents have a negative impact on the initial condition of being poor when the parents 
have only finished secondary education. 
 
Column of survey retention of Table 3.6 shows the factors that explain the attrition of the P-
CASEN sample. The two characteristics of the heads of households that make them less likely 
to be retained in the sample in the following period are (i) being male and (ii) having a university 
degree. The occupational categories do not seem to have a significant impact on attrition. In the 
case of the characteristics of the partner of the head of the household that increase the 
probability of remaining in the sample, these are (i) having completed only primary education, 
and (ii) being unemployed or inactive.  
 
In the case of the characteristics of the household, being a household that is single with children 
has a positive impact on retention. Conversely, for single-person households, the impact is 
negative. Lastly, the variable that indicates whether the individual is an original member of the 
sample has a positive and the highest coefficient, which indicates that an individual who 





Table 3.6: Model estimates of poverty entry rates, initial poverty status and survey retention, Chile (2006-2009) 
                        
Variables (measured at t) Poverty entry:  
Poor at t+1| Non-poor at t 
 
Poverty status at t 
 
Survey retention  
  Coefficient Std. Dev.   Coefficient Std. Dev.   Coefficient Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics 
           
Female 0.039 * (0.020) 
 
0.171 *** (0.020) 
 
-0.046 ** (0.021) 
Age -0.006 *** (0.001) 
 





Education: Ref. Secondary school 
           
Primary school 0.140 *** (0.020) 
 
0.362 *** (0.018) 
 
0.133 *** (0.020) 
University degree -0.331 *** (0.037) 
 
-0.679 *** (0.047) 
 
-0.163 *** (0.029) 
Labour status: Ref. Formal employed 
           
Informal employed 0.416 *** (0.025) 
 





Unemployed 0.425 *** (0.093) 
 














HH head’s partner characteristics 
           
Age -0.008 *** (0.001) 
 





Education: Ref. Secondary school 
           
Primary school 0.240 *** (0.023) 
 
0.329 *** (0.023) 
 
0.045 * (0.024) 
University degree -0.400 *** (0.063) 
 





Labour status: Ref. Formal employed 
           
Informal employed 0.255 *** (0.033) 
 





Unemployed 0.168 *** (0.052) 
 
0.350 *** (0.043) 
 
0.227 *** (0.057) 
Inactive 0.100 *** (0.022) 
 
0.184 *** (0.022) 
 
0.046 ** (0.022) 
Household characteristics 
           
Household type: Ref. Couple without children 
          
Single without children 0.153 *** (0.034) 
 





Couple with children 0.136 *** (0.029) 
 





Single with children 0.329 *** (0.035) 
 
0.546 *** (0.036) 
 
0.155 *** (0.035) 








-0.198 *** (0.056) 
Number of persons 0.054 *** (0.008) 
 
0.274 *** (0.007) 
 
-0.028 *** (0.007) 
Number of children < 15  0.140 *** (0.013) 
 
0.085 *** (0.012) 
 
0.065 *** (0.012) 
Number of workers -0.201 *** (0.017) 
 





Housing: Ref. Own housing 
(mortgage) 
           
Own housing, mortgage -0.366 *** (0.030) 
 
-0.415 *** (0.034) 
 
-0.149 *** (0.025) 
Rent 0.217 *** (0.026) 
 
0.380 *** (0.026) 
 
-0.364 *** (0.024) 
Subsidized or rent free 0.204 *** (0.025) 
 
0.661 *** (0.019) 
 
-0.075 *** (0.023) 
Rural 0.133 *** (0.023) 
 
0.154 *** (0.022) 
 
0.094 *** (0.026) 
Regions: Ref. 13th 
           
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.094 *** (0.026) 
 





5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.152 *** (0.018) 
 
0.275 *** (0.019) 
 
0.147 *** (0.018) 
11th and 12th  -0.215 *** (0.050) 
 
-0.287 *** (0.052) 
 
0.271 *** (0.055) 
Time (t): Ref. 2007 
           
2008 0.105 *** (0.018) 
 
-0.173 *** (0.016) 
    





    
Individual characteristics (Exclusion restrictions) 
           
Mother education: Ref. No schooling 
           
Primary school 




    
Secondary school 
    
-0.156  *** (0.047) 
    
University degree 




    
Type of work done by mother: Ref. Self-employed 








    
Paid employment 
    
0.116  *** (0.033) 
    
Non-employment 




    
Father education: Ref. No schooling 
           
Primary school 




    
Secondary school 
    
-0.107  ** (0.045) 
    
University degree 




    
Type of work done by father: Ref. Self-employed 
          
Employership 




    
Paid employment 
    
-0.069  *** (0.026) 
    
Non-employment 




    
Original sample member 
        
0.509 *** (0.056) 
Constant 
    
-1.181  *** (0.063) 
 
0.602 *** (0.081) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -61,078.240 
Wald chi-square (d.f. = 131) 316,449.326 (p<0.000) 
Number of observations (person-waves) 65,205 
            
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. Simulated pseudo maximum likelihood estimation with 250 random draws.  
*** significance at 1 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
 
Vulnerability lines by poverty entry rates 
 
In this sub-section, I present the results of predicted household income by poverty entry rates 
for different non-poor samples. Table 3.7 shows vulnerability lines in the base year for three 
subsamples of non-poor associated with the average probability of falling into poverty next year. 
When using the World Bank poverty line ($5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP), the moderate 
vulnerability line is $12.8 dollars pppd with a poverty entry rate of 11.2 per cent for the all non-
poor. The value obtained do not differ much from the $13.0 pppd delivered by the World Bank 
(2018) after its most recent update of the vulnerability line. However, the interpretation offered 
by the World Bank differs significantly from the one obtained from my result. While the 
vulnerability line of the World Bank is associated with a risk of falling into poverty of 10 percent 
in a time horizon of between 3 and 5 years (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014), I obtain a 
vulnerability line related to the average risk that households have of falling into poverty from 
one year to the next.  
 
The low vulnerability line enables to identify the income-secure middle class. The second line 
in Table 3.7 shows that the income threshold for the lower bound for this group is $20.0 dollars 
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pppd with an average probability of falling into poverty of 4.6 per cent.52 This value is a third 
higher than the vulnerability line used by the World Bank for the same purpose, namely, to be 
the lower limit to identify those who are the income-secure middle class due to having a low 
risk of falling into poverty. 
 
Furthermore, the low vulnerability line that I propose is close to the $21.19 dollars pppd in 2011 
PPP terms of the poverty line used to compare high-income countries (Jolliffe & Prydz, 2016). 
In this way, the cut-off line to define the income-secure class in upper-middle-income countries 
would provide a direct association with the absolute poverty line of high-income countries that 
could be used in future research to study and compare changes in the income distribution among 
high-income countries with upper-middle-income countries. 
 
The high vulnerability line is 9.9 dollars pppd and the poverty entry rate for the non-poor sub-
sample is 17.1 per cent.53 The fact that the value of the high vulnerability line is a 30 per cent 
lower than the vulnerability line for the non-poor should not be a surprise. As discussed below, 
this is due to the high proportion of the non-poor population that is very close to the poverty 
line. 
 
Table 3.7: Vulnerability lines for subsamples of non-poor in the base year (t) using different poverty lines 
                
Vulnerability lines for different 
poverty lines  
Sub-samples of non-
poor in the base year (t) 
Poverty entry rate next year (t+1) Vulnerability line in base year (t) 
Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
!!: $5.5 pppd in 2011 PPP          
1. Moderate vulnerability line ("!") !! < $! 0.112 0.001 0.109 0.115 12.77 0.11 12.54 12.99 
2. Low vulnerability line "!" < $! 0.046 0.001 0.043 0.049 20.03 0.17 19.71 20.36 
3. High vulnerability line !! < $! < "!" 0.171 0.002 0.167 0.176 9.86 0.06 9.75 9.97 
!!: $6.41 pppd in 2011 PPP          
1. Moderate vulnerability line ("!") !! < $! 0.138 0.002 0.135 0.141 11.79 0.05 11.69 11.90 
2. Low vulnerability line "!" < $! 0.067 0.002 0.064 0.070 17.40 0.07 17.26 17.55 
3. High vulnerability line 		!! < $! < "!" 0.233 0.003 0.223 0.239 8.57 0.06 8.45 8.69 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Note: To describe the sub-samples I used the following notation: !! (poverty line in year t) "! (household income in year t), 
#!"	(moderate vulnerability line in year t). 
 
 
52 The low vulnerability line comes from the non-poor subsample where all households have income in the base 
year over the moderate vulnerability line (H#E < :#). 
53 The high vulnerability comes from the non-poor subsample where all households have income in the base year 
between the poverty line and the moderate vulnerability line (W# < :# < H#E). 
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For the Chilean official poverty line ($6.41 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP) the moderate vulnerability 
line is $11.8 dollars pppd, the low vulnerability line is $17.4 dollars pppd, and the high 
vulnerability line is $8.6 dollars pppd. As expected, these income cut-offs are lower than the 
vulnerability line based on World Bank poverty line used in upper-middle-income countries. 
 
Sensitivity analysis of the vulnerability line approach to associate poverty entry rates with household income 
 
I assess the sensitivity of the calculated vulnerability lines to some of the choices I made in 
deriving them. First, I evaluate the sensitivity to the selection of using the ± 1 per cent interval 
to calculate the average monetary threshold associated with a poverty entry rate. Panel A in 
Table 3.8 shows that a choice of a narrower probability interval of ± 0.5 per cent would have 
led to similar income cut-offs for both high vulnerability line and low vulnerability line. For a 
wider interval around the poverty entry rate such as ± 2 per cent the high vulnerability line and 
low vulnerability line change less than 3 per cent compared with the vulnerability lines for the 
± 1 per cent interval. 
 
Table 3.8: Sensitive analysis for the association of vulnerability lines with predicted poverty entry rates 
          
Sensitive analysis for  
vulnerability lines 
High vulnerability line associated with a 
poverty entry rate of 4.6 per cent 
 Low vulnerability line associated with a poverty 
entry rate of 13.4 per cent 
Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]  Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
a) Percentage points probability around  
the poverty entry rate  
 
      
       ± 0.5  9.88 0.07 9.74 10.03 
 
 20.15 0.12 19.91 20.40 
       ± 1 9.86 0.06 9.75 9.97  20.28 0.09 20.10 20.46 
       ± 2 9.92 0.04 9.84 9.99  20.85 0.07 20.71 20.98 
b) Household income          
       Observed income 8.30 0.05 8.21 8.40  23.17 0.17 22.84 23.49 
       Predicted income without 







 17.23 0.08 17.08 17.39 
       Predicted income addressing  
the retransformation bias 
9.86 0.06 9.75 9.97 
 
 20.28 0.09 20.10 20.46 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Vulnerability lines derived from the World Bank poverty line ($5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP). In Panel B, all household 
income used the ± 1 per cent interval around the poverty entry rate. 
 
Second, I assess the difference between vulnerability lines depending on the household income 
used (see panel B, Table 3.8). My high vulnerability line is around 17 per cent higher than the 
high vulnerability lines that are calculated using the observed income and the predicted income 
(without addressing the retransformation bias). When I compare the low vulnerability lines, the 
differences are even more significant. My low vulnerability line is 34 per cent higher than the 
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low vulnerability line based on the predicted income without addressing the retransformation 
bias and 18 lower than the one calculated with observed income. 
 
Using both high and low vulnerability lines to measure high, moderate and low vulnerable 
 
Based on the results of Table 3.7 and using the World Bank poverty line, Figure 3.4 shows the 
poverty entry rate associated with both the low and high vulnerability lines. It also shows the 
association between the average risk of falling into poverty from one year to the next and the 
level of household income for each of the tenths of the income distribution. Although the 
deciles correspond to the entire income distribution, the subsample of decile 1 considers only 
those that were non-poor in the period ', and decile 10 considers only those households that 
had an income inferior to $70 pppd. 
 
Figure 3.4: Vulnerability lines by poverty entry rates for non-poor subsamples 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Note: I used the World Bank upper middle-income countries poverty line ($5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP). 
 
The green diamond in Figure 3.4 shows the low vulnerability line ($20.0 dollars pppd) associated 
with its probability of entering into poverty (4.6 per cent). The absolute cut-off for the low 
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vulnerability line is in between the average risk of falling into poverty of decile groups 8 and 9 
of the income distribution. This indicates that less than 20 percent of the population in Chile 
can be considered part of an income-secure middle class. 
 
The orange square indicates the high vulnerability line ($9.9 dollars pppd) associated with its 
probability of entering into poverty (17.1 per cent). Vulnerability lines associated with the 
average risk of falling into poverty of income decile groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 are below the proposed 
high vulnerability line. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the income distribution and the two vulnerability line cut-offs that create and 
classify three groups within the distribution according to their degree of vulnerability, that is: 
high, moderate and low. The figure shows the size of each group within the income distribution, 
providing clear guidance to prioritise social policies tailored to each group. This is, policies 
aimed to prevent that those facing high vulnerability fall into poverty again, and support those 
experiencing moderate vulnerability so they can enter the income secure middle-class instead of 
moving backwards to face either high vulnerability or poverty.  
 
Figure 3.5: Income distribution by degrees of vulnerability to poverty in Chile 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes: The dark dots indicate the association between the probability of falling into poverty in the next year and the income 
level for the deciles of the income distribution. 
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Furthermore, Figure 3.5 shows the average risk of falling into poverty for the decile groups of 
the income distribution, which is associated with the average household income in each decile 
group. This information is also relevant for the design of social policies that aim to focus 
resources and obtain a greater impact within these three groups with different levels of 
vulnerability to poverty. For example, Figure 3.5 shows that almost one-third of the population 
face a high vulnerability, where decile groups 2 and 3 have a probability of falling into poverty 
of more than a 25 per cent, while decile group 4 has a probability of entering poverty of 20 per 
cent. Knowing this gradient enables the design of differentiated policies for each of the groups. 
  
Other advantage of the strategy that I have designed is that it shows the relationship between 
the household per capita income and the probability of falling into poverty for each of the three 
groups separately. This allows for using the point estimates of the poverty transition equations 
to examine how the predicted probabilities of poverty entry vary for individuals and households 
in each group with different combinations of characteristics. 
 
In order to ascertain whether the three groups identified according to their level of vulnerability 
to poverty differ from each other, I estimate a three-group mean comparison to test if there is 
a significant difference between the characteristics of: i) the poor and those who are highly 
vulnerable, ii) those who are highly vulnerable and those who are moderately vulnerable, and iii) 
households that are moderately vulnerable and those who show low vulnerability. 
 
Table 3.9 shows that the differences between the four groups are broad and statistically 
significant for most of the variables, particularly those related to the type and structure of the 
household. However, when comparing the moderately vulnerable with those less vulnerable to 
poverty, the variables related to the labour status of the head of household and the number of 
workers in the household are not statistically significant, whereas the variable that reports on 
whether the head of household has a university degree presents the greatest average difference 
between the two groups. This suggests that for a household to transit to a low risk of falling 
into poverty (i.e. to become income-secure middle class) the number of household members 






Table 3.9: Characteristics of the household in the last year (t-1) by degrees of vulnerability to poverty in 
Chile (Percentage of household and three-group mean-comparison t-test) 
                   
 
Vulnerability to poverty classification  Level of significance of differences between two groups (ref. 95 %) 
 
Variables 





 Poverty & 
High vul. 
Hig vul. & 
Mod. vul. 
Mod. vul. & 
Low. vul. 
 
Household head characteristics 
        
 
Female 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.33 
 
0.047 0.012 0.004  
Age 44.7 47.0 49.2 49.5 
 
0.000 0.000 0.527  
Education: Primary school 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.19 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Education: Secondary school 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.53 
 
0.000 0.001 0.063  
Education: University degree 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.27 
 
0.199 0.000 0.000  
Labour status: Formal employed 0.53 0.67 0.75 0.77 
 
0.000 0.000 0.142  
Labour status: Informal employed 0.22 0.15 0.09 0.09 
 
0.000 0.000 0.770  
Labour status: Unemployed 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 
 
0.002 0.000 0.384  
Labour status: Inactive 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 
 
0.034 0.085 0.368  
HH head’s partner characteristics 
        
 
Age 41.7 43.6 45.6 46.1 
 
0.000 0.000 0.151  
Education: Primary school 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.10 
 
0.04 0.000 0.000  
Education: Secondary school 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.35 
 
0.000 0.004 0.801  
Education: University degree 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.12 
 
0.018 0.000 0.000  
Labour status: Formal employed 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.28 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Labour status: Informal employed 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 
0.002 0.890 0.283  
Labour status: Unemployed 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 
0.100 0.028 0.024  
Labour status: Inactive 0.44 0.39 0.31 0.22 
 
0.026 0.000 0.000  
Household characteristics 
        
 
Household type: Couple without children 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.36 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Household type: Single without children 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.18 
 
0.032 0.000 0.000  
Household type: Couple with children 0.60 0.52 0.39 0.28 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Household type: Single with children 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.05 
 
0.001 0.000 0.000  
Household type: Lone person 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.13 
 
0.073 0.000 0.000  
Number of persons 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.2 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Number of children < 15  1.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Number of workers 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.7 
 
0.000 0.000 0.871  
Housing: Own housing (no mortgage) 0.50 0.59 0.62 0.59 
 
0.000 0.071 0.033  
Housing: Own housing, mortgage 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.21 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Housing: Rent 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13 
 
0.485 0.191 0.032  
Housing: Subsidized or rent free 0.35 0.20 0.12 0.07 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
Rural 0.24 0.18 0.10 0.06 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000  
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Regions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 
 
0.322 0.395 0.781  
Regions: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.63 0.57 0.47 0.42 
 
0.006 0.000 0.002  
Regions: 11th and 12th  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
0.002 0.091 0.371  
Regions: 13th 0.24 0.30 0.38 0.43   0.001 0.000 0.006  
Nº household 922 1,667 2,267 1,391      
         
 
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes: Reference year is 2006. Cross-sectional weights are used. 
 
3.7 Implications of using vulnerability lines based on a low-income dynamics approach  
 
Using income thresholds based on a poverty dynamics approach to identifying degrees of 
vulnerability to poverty allows me: i) to study the predicted probabilities of poverty entry for 
different combinations of household types; and ii) to have a better understanding of cases that 
do not meet the monotonicity assumption between both predicted income and predicted 
probability poverty entry. Below I explain both of them. 
 
Predicted probabilities of poverty entry for different household characteristics 
 
In order to demonstrate the scope of the analysis enabled by this approach I have estimated for 
twelve family types the household income and their probability of falling into poverty along 
with their non-poverty spell duration.54 To carry out this exercise I used the estimated points of 
the parameters of the model that controls for the selection biases associated with initial 
condition and attrition (Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.10 shows the results of the stylised families associated with the household welfare 
classification obtained from the low and high vulnerability lines. The households are listed 
according to their position in the income distribution. The reference household type (Case 1) is 
at the upper end of the income distribution with an estimated income of $81.1 dollars pppd in 




54 Based on the assumption that the relevant processes occur under a steady state equilibrium, it is possible to 
estimate the length of  time spent as non-poor. I use the median non-poverty duration defined as log(0.5)/log(1-
["#) (Boskin & Nold, 1975; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004). 
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Table 3.10: Estimates of predicted probability of falling into poverty and durations for stylised 
households 
          
Household Characteristics (types) Household per 
capita income a 






countries poverty line  
($5.5 pppd in 2011 PPPP) 







Case 1: Couple with one child aged over 15 years. The head 
of the household is a 50-year-old male. His partner is 45 
years old. Both have completed university education and, are 
employed in formal work. They reside in their own housing 
(paying a mortgage) in an urban area in the Capital city. 
81.1 Affluent professionals 0.001 692.8 
Case 2: Case 1 except child is under 15 years old. The head of 
the household is 45 years old and his partner is 40 years old.  64.3 




Case 3: Case 2 except head of household’s partner has only 















Case 6: Case 5 except head of household has only completed 
secondary school and his partner is employed in formal 
work.  
19.9 




Case 7: Case 6 except they have one additional child aged 
over 15 years old in the household. 16.9 
Moderate 
vulnerability 0.088 7.5 
Case 8: Case 7 except head of household’s partner is 
employed in informal work. 15.3 
Moderate 
vulnerability 0.137 4.7 
Case 9: Case 8 except head of household’s partner is inactive. 12.0 




Case 10: Case 9 except household is employed in informal 
work. 9.9 
High 
vulnerability 0.264 2.3 
Case 11: Case 10 except head of household’s partner has only 
completed primary school. 7.9 
High 
vulnerability 0.312 1.9 
Case 12: Case 11 except the head of household is female and 
her partner is unemployed. 6.1 
At the edge of 
poverty 0.348 1.6 
     
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Note: Estimates are based on expressions 19 and 23, point estimates from Table 3.6. 
 
In column 1 of Table 3.10, the characteristics of households that change from one case to 
another are detailed. These changes are related to an increase in the probability of falling into 
poverty. In this way, the table offers a depiction of the household types that fit into the different 
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classifications. It also provides information on the households whose income is close to the 
vulnerability lines used to distinguish one group from another. 
 
For example, a household that is classified as ‘income-secure middle class’ has an income of 
$25.1 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP and a risk of entering into poverty of 7.5 per cent. This case, 
which corresponds to Case 5 in Table 3.10, is a household formed by a couple with one child 
aged over 15 years. The head of the household is a 45-year-old male, who has completed 
university education and is formally employed. His partner is 40 years old, has completed 
secondary school, and is inactive. They rent their house in an urban area in the capital city. 
 
Of particular interest is Case 8 in Table 3.10. This household differs from Case 5 because it has 
two children, the head of the household has only secondary education, and his partner works in 
the informal sector of the economy. The estimated household income is $15.3 dollars pppd in 
2011 PPP and the probability of entering into poverty in the next year is 13.7 per cent. Following 
the current criterion of the World Bank (2018) this household would be considered middle-class 
despite having a risk of falling into poverty of over 10 per cent. Under the criteria I propose, 
using two lines of vulnerability, this household would be classified as moderately vulnerable. 
 
Plausible inconsistencies between predicted income household and predicted probability poverty entry 
 
As I have mentioned, my approach has an implicit assumption of monotonicity between the 
base period household income (among non-poor) and the probability of poverty entry, that is, 
higher income implies a lower probability of falling into poverty. However, when applying 
vulnerability lines to distinguish the degree of vulnerability to poverty, I risk making 
misclassification errors because there are cases where that assumption is not met.  I argue that 
these cases can be seen as ‘plausible inconsistencies’. Looking at the variables of the models that 
predict both the probability to falling into poverty and household income, ‘plausible 
inconsistencies’ are found to explain, for example, cases of households that share the same 
income but face different poverty entry probability, and inversely, households that share the 
same poverty entry risk but have different incomes. 
 
Table 3.11 illustrates some examples of ‘plausible inconsistencies’. I take two households that 
would be classified as middle-class using the World Bank’s vulnerability line, with an income 
per capita close to $15.0 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP, and compare them (Case A and Case B are 
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shown in the first panel of Table 11). Household A differs in terms of two characteristics from 
household B: instead of two children they have only one, and the head of the household works 
in an informal job.  
 
Table 3.11: Comparison between different households with the same predicted daily income and with 
the same probability of falling into poverty in the next year 
        
Household Characteristics 
Household per capita 
income a day (in 2011 
PPP) 
Upper middle-income countries  
poverty line  
$5.5 pppd in 2011 PPPP) 




duration in years 
(median) 
Base Case: Household compound by a couple. They rent their 
house and reside in an urban area in the Chilean capital city of 
Santiago. 
   
1. Two types of household with similar predicted daily income 
   
Family A: Couple with one child. The head of the household is a 
40-year-old male.  His partner is 35 years old. Both have 
completed secondary education. The head of the household is 
employed in the informal sector of the economy. His partner is 
also employed in informal work.  
15.0 0.232 2.6 
Family B: Couple with two children. The head of the household 
is a 45-year-old male. His partner is 40 years old. Both have 
completed secondary education. The head of the household is 
employed in the formal sector of the economy. His partner is 
employed in informal work.  
15.3 0.137 4.7 
2. Two types households with a similar probability of falling into 
poverty in the next year 
   
Family C: Couple with two children. The head of the household 
is a 40-year-old male. His partner is 35 years old. Both have 
completed secondary education and are employed in the formal 
sector of the economy. 
16.2 0.101 6.5 
Family D: Couple without children. The head of the household 
is a 60-year-old male.  His partner is 50 years old. Both have 
completed secondary education. The head of the household is 
unemployed. His partner is employed in formal work.  
11.2 0.101 6.5 
    
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Note: Estimates are based on equations 19 and 23, point estimates from Table 3.6. 
 
The probability of falling into poverty for Case B (a household of four people) is 13.7 per cent, 
whereas Case A, though a smaller household, has two members working in the informal sector 
and shows a probability of falling into poverty that is around double that of Case B. This result 
should not be surprising because it reflects the economic insecurity of a household with two 
informal workers, despite the fact that it has fewer members than the other. 
 
130 
Likewise, there are households with the same risk of entering poverty and different income 
levels. In panel B of Table 3.11, an example of this is shown. Case C and Case D describe 
households with different characteristics, namely, number of children, age of the couple, size of 
the household and number of people working. However, despite their level of per capita income 
being different, they have the same risk of entering poverty. 
 
The existence of ‘plausible inconsistencies’ in the classification of the households according to 
degrees of vulnerability to poverty connects with the discussion posed by Schotte et al. (2018), 
who strongly question the use of income cut-offs, proposing instead the use of the poverty entry 
probability thresholds to classify groups within the income distribution. My results show that 
non-compliance with the monotonicity assumption between income and risk of falling into 
poverty may not necessarily be seen as a classification problem. Both outcomes are plausible to 
be used to classify groups with different risks of falling into poverty. However, it could be argued 
that the use of vulnerability lines could have a greater problem of ‘accuracy’ that using poverty 
risk thresholds (Celidoni, 2013; Hohberg et al., 2018).  
 
Table 3.12: Comparison of predictive performance between degrees of vulnerability to poverty and 
vulnerability to poverty for different vulnerability cut-offs 
a) Degrees of vulnerability to poverty 
Two vulnerability lines  Two probability cut-offs 
 2008    2008  
2007 Poor Non-poor  2007 Poor Non-poor 
Highly vulnerable 24.8 75.2  Highly vulnerable 21.3 78.74 
Moderately vulnerable 7.8 92.2  Moderately vulnerable 7.7 92.3 
Lowly vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 3.7 96.3  
Lowly vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 1.7 98.4 
b) Vulnerability to poverty 
One vulnerability line  One probability cut-off 
 2008   2008 
2007 Poor Non-poor  2007 Poor Non-poor 
Vulnerable 20.0 80.0  Vulnerable 17.9 82.13 
Non-vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 4.3 95.7  
Non-vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 4.4 95.6 
       
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Estimates are based on balance data between 2007-2008 using survey longitudinal weights. Vulnerability lines derived 
from the World Bank poverty line ($5.5 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP).  
 
Table 3.12 shows the results of the comparison of predictive performance for both vulnerability 
cut-offs. It also compares the use of degrees of vulnerability to poverty versus a simple 
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dichotomy of vulnerable versus non-vulnerable. I chose the years 2007 and 2008 to show the 
households ’situation just before the economic crisis and one year after.55  
 
Panel A of Table 3.12 shows those who were classified with degrees of vulnerability using two 
vulnerability cut-offs. Using vulnerability lines in the classification, one of four highly vulnerable 
households fell into poverty. Using probability cut-offs this percentage is lower: 21.3 per cent 
of highly vulnerable households were poor in 2008. For those who are moderately vulnerable 
to both types of cut-offs, the percentage was close to 8 per cent. The percentage of households 
with a low vulnerability that fall into poverty was 3.7 per cent for the income threshold and less 
than 2 per cent for the poverty risk cut-offs. Using the official poverty line for Chile, the 
proportion of households that enter into poverty is similar, except among the moderately 
vulnerable where the percentage that falls into poverty in 2008 is around 10 per cent. See Table 
A.2 in the Appendices. 
 
As in Panel A, Panel B of Table 3.12 shows that the vulnerability line performs better to predict 
who fell into poverty than the probability cut-off. From the comparison of Panel A with Panel 
B, it is possible to identify two advantages of classifying households according to their degree 
of vulnerability rather than a simple dichotomy of vulnerable versus non-vulnerable. First, using 
two vulnerability lines allows for a better prediction of those who fall into poverty. For instance, 
it enables to compare the highly vulnerable with those identified as vulnerable using one 
vulnerability line. Second, it identifies the moderately vulnerable group whose proportion of 
households that fall into poverty is significantly higher than the percentage among the 
economically secure (middle class) group.   
 
In the short term, using more than one vulnerability line to identify different non-poor 
vulnerable groups provides better information to policymakers to design and implement social 
protection programs to face situations such as an economic crisis. In the long-term, it improves 
the anti-poverty targeting performance in countries with a weak welfare state and a distribution 




55 Although the collapse of  the housing bubble in the United States began in 2006, the so-called subprime mortgage 






In this chapter, I have proposed an empirical framework to identifying different degrees of 
vulnerability to poverty within the income distribution using a poverty dynamics approach. 
Applying this approach to household data from Chile, I estimate low and high vulnerability 
lines. This enables the identification of three types of households: those with high vulnerability, 
moderate vulnerability and low vulnerability to poverty. The last of these is the income-secure 
middle class. 
 
Making the distinction between the different types of vulnerability is crucial not only for the 
design of social policies targeted at families with a high risk of poverty, but also to understand 
the characteristics of those that show greater economic stability or security.  
 
Assuming that the economic conditions that determine vulnerability remain unchanged in the 
future, the thresholds denominated in real income terms can be used to measure the size and 
evolution of vulnerable groups using cross-sectional household surveys. This is important 
because there are few household panel surveys in most upper-middle-income countries. 
Furthermore, these thresholds allow for comparing countries where the income distribution are 
similar (sharply shifted to the left), and there is a weak welfare system — a feature shared by 
most of the countries in Latin America at least. 
 
In countries that use a poverty line of $5.5 dollars pppd (2011 PPP), household with high 
vulnerability are those with a per capita income of between $ 5.5 and $ 9.9 dollars (above the 
poverty line and below the high vulnerability line), household facing moderate vulnerability are 
those with a per capita income of between $ 9.9 and $ 20.0 dollars (between the high and low 
vulnerability lines, respectively), and household experiencing low vulnerability -the income-
secure middle class- are those with a per capita income of between $ 20 and $ 70 dollars per 
day.   
 
My approach proposes a more demanding definition of the middle class than the one suggested 
by the World Bank (between $13.0 and $70.0 dollars pppd (2011 PPP)). This is because it 
distinguishes two vulnerable groups rather than one: those at high versus moderate risk of 
experiencing poverty in the near future. It is worth mentioning that the World Bank’s 
vulnerability line and the ones that I propose have different interpretations. The World Bank’s 
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vulnerability line is associated with the risk of all non-poor households falling into poverty 
estimated using panel data with long interval periods (3 to 5 years apart). Instead, I propose low 
and high vulnerability lines that are associated with the probability of falling into poverty from 
one year to the next for different groups within the income distribution. The use of a "one year 
to the next" criterion not only provides more precision in the identification of the vulnerable 
groups but can also better serve the implementation of risk-management and anti-poverty 
policies. 
 
The implications of these results are significant. A high proportion of the population that would 
be classified as middle class using the World Bank’s vulnerability line are households that, 
according to my approach, face considerable economic insecurity. I would classify them as 
moderately vulnerable. I argue on the basis of these findings that previous research has 
underestimated how many people in Chile are vulnerable to falling into poverty and that it has 
overestimated the growth of the middle-class. These sobering conclusions should be of great 
interest to Chilean policy makers and others in other middle-income countries, especially in 
Latin America.  
 
Vulnerability to poverty lines offer to governments a concrete way to improve the targeting 
accuracy of programmes that seek to reduce absolute poverty. The extension of social protection 
coverage to these new social groups should be accompanied by the comprehensive design of 
social security programmes that consider vulnerability to poverty as part of economic welfare 
measures to assess social progress. In this way, the approach to vulnerability to poverty that I 
have proposed should fulfil a dual role: targeting and monitoring these new social groups. 
 
Finally, my study is at the intersection of interest in multiple disciplines, particularly economics 
and sociology. It contributes to the economic literature, not only by bridging the gap between 
the vulnerability to poverty and poverty dynamics approaches but also by empirically 
determining the income cut-offs to identify degrees of vulnerability to poverty going beyond 
the distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable. It also contributes to the discussion 
around social stratification in sociology, since the approach I propose based on degrees of 
vulnerability to poverty better adjusts to the reality of middle-income countries and to the 






Table A.1: Model estimates of poverty entry rates, initial poverty status and survey retention, Chile (2006-2009) 
                        
Variables (measured at t) Poverty entry:  
Poor at t+1| Non-poor at t 
 
Poverty status at t 
 
Survey retention  
  Coefficient Std. Dev.   Coefficient Std. Dev.   Coefficient Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics 





0.098 *** (0.021) 
 
-0.046 ** (0.021) 
Age -0.006 *** (0.001) 
 





Education: Ref. Secondary school 
           
Primary school 0.129 *** (0.019) 
 
0.3 *** (0.019) 
 
0.133 *** (0.020) 
University degree -0.356 *** (0.041) 
 
-0.717 *** (0.058) 
 
-0.163 *** (0.029) 
Labour status: Ref. Formal employed 
           
Informal employed 0.394 *** (0.025) 
 





Unemployed 0.171 * (0.102) 
 














HH head’s partner characteristics 
           
Age -0.009 *** (0.001) 
 





Education: Ref. Secondary school 
           
Primary school 0.228 *** (0.023) 
 
0.281 *** (0.025) 
 
0.045 * (0.024) 
University degree -0.433 *** (0.074) 
 





Labour status: Ref. Formal employed 
           
Informal employed 0.283 *** (0.035) 
 









0.295 *** (0.050) 
 
0.227 *** (0.057) 
Inactive 0.124 *** (0.023) 
 
0.094 *** (0.025) 
 
0.046 ** (0.022) 
Household characteristics 
           
Household type: Ref. Couple without children 
          
Single without children 0.154 *** (0.036) 
 





Couple with children 0.073 ** (0.029) 
 





Single with children 0.303 *** (0.035) 
 
0.493 *** (0.038) 
 
0.155 *** (0.035) 








-0.198 *** (0.056) 
Number of persons 0.038 *** (0.008) 
 
0.251 *** (0.008) 
 
-0.028 *** (0.007) 
Number of children < 15  0.133 *** (0.013) 
 
0.114 *** (0.013) 
 
0.065 *** (0.012) 
Number of workers -0.162 *** (0.014) 
 





Housing: Ref. Own housing 
(mortgage) 
           
Own housing, mortgage -0.307 *** (0.032) 
 
-0.315 *** (0.038) 
 
-0.149 *** (0.025) 
Rent 0.233 *** (0.026) 
 
0.43 *** (0.028) 
 
-0.364 *** (0.024) 
Subsidized or rent free 0.212 *** (0.024) 
 
0.716 *** (0.021) 
 
-0.075 *** (0.023) 
Rural 0.079 *** (0.023) 
 
0.127 *** (0.024) 
 
0.094 *** (0.026) 
Regions: Ref. 13th 
           









5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th 0.13 *** (0.019) 
 
0.214 *** (0.021) 
 
0.147 *** (0.018) 
11th and 12th  -0.133 *** (0.051) 
 
-0.299 *** (0.059) 
 
0.271 *** (0.055) 
Time (t): Ref. 2007 
           
2008 0.145 *** (0.019) 
 
-0.178 *** (0.018) 
    





    
Individual characteristics (Exclusion restrictions) 
           
Mother education: Ref. No schooling 
           
Primary school 
    
-0.064 * (0.033) 




    
-0.142  *** (0.047) 
    
University degree 
    
-0.227 ** (0.103) 
    
Type of work done by mother: Ref. Self-employed 
          
Employership 




    
Paid employment 
    
0.094  ** (0.033) 
    
Non-employment 




    
Father education: Ref. No schooling 
           
Primary school 




    
Secondary school 
    
-0.099  ** (0.045) 
    
University degree 




    
Type of work done by father: Ref. Self-employed 
          
Employership 




    
Paid employment 
    
-0.063  *** (0.026) 
    
Non-employment 




    
Original sample member 
        
0.509 *** (0.056) 
Constant 
    
-1.345  *** (0.063) 
 
0.602 *** (0.081) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -52,691.112 
Wald chi-square (d.f. = 131) 487,629.326 (p<0.000) 
Number of observations (person-waves) 65,205 
            
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Model used the Chilean official poverty line ($6.41 dollars pppd in 2011 PPP). Robust standard errors clustered at the 
individual level. Simulated pseudo maximum likelihood estimation with 250 random draws.  *** significance at 1 percent; ** 
significance at 5 percent; * significance at 1 percent. 
 
Table A.2: Comparison of predictive performance between degree vulnerability to poverty and 
vulnerability to poverty for different vulnerability cut-offs 
a) Degree vulnerability to poverty 
Two vulnerability lines  Two probability cut-offs 
 2008    2008  
2007 Poor Non-poor  2007 Poor Non-poor 
Highly vulnerable 25.4 74.6  Highly vulnerable 21.2 78.8 
Moderately vulnerable 10.7 89.3  Moderately vulnerable 10.1 89.1 
Lowly vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 3.3 96.7  
Lowly vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 0.9 99.1 
b) Vulnerability to poverty 
One vulnerability line  One probability cut-off 
 2008    2008  
2007 Poor Non-poor  2007 Poor Non-poor 
Vulnerable 19.9 80.1  Vulnerable 17.6 82.4 
Non-vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 4.6 95.4  
Non-vulnerable 
(Middle-class) 5.2 94.8 
       
Source: Author’s calculations using the P-CASEN 2006-2009. 
Notes:  Estimates are based on balance data between 2007-2008 using survey longitudinal weights. Vulnerability lines derived 











I propose a strategy to measure economic insecurity in countries in the Global South. I build a 
‘Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index’ that combines four indicators of economic 
vulnerability that cause stress and anxiety: unexpected economic shocks, unprotected 
employment or non-workers in the household, over-indebtedness and asset poverty. In this way, 
the index offers a measure that directly relates economic uncertainty to stress and anxiety due 
to the lack of protection and buffers to face an unexpected economic shock. I apply my 
approach to Chile using Survey of Household Finances (SHF) cross-sectional data (2007, 2011, 
2014 and 2017). The results show, first, that about half of the Chilean households experienced, 
on average, two or more economic vulnerabilities during the last decade with an intensity of 2.3 
vulnerabilities. And second, economic insecurity affects households on the entire income 





Although the macroeconomic effects of the financial crisis of the late 2000s, such as the decline 
in economic activity and the rise in unemployment, affected–with different intensities–all high-
income countries, it did not cause significant changes to income inequality or poverty (Jenkins, 
Brandolini, Micklewright, & Nolan, 2013). However, a high proportion of households 
experienced unemployment, descending income mobility, and sharp falls in their assets (wealth) 
all of which contributed to an increase in the perception of economic insecurity as well as a 
deterioration in the public’s confidence in the capacity of political leaders and public policies to 
address these problems effectively (Hacker, 2019; Rohde & Tang, 2018). 
 
Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) highlighted the importance of measuring economic insecurity 
in order to understand how economic risks are related to individuals’ well-being and offer social 
policies with a wider perspective that the one obtained through static measures of poverty and 
material deprivation. Since then, several authors have proposed measures of economic 
insecurity that address the stress and anxiety produced by exposure to adverse economic events 
and the incapacity to face them when they occur. For reviews see Osberg (2018) and Hacker 
(2018). 
 
Although a unique definition of economic (in)security has not yet been established (Rohde & 
Tang, 2018), a comprehensive measure of economic security should account for three elements: 
i) the household risk of a having an adverse event, ii) the negative economic consequence of 
that event occurring, and iii) some set of protections such as self-insurance through wealth or 
unemployment insurance to compensate or prevent the losses (Hacker, 2018). The measures 
proposed up to now have made use of the available data, mainly from developed nations, that 
capture the economic insecurity dimensions (usually giving an emphasis to some of them), for 
instance, the estimation of the probability of economic shocks using data from longitudinal 
surveys (Hacker et al., 2014; Rehm, 2016a; Rohde et al., 2014), or the measurement of 
households and individual buffers using data from household financial surveys (Balestra & 
Tonkin, 2018; Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013; Haveman & Wolff, 2004). 
 
In middle-income countries such as Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, there is a little theorical 
or empirical discussion on economic insecurity even though a large proportion of the population 
are exposed to economic shocks that not only generate income losses for the households but 
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also lead them to experience poverty. In the case of the Latin-American region, the social group 
most exposed to economic shocks has been described as the ‘strugglers’ (Birdsall et al., 2014) 
due to the permanent effort made by this type of household to maintain their income levels. 
This social group faces high economic insecurity since they have neither sufficient assets to 
offset an economic shock, nor access to unemployment insurance or compensation in case of 
dismissal when working in the informal sector. The emergence of this group of households that 
are vulnerable to poverty in Latin America has been accompanied by a massive increase in access 
to credit for consumption and mortgages (Matos, 2017). However, the rapid credit growth in 
the region is explained as being a credit boom instead of a financial deepening (Hansen & Sulla, 
2013). This economic situation increases the risk of over-indebtedness in low-income 
households (Guérin, Morvant-Roux, & Villarreal, 2013; Schicks, 2013). In addition, several 
countries in Latin America are highly vulnerable to natural disasters such as floods, droughts 
and earthquakes, which cause aggregate shocks to both the assets and income of households 
living in the affected areas. 
 
In this paper, I propose a measure of economic insecurity at the household level that can be 
applied in contexts where: i) inequalities in household wealth are high, ii) the social safety net is 
limited, iii) indebted households are increasing due to strong credit growth, and iv) the reduction 
of absolute income poverty rather than relative poverty is the primary concern for policy. In 
particular, I study the adverse effect on households’ well-being of the uncertainty of not being 
able to cope financially with an unexpected event that triggers an economic loss. I use the 
Chilean Survey of Household Finances (SHF) cross-sectional data (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017) 
and build four objective indicators (unexpected economic shocks, unprotected employment or 
non-workers, over-indebtedness and asset poverty) for two dimensions of economic insecurity: 
i) household risk to an unexpected economic event, and ii) lack of household buffers to face an 
economic shock.  
 
I combine these indicators using a multidimensional approach to build an adjusted 
multidimensional vulnerability rate for Chile called the ‘Multidimensional Economic Insecurity 
Index’ (MEII). This approach has two stages. First, I identify the economic vulnerabilities, and 
then, I apply an aggregation procedure to integrate the multidimensional information on 
economic insecurity into a single scalar measure (Alkire & Foster, 2011). 
 
The MEII I propose has two advantages that make it an appropriate measure for policy analysis. 
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The first advantage is that it simultaneously measures the incidence (proportion of economically 
insecure households) and the intensity of the economic insecurity (number of vulnerabilities 
affecting it). The second advantage is that the MEII can be decomposed by population 
subgroups (e.g. income decile groups or geographic areas) and economic insecurity domains 
(e.g. employment, income, indebtedness, and wealth). Thus, it allows for monitoring each of the 
dimensions of insecurity that are targeted by multi-sectoral policy strategies such as 
unemployment insurance, investment in social and affordable housing, micro-finance 
interventions, cash transfers, and policies to stimulate saving, among others. My proposed 
measure is the first to apply the concept of economic insecurity to middle-income countries and 
complement other well-being measures, such as vulnerability to poverty and multidimensional 
poverty, which are more commonly used in these countries. 
 
My estimates for Chile between 2007/2017 show high levels of economic insecurity in regard 
to both the risk of an unexpected economic event and the lack of a household buffer to offset 
a potential loss. More than a third of households were exposed to unexpected economic shocks 
during this period. The indicators providing information about households’ lack of protection 
reveal that 62.8 per cent were asset poor, 30 per cent had only unprotected workers or non-
workers, and 15.4 per cent faced over-indebtedness. When I combined the measures in the 
MEII, I found that, on average, about half of Chilean households experienced two or more 
economic vulnerabilities during the last decade, with an intensity of 2.3 vulnerabilities. The index 
tracks the GDP growth rate and labour informality rate, which shows its highest levels between 
2007 and 2011, before registering a significant decrease between 2011 and 2014, followed by an 
increase between 2014 and 2017. 
 
This chapter makes three contributions. First, from a conceptual point of view, I use two 
dimensions of economic insecurity related to an unexpected economic event and the household 
buffer to protect from this potential economic loss. Although both dimensions (and their 
respective indicators) are sources of insecurity, each of which may trigger stress and anxiety in 
individuals and households, the origin of these adverse psychological effects differs. In previous 
work, the focus in terms of the selection of indicators has either been on choosing between 
subjective and objective indicators (Rohde, Tang, Osberg, & Rao, 2015; Romaguera de la Cruz, 
2017) or on just one source of economic insecurity (Azzopardi, Fareed, Lenain, & Sutherland, 




Second, I propose indicators for these two dimensions of economic insecurity to be 
implemented in middle-income countries, especially those in Latin America, delivering a 
measure of well-being that contemplates the possibility of future events, which complements 
the forward-looking measures of vulnerability to poverty used in these countries. Until now, all 
measures of economic insecurity at the household or individual level have been applied using 
data from developed countries.  
 
My third contribution is the application of the MEII to Chile for the period 2007-2017. I study 
economic insecurity in a nation characterised by i) a significant reduction in absolute poverty 
coupled with a significant increase in vulnerability to poverty (Prieto, 2019); ii) an 
unemployment insurance system that has not yet managed to cover the workers who have 
greater job instability (Sehnbruch, Carranza, & Prieto, 2018); iii) an increase in consumer debt 
that has been accompanied by mental health problems in households facing over-indebtedness 
(Hojman, Miranda, & Ruiz-Tagle, 2016); and iv) a high proportion (75 per cent) of households 
experiencing asset-based poverty according to the OECD measure (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018), 
placing Chile, in this aspect, within the most economically vulnerable OECD countries. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, I summarise the most salient theoretical 
approaches and empirical findings related to economic insecurity. In Section 3, I describe the 
SHF data and dimensions and indicators of economic insecurity used in my research. In section 
4, I show the evolution of economic insecurity in Chile for each indicator. In section 5, I explain 
how I construct the index of economic insecurity. In Section 6, I discuss the downsides of 
multidimensional indexes of well-being and how to deal with them. In Section 7, I show and 






During the last decade, new approaches have been proposed to measure the social and 
economic well-being of the population. These approaches go beyond gross domestic product 
(GDP) to measure welfare, acknowledging that production is not an appropriate indicator of 
individual and social well-being (Adler & Fleurbaey, 2016; D’Ambrosio, 2018; Kakwani & 
Silber, 2007; Stiglitz et al., 2018, 2009). One of the new well-being metrics that has been studied 
theoretically and empirically at both levels is economic insecurity (Hacker, 2018; Osberg, 2018; 
Rohde & Tang, 2018). The notion of economic insecurity refers to "the adverse well-being effect 
of (involuntary) exposure to uncertainty in enduring an uninsured financial shortfall" (Rohde & 
Tang, 2018, p. 303). The idea behind it is that economic insecurity has a subjective component 
and is a forward-looking measure since stress and anxiety are associated with financial 
uncertainty. This measure assumes that changes in the subjective levels of anxiety in regard to 
lacking economic safety are highly correlated with changes in the objective risk (Osberg, 1998; 
Osberg & Sharpe, 2014). 
 
Economic insecurity versus vulnerability to poverty 
 
These characteristics distinguish economic insecurity from other welfare concepts such as 
income poverty, multidimensional poverty, vulnerability to poverty, and income mobility. 
However, economic insecurity may overlap in some respects and to varying degrees with some 
of the measurements mentioned above, especially with vulnerability to poverty, which is also a 
forward-looking measure related to the risk of income shortfall.56 In the economic literature, 
vulnerability is used as a synonym of insecurity, and throughout this chapter, I use these terms 
interchangeably. However, there is a clear distinction between the concept of vulnerability to 
poverty, defined as the risk faced by a proportion of the population of falling into poverty in 
the near future, and economic insecurity, which refers to the risk of facing an economic shock 
without being financially prepared, that affects (with different degrees) the entire population . 
 
 
56 Although both vulnerabilities to poverty and economic insecurity look forward at future hazards, the measures 
of  vulnerability are built using backwards-looking data on individuals’ past experiences (Cafiero & Vakis, 2006). 
Thus, any operationalization of  both concepts must assume that the economic conditions where the vulnerability 
measures were estimated in the past remain unchanged in the present and the future. 
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Also, there are three specific elements of economic security that distinguish it from vulnerability 
to poverty (Osberg, 2010; Rohde, Tang, Osberg, & Rao, 2017). First, the fear of experiencing a 
significant income drop matters more for health than the fear of being poor. Second, economic 
insecurity measures not only include household income (like the vulnerability to poverty 
approach) but also the buffering role of the wealth of the household, together with information 
on it (e.g. unforeseen medical expenditure or debt service burden), which allows for 
understanding the concept of economic insecurity as a multidimensional phenomenon. Third, 
the economic insecurity concept incorporates a subjective dimension regarding the perception 
of buffers, level of indebtedness or expectations regarding future shocks, which allows for 
capturing the idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals. 
 
Economic insecurity as a measure of well-being 
 
The importance of economic insecurity as a measure of well-being is recognised in the Human 
Development Report (HDR) by the United Nations Development Program (1994), which states 
that economic security "requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from 
productive and remunerative work, as a last resort, from a publicly funded safety net" (HDR, p. 
25). Beyond this formal recognition, the value of measuring economic insecurity is that provides 
estimates on two key welfare costs associated with it. First, economic insecurity makes difficult 
for households with children to plan for the future, resulting in psychological distress in the 
household environment and in diminished well-being, human capital investment, and 
development of the children in the household (Hardy, 2014; Hill et al., 2013; Western, Bloome, 
Sosnaud, & Tach, 2016).  
 
Second, economic insecurity can influence complex psychological processes that cause an 
increase in health problems throughout people’s lives (McEwen & Gianaros, 2010). Several 
studies have found that the physical and mental health of household members is affected by 
different downside risks of future economic events, such as sharp income drops or 
unemployment (Adda, Banks, & Von Gaudecker, 2009; Caroli & Godard, 2016; Ferrie, Shipley, 
Newman, Stansfeld, & Marmot, 2005; Kopasker, Montagna, & Bender, 2018; Smith et al., 2009). 
 
Studies have shown that households that experience difficulties in raising emergency funds 
when facing an unexpected economic shock are associated with poor health outcomes (e.g. 
Rohde, Tang, Osberg, & Rao, 2016). More specifically, households lacking access to health 
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insurance, and households financially fragile due to high indebtedness show higher prevalence 
of physical and mental health problems such as obesity, anxiety and depression (Clayton, 
Liñares-Zegarra, & Wilson, 2015; McWilliams, 2009; Münster, Rüger, Ochsmann, Letzel, & 
Toschke, 2009; Sweet, Kuzawa, & McDade, 2018; Sweet, Nandi, Adam, & McDade, 2013).  
 
A direct association between economic insecurity and subjective well-being has also been found, 
for example, the negative relationship between job insecurity and life satisfaction in countries 
such as Australia, Germany and the United Kingdom (Clark & Georgellis, 2013; Green, 2011; 
Otterbach & Sousa-Poza, 2016), and the positive correlation between the universal coverage of 
health insurance in one of the states in the U.S.A. and the levels of happiness of the affected 
population (Kim & Koh, 2018). 
 
There are several ways to build economic security indicators for these two dimensions. For a 
comprehensive review of the methods implemented recently, see Hacker et al. (2018) and 
Osberg (2018). However, the concept of economic insecurity has some methodological 
challenges in its operationalisation (Hacker, 2018; Rohde & Tang, 2018). First, it is difficult to 
know whether the economic shocks experienced by a household are unexpected or the result 
of a household decision. Second, although economic insecurity is a phenomenon that deals with 
unobservable and forward-looking expectations, most of the measures are based on 
retrospective information. Third, although several studies have shown a high correlation 
between both subjective and objective measurements (e.g. knowledge of future job loss 
(Hendren, 2017), it is reasonable to think that two individuals with similar characteristics may 
have very different perceptions about the future. Hence, under the same conditions, one 
individual can feel much more insecure than the other. 
 
Although economic insecurity has serious implications for well-being, there is no commonly 
accepted framework for its analysis. This can be explained by the methodological challenges in 
its operationalisation. First, it is difficult to know whether the economic shocks experienced by 
a household are unexpected or the result of a household decision. Second, economic insecurity 
is a phenomenon that deals with unobservable and forward-looking expectations rather than 
retrospective information. Third, it is reasonable to think that two individuals with similar 
characteristics may have very different perceptions about the future. Hence, under the same 
conditions, one individual can feel much more insecure than the other. 
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As a consequence, the empirical studies that have been carried out in developed countries up to 
now have proposed their own definitions of economic insecurity along with an ad hoc 
methodology for their measurement (Hacker, 2018; Osberg, 2018; Rohde & Tang, 2018). These 
insecurity measures, although they sometimes overlap, can be classified in three ways, according 
to: i) the unit of analysis (aggregate measures versus individual-level measures); ii) the nature of 
the dimensions (observed measures versus subjective measures); and iii) the number of 
dimensions considered (multidimensional measures versus unidimensional measures). 
 
Aggregate measures of economic insecurity 
 
When making comparisons across countries, the aggregated national indices allow for analysing 
trends in economic insecurity based on the combination of a variety of economic risk indicators. 
The two main macro indexes of economic insecurity are the Index of Economic Security (IES) 
proposed by Osberg & Sharpe (2014), and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) index 
of economic security (ILO, 2004). The IES comes from the ‘named risks’ approach, which 
examines four downside economic risks named in Article 25 of the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (i.e., unemployment, family breakup, medical costs, and poverty in old age).  
 
Osberg & Sharpe (2014) applied an IES adjusted to 70 countries and found substantially 
different levels of economic insecurity across rich and developing countries. The ILO index 
uses aggregated data from countries to measure seven forms of labour security (income, labour 
market, employment, work, skills, job, and voice representation). This index is currently applied 
to 90 countries, covering 86 per cent of their population (Rohde & Tang, 2018). It is important 
to mention that these measures do not allow for measuring the subjective and idiosyncratic 
characteristics of insecurity. As discussed below, econometric measures based on household-
level surveys allow for studying the effects and distribution of the insecurity features at the 
household or individual level, although this requires making assumptions on which there is still 









Individual-level measures of economic insecurity 
 
Subjective measures versus observed measures 
 
At the individual level, measures of economic insecurity can be obtained directly through 
subjective questions included in the surveys (e.g. general assessments of the economy, 
perceptions of buffers, and expectations regarding future shocks) (Espinosa, Friedman, & 
Yevenes, 2014; Hacker, Rehm, & Schlesinger, 2013; C. F. Manski, 2004; Rohde et al., 2015; 
Romaguera de la Cruz, 2017). The assumption behind these subjective measures is that people 
can make reasonably good forecasts of the economic risks they face. Although the economic 
literature has generally been sceptical about this type of premise (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2001),57 Hendren (2017) has shown that individuals can more or less correctly anticipate an 
economic shock in the near future. These findings suggest that perceived, and observed safety 
measures may be correlated, at least when individual responses are averaged over larger groups. 
However, several authors have opted to measure economic insecurity at the individual level 
using objective measures also obtained from surveys.  
 
Unidimensional measures versus multidimensional measures  
 
Using a one-dimensional-micro-based measurement approach, economic insecurity has been 
conceived of as i) job insecurity (Keim, Landis, Pierce, & Earnest, 2014; Rehm, 2016b), ii) a 
large income loss experience or a downward deviation from trend income (Hacker et al., 2014; 
Hacker, Huber, Rehm, Schlesinger, & Valletta, 2010; Rohde et al., 2014; Western et al., 2016), 
iii) financial difficulties (over-indebtedness and arrears) (Anderloni, Bacchiocchi, & Vandone, 
2012; Azzopardi et al., 2019; Białowolski, 2018), and iv) an inadequate private wealth buffer 
stock against shocks (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018; Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013).  
 
57 The main arguments of  those who ask for caution against using subjective measures are: i) their sensitivity to 
non-observable transient influences (e.g. the state of  mind of  the person responding to a life satisfaction measure 
(Krueger & Schkade, 2008); ii) bias due to cognitive factors (e.g. subjective data may vary according to the phrasing 
of  the questions, location in the survey and type of  scale used (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000)); and iii) the 
fact that they are not always correlated with the objective variable of  interest (e.g. perception of  criminal 
victimization and perception of  corruption versus reality (Ambrey, Fleming, & Manning, 2014; Olken, 2009). 
However, studies that have recognised these weaknesses in their analysis have also found that specific subjective 
measures show a highly positive correlation with the latent variable of  the phenomenon to be measured (Oswald 
& Wu, 2010), and that by not having perfect information about the variable of  interest with objective measures, 




Most of these measures of economic insecurity have focused on the United States, showing a 
significant increase in recent decades, with peaks in the years 1998 and 2007. Nevertheless, 
integrated measures fail to include important dimensions of economic insecurity in their 
construction, focusing on large income loss or the buffering role of private wealth or income 
volatility (Osberg, 2018). For example, they fail to capture the social protection that the state 
can provide (e.g. eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits or severance payments) or do 
not incorporate subjective measures on the perception of the economic situation that reflect the 
anxiety and concern of individuals in a direct way (Espinosa et al., 2014). 
 
In recent years authors have wondered whether economic insecurity is also increasing in other 
developed countries. Rohde et al. (2015) analysed the case of Australia using indicators of 
objective and subjective economic insecurity (job insecurity, financial dissatisfaction, emergency 
funds, unemployment risk, expenditure distress and income drop) and found that these are 
correlated with the country’s unemployment rate and GDP growth rate. At the same time, they 
proposed a measure of economic insecurity using a multidimensional index that combined all 
of the unidimensional measures into a single indicator using the principal components method. 
The rationale behind this multidimensional measure is that an appropriate concept of economic 
insecurity should be able to capture all types of economic stress explained by the risk of a 
negative financial future. In this way, economic insecurity can be conceptualised as a latent 
variable that can be inferred by the exposure to specific types of potential economic hazard 
(Rohde, Tang, & Osberg, 2017, p. 1669). 
 
The proposal of a multidimensional index to measure economic insecurity is not new. Bucks  
(2011) measured economic insecurity in the United States using twelve household-level 
measures of i) vulnerability to health, employment, or income shocks, ii) adequacy of household 
savings and income, and iii) borrowing constraints. His index is based on the methodology 
proposed by Alkire & Foster (2011) for measuring multidimensional poverty. Unlike Hacker et 
al. (2014), Bucks (2011) did not find a significant increase in economic insecurity except during 
the Great Recession (2007-2009).  
 
A third country where economic insecurity has been measured from a multidimensional 
perspective is Spain. Romaguera de la Cruz (2017) constructed an index from a modified version 
of the objective and subjective indicators used by Rohde et al. (2015) and an adjusted version 
of Alkire & Foster’s methodology (2011). The estimates show that after the Great Recession, 
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economic insecurity in Spain fell (in the year 2011), but since then the economic insecurity has 
been continually increasing. However, multidimensional measures that capture the insecurity of 
a household or individual in a single statistic have an important disadvantage. They are less clear 
and more sensitive to the choice of dimensions and weights in the construction of the index 
than an integrated measure  (Hacker, 2018). 
 
Economic insecurity measures in the Global South 
 
Although Osberg & Sharpe’s IES proposed a multidimensional measure at the aggregate level 
to compare both Global North and Global South countries, indices of economic insecurity at 
the individual or household level allow for comparative analysis between different groups within 
each country, making them a key tool for the design of social protection policies that can offer 
a better safety net to protect households from the stress or anxiety caused by not being 
economically prepared to face different economic shocks in the future. 
 
It is worth mentioning that economic insecurity measures at individual-level have not been 
developed in the Global South. In these countries vulnerability to poverty is the concept that is 
most often examined. It has helped in thinking about how to protect people from the risk of a 
decline in their well-being (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). Specifically, in Latin America, 
vulnerability to poverty is the concept that has been used to study the income dynamics of 
households with a focus on income drops (Ferreira et al., 2013; Stampini, Robles, Sáenz, 
Ibarrarán, & Medellín, 2016b). 
 
In Global South countries, vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity are forward-looking 
concepts that overlap in their goal of informing the design of policies focused on preventing 
households facing unexpected income falls. The complementarity between these two measures 
makes them applicable to nations beyond the developed world, that is, countries characterised 
by a large reduction in absolute poverty is accompanied by an increase in the number of 
households that have a high risk of falling into poverty again, weak social protection systems, 





4.3 Data and measures of economic insecurity 
 
SHF data 
I use data from the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (SHF) carried out by the Central 
Bank of Chile in 2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017. The SHF is representative of urban private 
households. It collected information on income, expenditure, household characteristics, 
household assets and debts with a high degree of detail.58  The SHF used a stratified, multi-stage 
probability sample selected from the population Census (2002 and 2012) sampling frame and 
included an oversample of well-off households using taxpayer information from the Chilean 
Internal Revenue Service (SII for its acronym in Spanish). The SHF design is similar to that of 
the U.S.A. Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell & Woodburn, 1999), as well as of the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey coordinated by the European Central Bank 
(HFCN, 2016).59  
 
I use the SHF household-level data, which not only contains variables on financial and non-
financial assets and debts, but also include socioeconomic and demographic variables. The size 
of the sample in 2007 was 3,827 households. The 2011 sample comprised 4,057 households and 
the samples in 2014 and 2017 comprised 4,502 and 4,449 households respectively. 
 
In summary, the economic insecurity variables obtained from the SHF are i) employment status 
and type of contract of household members; ii) retrospective questions related to significant 
unexpected expenses or substantial unexpected income drops faced by the households in the 
last two years; iii) information on the burden that debt imposes on the income of household;  
and iv) household assets such as non-housing wealth.  
 
I use the Chilean national poverty line defined by the Ministry of Social Development (2015), 
which measures poverty in absolute terms. This threshold is based on the cost of a basic food 
bundle. I construct post-transfer household income as the sum of income from labour, imputed 
 
58 The SHF methodological documents, reports and databases can be accessed through the following link: 
https://www.bcentral.cl/financiera-de-hogares 
59 These characteristics have made it possible to include the Chilean SHF in the OECD Wealth Distribution 
Database,  which  has  been used for comparative studies on households’ wealth inequality (Balestra & Tonkin, 
2018; Murtin & d’Ercole, 2015; OECD, 2013b). 
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rent, and private transfers plus public transfers. Because I use assets as a stock of material 
resources that can support the current consumption of a household, it is appropriate to 
equivalise it in the same way as household income is equivalised (OECD, 2013b, p. 141). 
Therefore, to account for different disposable income and asset requirements for different 
family sizes, I equivalise both income and assets using the scale that is equivalent to the 
household size to the power of 0.7.60  
 
I break down my estimates of the Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index by individual 
characteristics such as gender, age and education level and household characteristics such as 
family type (couple or single, with or without children, or lone person), size of the household, 
housing (outright owner or owner with mortgage or tenant) and location (regions). 
 
Measures of economic insecurity 
 
To measure economic insecurity requires  quantifying the level of stress or anxiety of a 
household attributed to an uncertain financial future. Given that stress or anxiety is not directly 
observable in the data sources that sociologists and economists usually work with, sources of 
economic insecurity rely on proxies. I classify these proxy measures into two dimensions. The 
first dimension is the risk of the household experiencing potential events related to negative 
economic consequences such as unemployment, losses in asset values, or unexpected medical 
expenses. The second dimension is the lack of household economic buffers, which generates 
stress such as not having enough assets to face an event that decreases incomes or increases 
expenses, or not having access to social protection mechanisms to offset these economic losses. 
 
Following an approach focused on the household-level measures, due to the existence of a 
shared decision-making process, my work uses four sources of stress distributed across two 
dimensions of the economic insecurity. As mentioned above, the first dimension is vulnerability 
to economic loss. I consider in this dimension a measure of unexpected large income loss or 
unanticipated expenses (known as downside income insecurity). The lack of household buffers 
is the second dimension. It includes three measures: i) unprotected employment or non-workers 
in the household, ii) over-indebtedness, and iii) asset poverty. 
 
60 The use of  equivalence scales for the estimation of  household income in Chile began in 2013. The value of  the 
equivalence elasticity was defined by an Expert Advisory Committee to update the poverty line (Ministerio 
Desarrollo Social, 2015). 
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My starting point in the selection of these indicators is that the level of stress or anxiety of an 
individual or household depends on the combination of these four sources of economic 
insecurity. For example, a family facing a decrease in their income (e.g., losing their job without 
access to unemployment insurance) might spend their savings or borrow money. However, 
families that have low levels of savings, or that have a limited ability to borrow, or are already 
allocating a large portion of their income to servicing a debt, may have trouble addressing this 
unexpected drop in earnings and be forced to give up food or fail to pay their debts or other 
receipts.  
 
Sometimes these situations overlap or combine with aggregated shocks like economic crises or 
natural disasters, which cause households to face an enormous wealth loss. An example is Latin 
America, where a large proportion of the population live in informal settlements located on 
residual land (e.g. ravines and river shores) making them particularly vulnerable to the frequent 
occurrence of natural disasters (earthquakes and floods). This reality has a negative impact on 
the value of the real assets of households (e.g. dwellings or vehicles) affecting the long-term 
economic security of these families (Baez, Fuchs, & Rodriguez-Castelan, 2017). These situations 
are associated with an increase in the level of stress or anxiety of the head of household and 
other members. 
 
In the following section, I justify the selection of the four sources of economic insecurity. For 
that, I rely on the empirical evidence offered by the health economics literature. Several 
investigations have linked these economic vulnerabilities with health problems, in particular 
with the stress of the home and its members. I describe the operationalisation of the indicators 
for each source of economic insecurity based on the information provided by the SHF. 
 
Household risk to an unexpected economic event 
 
Income insecurity refers to the risk of large income drops or unexpected expenses faced by 
families should they encounter unpredictable events of social life (Western, Bloome, Sosnaud, 
& Tach, 2012). In addition to unemployment risk, the common triggers of income insecurity 
are family breakdown and illness. Concerning health problems, these not only cause losses in 
household income (e.g. independent or informal workers with no protection for this type of 
incidents) but also unanticipated costs whereby part of the household income has to be used 
for medical expenses (Adda et al., 2009). Studies have shown that household experiences of 
 
151 
income instability are associated with situations of stress in parents and children, and increase 
the likelihood of indebtedness of the household, inconsistency in consumption, and 
underinvestment in children (Hill et al., 2013; Western et al., 2016; Yeung, Linver, & Brooks–
Gunn, 2002).  
 
The indicator I propose to measure income insecurity is based on the following SHF 
retrospective question: “Have you faced either unexpected expenses of significant magnitude 
or an income drop of significant magnitude during the last year?”.61 Although it is not an 
objective measure such as a household disposable income fall, it does ensure that the economic 
shock is considered as unexpected and not a household decision. I change this dichotomous 
indicator for a measure of risk attached to each household making out-of-sample predictions. I 
use a probit model, in which the dependant variable takes the value 1 if the household faced any 
economic event that triggered a sharp drop in income or a sharp increase in their expenses in 
4 − 1, and 0 otherwise. Both household head characteristics and household characteristics at 4, 
are used as covariables, including gender, age, labour status, educational level, type of 
households, number of children, number of workers, housing and household income. See the 
model on Table A.1, in the appendices. 
 
Assuming the relation stays the same for the next period, I attached to each household the 
predicted probability calculated using the characteristics at the current period and coefficients 
from the regression of that year. I classify a household as income insecure if the risk of an 
unexpected economic event is situated above a threshold. I establish the 70th percentile of 
predicted probabilities as a threshold because it is the cut-off that is closest to the observed 
values after doing sensitivity analyses for different thresholds. In this way, I differ from authors 
who have measured a similar economic insecurity dimension (a drop in household income) in 
their multidimensional index following the proposal of Hacker et al. (2010). Bucks (2011), 
Rohde et al.(2015) and Romaguera de la Cruz (2017) operationalise the income insecure 
dimension as a binary indicator of whether households experienced a large income drop in the 
last year, not the risk of facing it. By doing this, in addition to having an ex-post measure instead 
of a looking-forward measure, they cannot classify as vulnerable households that have not 
experienced such an economic shock in the previous year. 
 
61 In 2007 the SHF did not include this question. Therefore, I used as a proxy the SHF 2007 question if  household 
had expenses larger than its income in the last year. 
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As mentioned above, both job loss and serious illness are among the major event of unexpected 
economic shock. There is an extensive literature that measures when out-of-pocket exceed a 
cut-off such as 10 or 25 per cent of household income for consumption known as a catastrophic 
expenditure (e.g. Thomson, Cylus, & Evetovits, 2019; Wagstaff, Eozenou, & Smitz, 2020). 
Studies have shown an association between health outcomes and households that do not know 
how to pay a medical bill in case of severe disease (e.g. because they do not have health 
insurance) (Adda et al., 2009; McWilliams, 2009). 
 
For job insecurity, studies are even more abundant. It was first defined by Greenhalgh & 
Rosenblatt (1984, p. 484) as the “perceived powerlessness to maintain desired continuity in a 
threatened job situation”. Since then, a series of studies have analysed the levels of anxiety 
(Cheng & Chan, 2008; Huang, Lee, Ashford, Chen, & Ren, 2010; Keim et al., 2014) and health 
physical and mental problems generated by workers’ concerns about losing their jobs (Caroli & 
Godard, 2016; Green, 2011; László et al., 2010; Muenster, Rueger, Ochsmann, Letzel, & 
Toschke, 2011; Watson & Osberg, 2018).62 
 
I do not include both out-of-pocket health spending dimension and job insecurity dimension in 
my framework because the SHF data does not allow me to do so. Regarding the former 
dimension, the SHF does not collect information on household consumption. Therefore, I 
cannot calculate any measure of catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses. Regarding the latter 
dimension, the SHF asks for the interviewee’s perception about the future stability of his / her 
current job. However, these questions are not comparable between 2011 and 2014 and were not 
included in 2007. Although the SHF has a panel sub-sample that could allow estimating the risk 
of losing a job at the individual level, there is a significant proportion of individuals who were 
not interviewed in the next round. The follow-up rules of the panel focused on contacting 
households, not households’ members. Therefore, individuals who left their original household 







62 See Lee et al. (2018) for a complete review of  the research on job insecurity. 
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Lack of buffers to offset potential economic loss 
 
a) Unprotected employment or non-workers in the household 
 
Although I do not include an indicator that would account for the risk that a household has of 
an economic shock due to a job loss, I do consider the current employment situation of the 
household members in regard to facing an event of this type in the future. The term informal 
employment is used to refer to a lack of economic protection in the case of dismissal or a work 
accident. Salaried workers that do not have health and social security contributions as part of 
their labour relationship with their employer have an informal occupation. Self-employed 
workers and employees who are part of the informal sector (that is, their businesses are not 
registered in the Internal Revenue Service) are informal workers (ILO, 2013).  
 
The SHF collects information on the occupational category and the type of contract of all the 
members of the household that are working at the time the survey is applied. Also, it asks 
whether or not household members pay social security contributions. This information allows 
me to construct a variable that distinguishes an informal worker from a formal one. I start from 
the assumption that formal jobs normally offer economic protection in the case of dismissal.  
 
For households without any labour market attachment, I consider that they are also unprotected 
against an unexpected economic shock. This consideration is important because these types of 
households could be classified as economically secure as they do not have informal workers. 
Thus, the objective indicator of economic insecurity for each household works as follows: I 
classify a household as economically insecure if i) none of the workers in the household has 
access to unemployment insurance benefits or would receive any sort of compensation in the 
event of their dismissal, or  ii) the household does not have members working. This indicator 





Several researchers have shown that over-indebtedness can lead to financial difficulties (e.g., 
unsuitable debt or debt arrears) that cause a series of adverse psychological effects (such as 
distress, anxiety, reduction of life satisfaction and depression) in the members of the household, 
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mainly the head of household (Białowolski, 2018; Białowolski & Weziak-Bialowolska, 2014; 
Bridges & Disney, 2010; Brown, Taylor, & Wheatley Price, 2005; Hojman et al., 2016; Selenko 
& Batinic, 2011; Sweet et al., 2013). Although it is not possible to know exactly whether the 
over-indebtedness was due to an unexpected event, or a risky planned decision, a household 
with a high default risk experiences a stressful situation because it is highly sensitive to any future 
economic loss, even if this is not a significant loss.  
 
In the SFH, various questions address the level of indebtedness and debt problems that the 
households interviewed have experienced. The indicator of vulnerability that I use measures the 
debt service to income ratio. It provides information on the burden that the debt imposes on 
the household’s current income, and it is estimated as the ratio of the monthly payment of the 
debt to the disposable income of the household. Although in the SHF the interviewee is asked 
about his/her perception of the level of household indebtedness, I use only the information 
observed about this source of economic insecurity. In this way, I avoid introducing potential 
subjective bias related to the idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals in the construction of 
the indicator.  
 
c) Asset poverty   
 
A household that does not have an adequate buffer (wealth) against major economic shocks is 
aware of its economic vulnerability generating stress and anxiety among its members (Bossert 
& D’Ambrosio, 2013). The economic literature focused on the lower part of the income 
distribution has measured this economic disadvantage as asset poverty (Brandolini, Magri, & 
Smeeding, 2010). A household is considered to experience asset poverty if its assets (e.g. net 
worth, non-housing wealth or liquid assets) are insufficient to keep it above the poverty line for 
a specific period of time (e.g. 3 or 6 months) (Haveman & Wolff, 2004).63 I use non-housing 
wealth as household assets, which refers to the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities, without considering any wealth or debt related to the primary residence. I consider 
three months as the least amount of time that a household should be able to stay out of poverty 
 
63 The OECD has used this definition of  asset poverty to compare the levels of  economic vulnerability of  member 
countries (Balestra & Tonkin, 2018). Economically vulnerable households are those that are not income poor but 
asset poor. The wealth concept used is liquid financial wealth (e.g., bank accounts and other financial assets) because 
it can be easily monetised, and the period of  time is 3 months. The income poor are those with an equivalised 
income below 50 percent of  the median income  (OECD, 2017, p. 89). 
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if it liquidates all of its non-housing wealth.  
 
Although several works use liquid assets in the asset-poverty operationalisation (Balestra & 
Tonkin, 2018; Hacker et al., 2014) I decided not to use this for Chile for two reasons. First, 
when applying the liquid assets measure to Chile, 9 out of 10 households fall into asset-poverty 
in the 10-year period analysed (2007/2017). Hence, this definition provides little information 
for middle-high income country contexts like Chile. Second, including real assets such as 
vehicles in the operationalisation of asset-poverty allows for considering selling the vehicle to 
be a concrete and feasible strategy for the household to address an income shock in this type of 
national context. 
 
Table 4.1: Dimensions, indicators and cut-offs of the economic insecurity sources 
      
Dimensions  Indicators Household is vulnerable if…  
Household risk to an 
unexpected economic event Unexpected economic shocks 
the risk of experiencing an unexpected decrease in 
incomes or an unexpected increase in expenses in the 
next year is greater than the 70th percentile risk of all 
households 
Lack of buffers to offset 
potential economic loss 
Unprotected employment or 
non-workers 
its workers have not a labour contract and none pay 
social contributions, or it does not have workers 
Over-indebtedness  the ratio of the monthly payment of the debt to the disposable income of the household 
Asset poverty assets are insufficient to keep it above the poverty line for three months 
Note: All variables are dichotomous. 
 
In total, I generate four measures of economic insecurity at the household level. For the 
dimension on the household risk to an unexpected economic event, I use one indicator and for 
the dimension on the lack of household economic buffers, I use three indicators (Table 4.1). 
This allows me to have a set of indicators that captures vulnerability in different ways. While 
none of the indicators perfectly captures all aspects of each economic insecurity dimension, 





4.4 Economic insecurity in Chile: an overview 
 
In this section, I provide a descriptive analysis of the four indicators of economic insecurity to 
contextualise economic insecurity in Chile between 2007 and 2017. Table 4.2 shows the 
behaviour of the insecurity measures constructed with the SHF data. In aggregate, the indicators 
deliver a broad and clear definition of economic insecurity. When combining all of the years, 8 
out of 10 households are classified as economically insecure in at least one of the four measures 
during the decade studied. Half of the population is classified as economically insecure when 
considering two or more vulnerabilities. When using a more demanding criterion, that is, three 
or more vulnerabilities, 13.9 per cent are economically insecure, and only 1.6 per cent of 
households are in a situation of insecurity in the four indicators. 
 
Table 4.2: Shares of households classified as economically insecure in Chile, 2007-2017 
                




SHF cross-section survey year Time trend:  
2007-2017 2007 2011 2014 2017 
Household risk to an unexpected economic event        
Unexpected economic shocks 37.9 43.7 37.9 31.5 38.5 -5.3* * 
Lack of buffers to offset potential economic loss        
Unprotected employment or non-workers 30.0 34.0 37.6 23.8 24.5 -9.5 ** 
Over-indebtedness 15.4 15.1 13.5 15.2 17.6 2.6 * 
Asset poverty 62.8 67.2 72.7 56.2 55.1 -12.1 ** 
Households by number of vulnerabilities        
One (any) vulnerability 81.0 84.6 86.8 75.1 77.7 -6.9 ** 
Two or more 49.5 55.4 56.9 40.6 45.1 -10.3 ** 
Three or more 13.9 18.0 16.0 9.9 11.6 -6.4 ** 
Four 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.1 1.3 -0.6 * 
Number of households   3,827 4,057 4,502 4,549     
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
The estimated trends are shown in the last column of Table 4.2. The indicator that measures 
the risk of households facing an economic shock presents a significant negative tendency during 
the period analysed, despite the increase from 31.5 per cent to 38.5 per cent between 2014 and 





Figure 4.1 shows that after the economic crisis in 2008, the annual unemployment rate rose to 
11.3 per cent in 2009, and then began to decline during the economic expansion period, reaching 
6.2 per cent in 2013. Since then the rate of unemployment has slightly increased. Likewise, the 
economic growth recovered by 2010, reaching similar rates to that before the financial crisis; it 
then fluctuated at around 5.5 per cent per year until 2013, after which time there was a 
substantial decline (about 1.7 per cent annually). 
 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of economic growth and unemployment in Chile, 2007-2017 
 
Sources: For GDP growth, data from OECD Economic Outlook 102 database, and for unemployment data from 
International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database. 
 
Concerning the lack of protection of households to offset an economic loss, significant 
improvements are observed. The proportion of households with workers without access to 
social protection mechanisms or non-workers decreased from 34.0 per cent in 2017 to 24.5 per 
cent in 2007. Likewise, the proportion of households without enough private assets to face an 
event with negative economic consequences fell from 67.2 per cent in 2017 to 55.1 per cent in 
2007. The highest levels of economic insecurity were reached in 2011 when 37.6 per cent of 
households were either in unprotected jobs or had non-worker members, and 72.7 per cent of 










































during the period studied. In 2017, 17.6 per cent of households showed a high risk of default.  
 
The tendencies of these three measures of household buffers to offset an unexpected economic 
loss can be somewhat contrasted with macro indicators. For instance, the asset poor households 
follow the macro changes in the economy and labour market (Figure 4.1). In the case of 
households with unprotected employment, it is not evident that this is related to a decrease in 
unemployment. This can be associated with either an increase in informal jobs or with an 
increase in the rate of labour-protected jobs. Figure 4.2 clarifies this point. Between 2010 and 
2013, the proportion of informal work fell from 39.2 per cent to 34.9 per cent in the Chilean 
labour market. However, in the following years, the informality rate increased slightly, reaching 
35.8 per cent in 2017. As to the level of households’ over-indebtedness, this indicator follows 
the trend of financial resources allocated by domestic money banks. Figure 4.2 shows that 
between 2010 and 2017, the bank private credit rate increased by 13.2 per cent, peaking at 80.6 
per cent in 2015. 
 
Figure 4.2: Evolution of bank credit to GDP and labour informality in Chile over time 
 
Sources: For labour informality data from New National Employment Survey (known as NENE in Spanish which 
began to be applied on 2010), and for domestic credit to private sector by banks, data from World Bank, databank.  
 
Table 4.3 shows the association between economic insecurity measures. A third of households 
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In the case of the over-indebtedness indicator, 46 per cent of households have a high probability 
of experiencing an event that generates an economic loss. As to the asset poverty indicator, 44.5 
per cent of households in this situation are at risk of having a significant income drop or higher 
expenses in the near future. It is worth noting that none of the correlation coefficients between 
the indicators is greater than 0.3 (see Table A.2 in the appendix). This minimises the problem 
of double counting, which, as I will discuss in the next section, is one of the critiques to 
multidimensional approaches. 
 
Table 4.3: The joint distribution between economic insecurity indicators in Chile, 2007-2017 
          
Indicators 




employment Over-indebtedness  Asset poverty 
All households 37.9 30.0 15.4 62.8 
Unexpected economic shocks - 25.9 18.6 73.5 
Unprotected employment or  
non-workers 32.9 - 15.1 70.2 
Over-indebtedness  46.0 29.5 - 72.7 
Asset poverty 44.5 33.5 17.9 - 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
 
4.5 A multidimensional measure of economic insecurity 
 
Although the sum of the vulnerabilities presented in Table 4.2 reveals, with a single measure, 
the proportion of households that are in a situation of economic insecurity, the index of 
economic insecurity is not sensitive to changes in the vulnerabilities of the households that are 
above or below the threshold used. In formal terms, this type of index does not satisfy the 
properties of dimensional monotonicity. For example, if one were to consider a household 
economically insecure when it shows two vulnerabilities, the headcount ratio of economically 
insecure households would not change if a household experiencing three types of vulnerabilities 
increased to four. 
 
Using the adjusted headcount ratio to measure multidimensional economic insecurity 
 
There are several approaches that have been developed to aggregate and summarise information 
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on multidimensional phenomena such as poverty and inequality (Aaberge & Brandolini, 2015). 
One of the best known is Alkire & Foster’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) (2011) based 
on the counting approach (Atkinson, 2003). Alkire & Foster (2011) propose an adjusted 
headcount ratio as a MPI that is sensitive to changes in the dimensions of the phenomenon that 
households are facing over time. My empirical strategy is to adapt their approach to the 
construction of a multidimensional index of economic insecurity. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Alkire & Foster (2011) MPI has been calculated in 104 countries to 
identify multiple deprivations at the household level (Alkire & Santos, 2014), and their adjusted 
headcount ratio has been used in other multidimensional concepts such as job quality. For 
instance, García-Pérez et al. (2017) for Spain and Sehnbruch et al. (2020) for nine Latin 
American countries. Economic insecurity also has been measured from a multidimensional 
perspective following Alkire & Foster (2011) approach in north-western countries. The first 
time was in the U.S. using cross-sections and panel data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
between 1989 and 2009 (Bucks, 2011), and recently in 28 EU countries, using longitudinal EU-
SILC data from 2009 to 2016 (Cantó, García-Pérez, & Romaguera de la Cruz, 2019b).64 
 
The approach that I follow has three parts: i) the identification of households that are 
economically insecure, ii) the aggregation of the different indicators into a scalar value, and iii) 
the selection of dimensional weights for each indicator.  
 
Identifying economically insecure households 
 
As I described above, I have selected the two dimensions and their indicators which, in my 
framework are related to household risk to an unexpected economic event and lack of buffers 
to offset a potential economic loss. Also, I identified economic insecurity for each of the 
indicators using specific thresholds (see Table 4.1). The next step is to determine if a household 
has enough vulnerabilities to be considered economically insecure.  
 
To do this, I build the variable Dé, which summarizes the total number of economic vulnerability 
indicators. It is a weighted sum of vulnerabilities in the indicators that define economic 
 
64 Cantó el al. (2019b) research is based on the Romaguera de la Cruz (2017) work who built an economic insecurity 
index using an adaptation of Alkire & Foster’s (2011) model proposed by García-Pérez et al. (2017). 
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insecurity. For a household C it is calculated as follows: 
Dé" = ∑ èJé"JKJ'$     C = 1,… , ? 
 
(1) 
where é"J is a variable that takes the value 1 if the household C is vulnerable in the indicator ê and 
0 otherwise, H is the total number of vulnerabilities analysed, èJ is the wight assigned to each 
indicator and ? is the total of number of households. The weights are standardised so that their 
sum equals the total number of indicators, H. Therefore, Dé" will take values between 0 and H, 
where 0 is associated to a household that is not considered to be economic insecurity in any 
indicators and H is associated to a household C that is considered to be economic vulnerable in 
all of them. 
 
Once I calculated the Dé value for each household, I identify a household as economically 
insecure from a multidimensional perspective if Dé is greater than or equal to the cut-off b (Dé" ≥
b). And then, the sum of the economically insecure households of ? households of the total 




Aggregate economic insecurity measures 
 
From an aggregate perspective, I can summarize the information on the economic insecurity of 
households by one scalar known as ‘adjusted multidimensional headcount ratio’ (í!).65 As 
mentioned the í! increases/decreases when the number of economic vulnerabilities 
increases/decreases, therefore it satisfies the properties of dimensional monotonicity (Alkire & 
Foster, 2011, p. 481). The í! calculates the total weighted sum of economic vulnerabilities 
divided by the maximum number of vulnerabilities that all households (?H) could have 








From the perspective of policy analysis the Alkire & Foster (2011) adjusted headcount ratio has 
two characteristics that make it an appropriate measure. First, it simultaneously measures both 
 
65 Alkire and Foster (2011) also propose measures of  intensity (í$) and inequality (í+) that are not used in my 




the incidence (proportion of economically insecure households) and the intensity of the 
economic insecurity (number of vulnerabilities affecting it). Second, it can be decomposed by 
population subgroup (e.g. income decile groups or geographic area) and economic insecurity 
indicators (e.g. unexpected economic shocks, unprotected employment, over-indebtedness, and 
asset poverty). 
 
Regarding the former, I can calculate the (í!) using the product of both the incidence (!) and 
the intensity (ì) of the economic insecurity phenomenon. 
í! = !îì (3) 
To measure the incidence of economic insecurity in the population, I calculate the 





Then I measure the intensity of economic insecurity as the average of the vulnerabilities faced 
by economic insecure households standardised (vLM
Q*+ = ∑ Dé"é{LM!O7}
(
"'$ ëLM⁄ ) by the total number 







Replacing ( and ) in Eq. 3, I get Eq. 2 since ëLM*&'











Regarding the latter, the í! is additively decomposable by population subgroup, and also by 
vulnerabilities (Alkire & Foster, 2011). Therefore, the í! can be expressed as a weighted sum 








where ?I is the size and í!I is the the adjusted headcount ratio of subpopulation >. 
 
66 The application of this measure, considering that each of the four indicators of economic vulnerability has equal 











where !J is the proportion of the total number of economically insecure households with 
elements of vulnerability on dimension ê. 
 
The	!, ì and í! estimates were computed in Stata (Release 15.0, Stata Corporation) using the 
mpi command (Pacifico & Poege, 2017). 
 
Using a normative approach to define the weighting structure 
Using an appropriate weighting scheme for any compound index is crucial. Weights have critical 
importance in the construction of a measure of wellbeing because they determine the trade-off 
between the dimensions and/or indicators, which can significantly affect the conclusions 
derived from the index (Decancq & Lugo, 2013; Ravallion, 2012b). The weights given to the 
different sources of stress that the household has due to economic vulnerabilities are a 
determining factor in the definition of the index I propose.67 There are several approaches to 
setting weights, which can be grouped into two types. The first are the data-driven approaches, 
which let the data ‘speak for themselves’ and depend solely on the distribution that the data 
being analysed provides. That is, data-driven weights are not based on either theoretical criteria 
or value judgements regarding what the trade-offs should be between the dimensions and 
indicators. The second are the normative approaches, which define the weights based only on 
value judgements or conceptual frameworks of the dimensions of the phenomenon studied 
rather than the information that the distribution of the data matrix can provide. 
 
There are two reasons for not using data-driven weighting strategies such as the principal 
component analysis (used by Rhode et al. (2015) to build the multidimensional index of 
economic insecurity in Australia) or frequency-based weights (used by Romaguera de la Cruz 
(2017) in her index for Spain). First, as mentioned in the previous section, the indicators that I 
 
67 The decision on which cut-off to use to aggregate the vulnerabilities also has consequences for the results of the 
application of the index. However, unlike the weight structure, there is no clear cut-off rule to determine the 




use for Chile do not have a high correlation with each other, minimising the problem of double 
counting, which can capture the same latent dimension for two highly correlated indicators. The 
use of techniques based on principal component analysis has some drawbacks such as the 
difficulty in interpreting the combination between the indicators of the index, and in assigning 
a low weight to the dimensions that show a weak correlation, relying on mechanic justifications 
rather than theoretical ones (Decancq & Lugo, 2013). 
 
Second, in countries like Chile that show a high percentage of economic vulnerability in all the 
indicators, using frequency-based weights has no justification. The reason for using frequency-
based weights is that households attach greater importance to vulnerabilities that do not affect 
most households. Besides, there are situations in which one dimension may have a significant 
impact on the population, but this does not mean the others with a lower impact are less 
important. For example, Brandolini (2007) found this type of inconsistency between dimensions 
such as health and education when using frequency-based weights to calculate a well-being index 
in Italy. 
 
Within the normative approach, the equal weighting is the most commonly used approach to 
build multidimensional indices of well-being (e.g. Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018)). 
Its use is recommended when the dimensions used in the index are considered equally important 
or when the dimensions included do not overlap. In my framework, the dimensions have both 
characteristics. First, the vulnerability indicators are not highly correlated (see Table A.2 in the 
appendix). Second, each dimension has an adverse effect on the well-being of a household, and, 
to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that have determined that an economic 
vulnerability (e.g., over-indebtedness) causes more stress or anxiety in the household members 
than another (e.g., unprotected employment). Therefore, by applying the same weight to each 
indicator of economic insecurity, I can treat them in the same way. 
 
Thereby, I assign the weights using a normative approach to define two economic insecurity 
indices. The first uses uniform weights, that is, the index of economic insecurity that has four 
indicators (treated as dimensions) whose weight (èJ) takes the value of 1 for each of them. I call 














The second index also uses uniform weights. It classifies households as economically insecure 
using predefined combinations of two dimensions using three indicators (it does not include the 
over-indebtedness indicator). I have called this index the Integrated Economic Insecurity Index 
(IEII). I explain the IEII in detail below. 
 
4.6 Drawbacks of multidimensional indexes of well-being 
 
The development of multidimensional indexes of well-being has been accompanied by 
criticisms related to the methodology (Ravallion, 2011). However, the focus of the questioning 
has never been about the multidimensionality of phenomena such as poverty. The point in 
question is whether this multidimensionality can be adequately measured in a single index. There 
are many ways to build what Ravallion (2012a) calls mash up indices or ad-hoc aggregation 
depending on the available data and the distribution of the weights chosen by the researcher. 
For example, if the objective is to monitor and evaluate antipoverty programmes, and improve 
the targeting of social benefits, it is not clear how it is of added value to measure the dimensions 
in a scalar value versus the alternative of focusing on monitoring and improving the 
measurement of separate dimensions (e.g. consumption poverty, health poverty or education 
poverty). The main criticism to this approach is that the meaning, interpretation and robustness 
of these indices are often unclear. 
 
A similar and more recent discussion has focused on the measurement of economic insecurity 
(Hacker, 2018; Osberg, 2018). Although the academic debate acknowledges that economic 
insecurity is a multidimensional phenomenon (Bucks, 2011; Osberg & Sharpe, 2014; Rohde et 
al., 2015; Romaguera de la Cruz, 2017) most of the analyses focus only on one of the dimensions 
of economic insecurity (Anderloni et al., 2012; Balestra & Tonkin, 2018; Białowolski, 2018; 
Bossert & D’Ambrosio, 2013; Keim et al., 2014; Rehm, 2016b; Rohde et al., 2014; Western et 
al., 2016).  
 
In this context, Hacker at al. (2014, 2010) have made a significant contribution by proposing a 
hybrid measure to build an index that relates downside income insecurity to an insufficient 
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financial safety net to buffer an unexpected economic loss. This measure, the Economic Security 
Index (ESI), offers policymakers a fully comprehensive measure of economic insecurity. To use 
the authors’ own words, the integrated index is defined as “an annual index that represents the 
share of individuals who experience at least 25 per cent decline in their inflation-adjusted 
‘available household income’ from one year to the next (except when entering retirement) and 
who lack an adequate financial security net to replace this income until it returns to its original 
level” (Hacker et al., 2014, p. 8). 
 
This measure has been criticised for only considering private wealth as a buffer stock protection 
against an economic shock without including in the measurement the protective role of the state 
through social assistance or social insurance (e.g. the benefits of unemployment insurance or 
workers’ compensation) (Osberg, 2018). Two additional criticisms that Hacker (2018) himself 
has raised regarding this index have to do with problems usually present in one-dimensional 
income insecurity measurements that use a retrospective approach. First, these measures cannot 
identify whether the income drop is a voluntary decision made by the household (e.g. an early 
withdrawal by the head of household) or rather the result of unforeseen events faced by it.  
 
Second, a measure based primarily on changes in household income omits aspects of economic 
insecurity that do not imply economic instability. For example, Hacker et al.’s (2014) index can 
indicate that a household is not financially insecure because it did not experience a large drop 
in income despite having a very low income, high indebtedness and very limited liquid financial 
wealth. This point acquires relevance in middle-income countries where a high proportion of 
the population can experience several economic vulnerabilities simultaneously, even if they have 
not experienced a recent fall in their income. 
 
Building upon the discussion presented above, I propose an Integrated Economic Insecurity 
Index (IEII) to complement the Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index (MEII) and, at 
the same time, to be considered as a reference to define the multidimensional threshold value 
(b) used in the MEII. 
 
An integrated measure of economic insecurity 
Another way to think about the hybrid measure that Hacker et al. (2014) propose to measure 
economic insecurity in the U.S. is the multidimensional approach. As mentioned before, the 
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ESI measures the proportion of households that experienced a large drop in income or a large 
increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses and lacked liquid financial wealth to offset the 
economic loss. In the multidimensional approach, this measure is equivalent to a 
multidimensional economic insecurity rate (!) that has two indicators of vulnerability (H=2), 
using uniform weights, and a threshold set at two (b =2). The specifications of this simplified 
multidimensional index do not require estimating a multidimensional adjusted headcount ratio 
(íLM) because in this particular case, the properties of dimensional monotonicity are fulfilled. 
For example, a household initially classified as economically insecure will be considered secure 
if it ceases to be vulnerable in either of the two dimensions. 
 
The IEII that I propose also derives from the multidimensional approach. The IEII allows for 
classifying a household as economically insecure in two scenarios. The first scenario is when the 
household has a high risk of experiencing a large income drop or a large expense increase and 
lacks at least one buffer to offset the economic loss (unprotected job or asset-poverty). This 
scenario is similar to the one proposed by Hacker et al. (2014, 2010) except for two features. 
First, it does not include voluntary economic losses (see section on the construction of 
indicators) and second, it considers social protection mechanisms of the welfare state by 
incorporating as a buffer the level of protection of the household’s workers. 
 
The second scenario is when the household lacks buffers that can protect it from an economic 
loss (that is, a household with unprotected workers that is also asset-poor). This scenario 
addresses the critique that Hacker (2018) himself poses to his index being unable to adequately 
distinguish households that are economically insecure in the lower part of the income 
distribution. For example, Hacker et al.’s (2014) index does not consider as economically 
insecure households that do not have a high risk of experiencing a significant income shock 
although they live in conditions of high vulnerability due to the lack of buffers to face economic 
losses. It is worth noting that unprotected work is highly correlated with low-income 
households; therefore, by including this buffer, I will be measuring a source of economic 
insecurity characteristic of this group of the population.  
 
The measurement of this second scenario does not include over-indebtedness as a buffer. There 
are two reasons for not doing so: first, so as not to complicate the IEII and, second, to avoid 
including a criterion that is highly demanding in regard to classifying households as economically 
insecure. In other words, I want to prevent the IEII from considering households as financially 
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secure when they are not over-indebted while they are asset-poor, and when their members are 
workers without labour protection. Besides, the smallest contribution of over-indebtedness in 
the measure of multidimensional insecurity is in the lower part of the income distribution (see 
Table 4.5). A classification that includes this indicator along with the other two buffers would 
report a lower proportion of economically insecure households in that part of the income 
distribution, compromising the goal of improving the measurement of economic insecurity 
among low-income households. 
  
The IEII classification enables me to represent in a single scale the risk of unbuffered economic 
loss from two major dimensions of economic well-being: i) household risk to an unexpected 
economic event, and ii) lack of buffers to offset the potential economic loss. This definition of 
economic insecurity offers a more comprehensive interpretation than that of the MEII, at the 
cost of not including the over-indebtedness indicator in the index, thus losing the information 
that this source provides about households’ stress. 
 
In formal terms, the IEII is a uniform weighting structure with equal values for the weights and 
a fixed b. The weights values and the threshold are chosen so that the index can classify the 
households according to the two scenarios of economic insecurity predefined in the integrated 










With these specifications, a household is economically insecure if it has i) a high risk of facing 






General analysis of economic insecurity measures 
 
Here I present the results at the household level of the economic insecurity measures that I have 
proposed, and I discuss why these results justify using the MEII over the IEII to understand 
the economic insecurity in Chile. Figure 4.3 shows the aggregate measure (í!) of the MEII for 
different thresholds (b). For the years 2007 and 2011, the confidence intervals overlap for each 
of the cut-offs, thereby presenting no significant differences in the í!. For b = 1, the value of 
í! for those two years is 0.4, reaching 0.02 when the household experiences the four 
vulnerabilities at the same time. When analysing the period 2014-2017, the values of í! are 
statistically different when the cut-off corresponds to two vulnerabilities (b = 2). This shows 
that the economic insecurity behaviour follows a U shape, that is, there is a significant drop in 
economic insecurity between 2011 and 2014, which is then followed by an increase in the MEII 
between 2014 and 2017. 
 
Figure 4.3: Adjusted multidimensional economic insecurity rate (M0) using uniform weights by number 
of k cut-off (Chile, 2007-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
To calculate the MEII I use b = 2, a threshold that, as shown in Figure 4.3, distinguishes 
significant changes in the economic insecurity of Chilean households after the Great Recession 
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lowest level of economic insecurity was observed in 2014, with a value of 0.231. 
 
Table 4.4: Measurements of economic insecurity in Chile, 2007-2017 
                







Std. Err.  
A (intensity of 
economic 
insecurity) 












uniform weights  
and k=2 
2007 0.554 0.012 0.590 0.005 0.326 0.007 
2011 0.569 0.009 0.579 0.004 0.330 0.006 
2014 0.406 0.012 0.568 0.005 0.231 0.007 
2017 0.451 0.010 0.571 0.004 0.258 0.006 






Two dimension and 
three indicators, 
uniform weights  
and k=2 
2007 0.505 0.012 0.740 0.005 0.374 0.009 
2011 0.526 0.010 0.728 0.004 0.383 0.007 
2014 0.348 0.011 0.710 0.004 0.247 0.008 
2017 0.384 0.010 0.713 0.004 0.274 0.007 
∆ 2007-2017 -0.121 ** -0.027 * -0.10 ** 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
Table 4.4 compares the MEII values for , = 2 with the aggregate measures for the IEII (( and 
+)). In both measures, a similar trend was observed during the decade, but with values slightly 
higher in the MEII than the IEII. This difference can be seen in 2014 and 2017, where the 
incidence in the MEII is approximately 15 per cent higher than in the IEII. It is important to 
note that the MEII outcomes for other values of , are quite different from the IEII outcomes 
(see table A2 in the annexes), being the cut-off of two vulnerabilities the one that constructs a 
multidimensional measure with values similar to those of IEII. 
 
A second difference between the two measures of economic insecurity is that the MEII seems 
to be a more smoothed measure than the IEII in both the incidence and the adjusted 
multidimensional economic insecurity rate. This is most clearly seen between 2011 and 2014, 
where both measures capture the sharp decline in economic insecurity, yet the IEII incidence 
presents a reduction of 36 per cent, whereas the MEII indicates that the fall was 30 per cent. 
 
The third difference between the two measures of economic insecurity, already mentioned 
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above, lies in their interpretation. While the MEII aggregate measures are constructed from the 
combination of one, two, three and four vulnerabilities (depending on the cut-off (,) chosen), 
the IEII informs us more comprehensively about the relationship between the three economic 
insecurities of the household. For the IEII, households are vulnerable for two reasons: i) having 
a high risk of facing an economic shock without having at least one of the two buffers to offset 
the economic loss, or ii) experiencing the lack of these two buffers at the same time (unprotected 
employment and asset poverty). However, when the MEII uses the cut-off of two vulnerabilities 
(, = 2), this not only contains the two mentioned scenarios of the IEII but also allows over-
indebtedness to be included as an indicator. The MEII provides greater flexibility than the IEII 
by applying a cut-off of two vulnerabilities to the four indicators. This makes it possible to 
classify economic insecurity more adequately for households in the lower part of the income 
distribution. For example, the MEII classifies a household as economically insecure if its 
workers are not protected from dismissal and are asset-poor without necessarily being over-
indebted. 
 
All three differences discussed above allow me to suggest that an MEII with a multidimensional 
cut of two (, = 2) is the most appropriate measure of economic insecurity to apply to Chile. 
The analyses that follow make use of the decomposition benefits of the aggregate measure +). 
From now on I will only refer to the aggregated results ((, -, and +).) delivered by this measure. 
 
Disaggregated analysis by dimensions, income decile groups and family types 
 
Table 4.4 shows that the changes in the adjusted multidimensional economic insecurity rate 
(+)) are explained more by variations in the incidence (() (over 12 per cent between 2007 and 
2017), than by changes in the intensity (-) of the vulnerabilities (less than 3 per cent for the same 
period). This result raises the question of what the contribution of each of the indicators is to 
+), and how this contribution changed over the decade studied. 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the evolution of the composition of +). In the four measurements 
obtained between 2007/2017, asset poverty is the dimension that contributes the most to 
economic insecurity, with an average of 40 per cent. The second most important component of 
the +)	for all households is unexpected economic shocks, with an average of 28 per cent. In 
third place is unprotected employment, with an average of 21 per cent. Finally, the component 
with the lowest contribution to the aggregated measure of the MEII is over-indebtedness, at 11 
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per cent. Yet, it is worth noting that this dimension is the only one out of the four dimensions 
considered that increased its contribution over the decade (from 10.4 per cent in 2007 to 13.8 
per cent in 2017). The increase over time of economic insecurity in households due to over-
indebtedness opens an important discussion about the lack of financial education in Chile as 
well as why households must increasingly resort to formal or informal credit to cover their 
expenses both scheduled as unexpected. The changes in the compositions of the other three 
dimensions become more apparent from 2011 onwards; the contribution of economic shocks 
increases, and the lack of buffers (asset poverty and unprotected employment) decreases. In 
2017 the relative +)	composition of these three dimensions was 28.8, 39.4 and 18.1 per cent 
respectively. 
 
Figure 4.4: Evolution of the relative composition of MEEI (M0) in Chile, 2007-2017 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
Notes: The MEII (Multidimensional Economic insecurity index) uses uniform weights and k=2 
Figure 4.5 shows the aggregate MEII measures for the years 2007, 2011, 2014, 2017 by income 
decile group. The results show two relevant phenomena. First, economic insecurity affects the 
whole population. The results show high levels of economic insecurity across the entire income 
distribution. Although the economic insecurity is much higher in the lower part of the income 
distribution, the incidence in the decile groups of the upper part of the distribution is relatively 
high as well. Panel A in Figure 4.5 shows that during the years 2007 and 2011 the average 
incidence of the MEII was around 80 per cent for the first two income decile groups, while in 


























the two highest income decile groups (9 and 10) was 12 per cent. This contrasts with the results 
from the only study that has carried out a similar analysis using a multidimensional index 
(Romaguera de la Cruz, 2017). This author found that in Spain, the +)	for deciles 9 and 10 was 
less than 1 per cent. Although this comparison is not strictly accurate since the period analysed 
was between 2009/2015 and the index was not built with the same indicators, it allows for 
emphasising the fact that economic insecurity in Chile is not bounded to the lower income 
groups.  
 
This result is particularly interesting when comparing the concept of economic insecurity with 
that of vulnerability to poverty (risk of falling into poverty). Poverty vulnerability analyses 
indicate that in Chile, only the highest income decile groups (9 and 10) have a near zero risk of 
falling into poverty. This means that a low risk in terms of vulnerability to poverty does not 
exempt households or individuals from the risk of curtailing their well-being, a risk that is 
associated with significant stress at the household level.  
 
Figure 4.5: Aggregate measures of MEII by income decile groups in Chile, 2007-2017 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
The second phenomenon that the results show is that although in Chile the levels of economic 
insecurity are high, these decreased significantly between 2011 and 2014. Figure 4.5 shows that 
this reduction is reflected throughout the first eight income decile groups in both aggregated 
measures (( and +)). The highest income decile groups (9 and 10) show no significant changes. 
As noted, this decrease in economic insecurity is coupled with good macroeconomic 
performance between those years: economic growth of 4.4 per cent on average and a decrease 
in informal work of almost 5 per cent. 
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Table 4.5: Relative contribution to M0 by income decile group in Chile, 2017 













Over-indebtedness Asset poverty 
1 0.490 0.178 0.346 0.078 0.397 
2 0.390 0.257 0.253 0.097 0.393 
3 0.383 0.304 0.169 0.131 0.396 
4 0.322 0.319 0.143 0.137 0.401 
5 0.278 0.366 0.097 0.157 0.380 
6 0.235 0.364 0.107 0.158 0.371 
7 0.198 0.355 0.060 0.174 0.412 
8 0.139 0.351 0.076 0.164 0.409 
9 0.092 0.197 0.057 0.338 0.408 
10 0.046 0.199 0.156 0.312 0.333 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances 2017. 
 
Taking advantage of the decomposition properties of one of the MEII’s aggregated measures, 
I analyse the contribution of the dimensions to economic insecurity according to households’ 
position in the distribution of income. And, more specifically, I analyse whether the composition 
of the four dimensions in the index differs between the extremes of the income distribution. 
Table 4.5 shows the adjusted multidimensional economic insecurity rate (+)) for the year 2017 
by income decile group. 
 
For the year 2017, the contribution of unexpected economic shocks is higher between deciles 3 
and 8 than at the extremes of the income distribution. In the case of asset poverty, the 
contribution is relatively constant. It does not seem to be related to income decile, except in the 
highest income decile group (10), where the contribution falls to 33 per cent. The indicator 
unprotected employment or non-workers in the household is important in the lower part of the 
income distribution, and its contribution falls in the highest deciles. Conversely, over-
indebtedness is more relevant for households at the top of the distribution, which reveals that 
over-indebtedness, falling revenues or increased expenditure are sources of greater stress among 




The breakdown of the MEII aggregate measures into subgroups of the population also makes 
it possible to identify the types of families with the highest levels of economic insecurity. From 
the perspective of public policy design, this information is relevant because it allows for 
identifying where and how to focus public resources to reduce household stress due to 
economic vulnerabilities, thus complementing other welfare measures that are traditionally used 
in the targeting of social policies. 
 
Figure 4.6: Incidence of economic insecurity (!) by family type in Chile, 2007-2017 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the incidence of economic insecurity in Chile between 2007 and 2017, broken 
down by population subgroup. The three groups with the highest rate of economic insecurity 
are households composed by i) a single mother with children; ii) couple with children, and iii) a 
single pensioner. Around 8 out of 10 single mother with children households experienced 
economic insecurity during the decade analysed. The other two subgroups show rates close to 
65 per cent in 2007. Although by 2017 these rates had declined to around 52 per cent. The high 
economic insecurity of these three types of families correlates with other welfare deprivation 
measures such as vulnerability to income poverty (López-Calva & Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). In this 
way, the application of the MEII informs policymakers that more than half of these households 
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Understanding the determinants of the economic insecurity in Chile 
 
In this last section of the results, I analyse the relationship between economic insecurity and 
some significant households’ characteristics variables. I use a probit model to estimate the 
probability of a household being economically unsafe. The dependent variable is the definition 
of the MEII for a cut-off of two vulnerabilities. The multivariate model was applied to pooled 
data from SHF household samples for the years 2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017. Specifically, my 
interest is in identifying the average marginal effect (AME) that each of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household has on economic insecurity for the studied period. Table 4.6 
shows these estimates 
 
Regarding the features of heads of households, i.e. gender, age and education, the results show 
first, that households headed by women are more vulnerable than households headed by men 
(7.7 per cent). An explanation of this result could be the gender inequalities that the Chilean 
labour market exhibits (participation, stability and wages). Second, the age of the head of the 
household was not a significant variable. This result shows that the economic insecurity 
throughout the decade was transverse to the life cycle of households. Finally, it is worth noting 
that households with heads of households that have a university degree have a significantly 
reduced risk of being economically vulnerable. The AME for heads of households with a 
university degree was 26.0 per cent.68 
 
As to the variables related to households' characteristics, i.e. type of family, number of children, 
number of members working, the results in Table 4.6 show that two types of households have 
a higher risk of being economically insecure compared to households with couples without 
children. In the case of households with a single mother with children, the risk is 27.3 per cent, 
while for couples with children is 11.8 per cent. These results are aligned with those presented 
in Figure 4.6, providing significant evidence of the need to direct support through tailored 
policies to these types of families to alleviate the stress and anxiety they experience. It is 
important to mention that during the last decade, Chile increased the cash transfer through its 
family benefit programs, reaching 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2015 (Tromben & Podestá, 2019, p. 
59). This percentage is still below the average of 1.2 percent from OECD countries. 
 
68 In other words, in average the probability of  these households is around 25 per cent higher than of  head of  
households that only completed secondary school. 
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Second, regarding the number of children in the household, an additional child increases the 
probability of a household being economically insecure by 3.1 per cent. Third, the number of 
workers in the household has a reverse effect and is significant. When a member of the 
household gets a job the probability of the household being economically insecure decreases by 
11.0 per cent. Finally, when a household rents their home this increases their probability of 
being economically vulnerable by 17.9 percent compared to a household that owns their home. 
Since housing was not included as a measure of asset poverty, this result does not have a 
mechanical explanation but rather directly relates this characteristic of the household to the level 
of insecurity that it experiences. 
 
Table 4.6: Average marginal effects on probability of a household being economic insecure for significant 
variables 




    AME Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics 
    
Female 
 
0.077 *** (0.017) 
Age: Ref.45 to 54 years 
    




















Education: Ref. Secondary school 
    
Primary school 
 
0.079 *** (0.020) 
University degree 
 
-0.260 *** (0.014) 
Household characteristics 
    
Household type: Ref. Couple with children 
    





Single mother with children 
 
0.118 *** (0.029) 
Couple without children 
 








-0.093 * (0.050) 
Number of children < 15  
 
0.031 ** (0.014) 
Number of workers 
 
-0.110 *** (0.007) 
Housing: Ref. Own housing (no mortgage) 
    
Own housing, mortgage 
 
0.179 *** (0.016) 
Rent   0.012 
 
(0.021) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017).  
Notes: I present average marginal effects for probit estimations in which the dependent variable is the 
Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index (MEII). *** significance at 1 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * 





In this chapter, I have studied both the nature and evolution of economic insecurity in Chile 
over the last ten years (from 2007 to 2017). To carry out this analysis, I have constructed the 
Multidimensional Economic Insecurity Index (MEII) combining four sources of economic 
insecurity causes stress and anxiety: unexpected economic shocks, unprotected employment, 
over-indebtedness and asset poverty. In this way, the MEII offers a measure at the household 
level that directly relates economic uncertainty to stress due to the lack of both social protection 
and buffers to face unexpected economic shocks. 
 
Until now only integrated measures of economic insecurity, such as that proposed by Hacker et 
al., (2014) have used this two-dimensional conceptual framework in the construction of an 
index. Other indices have focused on the objective and subjective dimensions of economic 
insecurity or only on one of its dimensions, such as large income drops or level of household 
wealth. The MEII that I propose incorporates sources of stress and anxiety that are 
characteristic of households located at the two ends of the income distribution in middle-
income countries. This is the case for the unprotected jobs at the bottom of the distribution, 
and the over-indebtedness at the top. In this way, the MEII becomes a more versatile and useful 
tool for the diagnosis and design of social policies for the reality of countries such as Chile and 
others that are similar in the Latin American region. Furthermore, using a multidimensional 
approach to construct the MEII not only allows me to analyse the incidence and intensity of 
economic insecurity but also to decompose the index by dimension or subpopulation. 
 
After selecting the appropriate vulnerability cut-off to the MEII and validating its results with 
an integrated index à la Hacker et al., (2014) I propose a cut-off of two vulnerabilities and four 
indicators with uniform weights to analyse the level and intensity of economic insecurity in 
Chile. Applying this measure to the data from the Household Financial Survey shows that during 
the decade studied, economic insecurity, on average, affected almost 50 per cent of urban 
households in Chile, with an intensity of 2.3 out of 4 indicators. By taking into account both 
incidence and intensity, I obtain an adjusted rate of average economic insecurity of 0.286. 
Although in the period of the economic crisis the level of insecurity did not change (measures 
taken in 2007 and 2011), its evolution in the subsequent years shows U-shaped behaviour where 
a significant fall in economic insecurity between 2011 and 2014 is followed by an increase 
between 2014 and 2017. This result shows a negative correlation with the country’s economic 
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cycle. Other macroeconomic indicators also correlate with some of the indicators that make up 
the MEII, for example, the reduction of the levels of labour informality with the unprotected 
unemployment indicator, and the constant increase in the bank private credit rate with the over-
indebtedness indicator. 
 
When considering the entire population, asset poverty is the indicator that contributes the most 
to economic insecurity. The other indicators follow in this order: unexpected economic shocks, 
unprotected employment, and over-indebtedness. Although insecurity is present throughout the 
income distribution, the composition of the four indicators varies according to the position of 
the household in the income deciles. Thus, although the asset-poverty contribution is similar 
throughout the income distribution, unprotected employment is more relevant in the lower 
deciles, while unexpected economic shocks and over-indebtedness make a more significant 
contribution in the higher deciles. 
 
The main determinants of economic insecurity are households headed by women who have 
children. Also, heads of households with low educational levels who work without a contract 
increase the household’s risk of being affected by economic insecurity. The number of workers 
in the household is the most critical determinant to predict their economic insecurity. These 
results are similar to studies that have used other economic welfare measures such as 
vulnerability to poverty. This allows for relating these forms of socioeconomic disadvantage to 
exposure to economic stress. In this way, one could argue that policies that seek to reduce the 
economic risk in the poorest households fulfil several desirable objectives simultaneously. 
 
The most significant difference between these welfare measures is that economic insecurity 
affects the entire income distribution, while the other measures do not provide relevant 
information on the highest deciles. The high economic insecurity experienced by all income 
groups finds an explanation in two critical and intertwined conditions: firstly, the low level of 
income and wealth collected through household surveys, even of those in decile groups 9 and 
10, which are not enough to protect individuals from the stress of future economic shocks; and 
secondly, the weak social protection system, which is incapable of working as a buffer to offset 
households’ economic insecurity. It is worth noting that in 2015 the OECD ranked Chile as 
having the greatest economic vulnerability among its members, for almost 8 out of every 10 
Chileans did not have liquid financial wealth to face a sudden adverse economic shock. In that 
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same year a new reform was made to the unemployment insurance system based on individual 
savings to increase insurance coverage for a greater proportion of the unemployed. 
 
By identifying the groups of households most affected by economic insecurity and its trend in 
recent years, the application of the MEII in countries such as Chile provides relevant 
information to monitor, evaluate and improve social safety nets together with labour market 
regulations. Although this welfare measure has been criticised for not considering the fact that 
the perception of economic vulnerability varies among households, it is important to 
acknowledge that the contexts in which households decide to avoid or increase their economic 
risks are determined and informed by the support scheme offered through social policies. The 
question that arises is, what is the base level of hazard that as a society we want to have? In the 
case of Chile, to a certain extent, the state shares with people the financial risk of hazards such 
as unemployment or illness, through programmes such as unemployment insurance or public 
health insurance. Households decide how to cope with the additional costs of an illness or 
unemployment taking into consideration information about programme benefits (if eligible) and 
their own resources. However, regardless of the level of risk aversion on the part of the 
household, social policies should be able to effectively address economically insecure 







Table A.1: Average marginal effects on the probability of a household facing a large drop in income or a sharp 
increase in its expenses for significant variables 
    
Variables  Pooled data:  
2007-2011-2014-2017 
 AME  Std. Dev. 
Household head characteristics    
   Female 0.020 ** (0.008) 
   Age (years) 0.005 *** (0.001) 
   Age2 (years) -0.001 ** (0.001) 
   Education: Ref. Secondary school    
      Primary school 0.021 ** (0.011) 
      University degree 0.002  (0.013) 
   Labour status: Ref.  Unoccupied    
      Formal employed 0.004  (0.011) 
      Informal employed 0.036 *** (0.012) 
Household characteristics    
   Household type: Ref. Couple without children   
      Single without children -0.033 ** (0.015) 
      Couple with children 0.053 *** (0.015) 
      Single mother with children -0.020  (0.015) 
      Pensioner couple -0.024  (0.020) 
      Single pensioner -0.069 *** (0.022) 
      Number of children < 15  0.026 *** (0.007) 
      Number of workers 0.015 *** (0.005) 
   Housing: Ref. Own housing (no mortgage)   
      Rent 0.043 *** (0.009) 
      Own housing, mortgage 0.025 ** (0.011) 
   Income: Ref. Decile 6-8 income group    
      Decile 1-5 income group 0.030 *** (0.010) 
      Decile 9-10 income group -0.078 *** (0.010) 
   Year: Ref. 2017    
   2007 0.026 ** (0.011) 
   2011 0.002  (0.010) 
   2014 -0.085 *** (0.010) 
    
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Chilean Survey of Household Finances (2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017).  
Notes: I present average marginal effects for probit estimations in which the dependent variable is a large drop in 
household income or a sharp increase in its expenses.   *** significance at 1 percent; ** significance at 5 percent; * 




Table A.2: Correlation between economic insecurity indicators in Chile, 2007-2017 
     








Unexpected economic shocks 1    
Unprotected employment or 
non-workers 
0.047 1   
Over-indebtedness  0.144 -0.003 1  
Asset poverty 0.213 0.141 0.096 1 
     










In the last decade, middle-income countries with fast-growing economies have been able to 
reduce the poverty levels of their populations significantly. Traditional measures of income 
poverty or multidimensional poverty continue to be relevant for the design of social policies 
focused on those who remain deprived. However, in contexts of high-income inequality and 
weak social protection systems, new approaches are needed to understand this new reality and 
thus design better social policies for the new income groups. I propose three new measures of 
social and economic well-being using different approaches. These measures are applied to Chile 
using two household surveys: the Panel CASEN and the Financial Survey. 
 
Each empirical chapter or paper addresses one of these measures. In the second chapter, I 
measured the persistence at the bottom and at the top of the income distribution using transition 
matrices. Also, I used a REDOP Model to measure whether position in the income distribution 
this year affects the chances of leaving poverty or remaining someone’s at the top of the income 
distribution next year. In the third chapter, I proposed a strategy to identify degrees of 
vulnerability-to-poverty that relates the risk of falling into poverty to household income. Using 
a low-income dynamics approach, I generate two lines of vulnerability-to-poverty. One 
distinguishes the income-secure middle class from the vulnerable to poverty group. The other 
distinguishes between the vulnerable who have a high risk of falling into poverty and those with 
a moderate risk. In the fourth chapter, I propose an integrated economic insecurity index from 
a multidimensional approach. The index allows us to classify a household as economically 
insecure for two dimensions of economic insecurity: i) household risk to an unexpected 
economic event, and ii) lack of household buffers to face an economic shock. 
 
Altogether the contribution of these three chapters is twofold. They enable a better 
understanding of the economic well-being of the new income groups (low income household 
who are not poor) from a longitudinal perspective, and they provide a concrete tool for the 
design, monitoring and evaluation of social policies focused on this new social reality. In this 
chapter I summarise the main findings of this study, provide hypotheses that could explain these 
findings, present implications for social policies, and offer recommendations for future research. 
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5.1 Main findings and contributions  
 
Low-income and high-income persistence 
 
The second empirical chapter provides interesting inputs to a discussion of individuals’ mobility 
within the income distribution in Chile. First, the descriptive results show that the persistence 
at these two extremes of the income distribution in Chile is much higher than the expected, 
showing signs of high economic insecurity. 
 
Thus, the evidence to support the thesis of a sticky floor at the bottom of the distribution that 
prevents people from scaling the income ladder seems to be less strong for Chile. The high 
mobility at the bottom of the income distribution is probably related to a right-skewed 
distribution. This means that since the boundaries between the income quintile groups 1 to 4 
were being close to each other, changes in the positions in the income distribution do not 
necessarily represent significant changes in individuals’ income. Therefore, although Chile has 
decreased its levels of absolute poverty, there is still a high turnover of households around the 
poverty line. Although this characteristic is true for most countries, a comparative study of 
income distribution shapes among countries showed that the case of Chile is more evident 
(Chauvel, 2018). 
 
Likewise, the evidence to support the idea of a glass floor, according to which high-income 
individuals stay put in their positions with no risk of falling, does not seem to be sufficiently 
strong in Chile either. The glass floor in Chile is much permeable than one would have initially 
thought. The turnover of this group occurs mainly between the middle-class and the affluent 
category. Again, the explanation can be found in the form of the income distribution. In Chile, 
the right tail of the income distribution is so stretched that those in the highest decile group may 
be either too close or too far from the income decile boundary. Those close to the income cut 
might be exposed to greater fluidity with the decile groups below. This suggests that a glass floor 
might be in a higher income cut-off (e.g. the wealthiest 5 per cent of the population). 
 
When analysing income persistence, the models show evidence that experiencing high (or low) 
income last year increases the probability of remaining in the same income position this year. 
Furthermore, not only do the observable and unobservable variables explain the persistence in 
these positions in the income distribution, but the impact of state dependence is also more 
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significant for the affluent than for the poor. Therefore, the influence of time on remaining in 
the same position is more important in the richest tenth than in the lowest part of the income 
distribution. Understanding which mechanisms explain affluent traps in Chile are new questions 
posed by this research. 
 
In summary, as expected, in both the lower and upper parts of the income distribution, there is 
a higher likelihood not to change position. State dependence was found to be a mechanism that 
explains that persistence. In the affluent group, past high-income experience is greater than past 
poverty experience in the poor. However, when compared to OECD member countries, Chile 
appears to be a fluid society throughout its income distribution, even at both ends of the 
distribution. This means that the entire population is vulnerable to downward from their 
positions. Hence, while all groups are likely to move upwards in the income ladder, this does 
not ensure the sustainability of those changes over time. This is likely to be because the income 
mobility is mostly bounded to short-range movements. 
 
My findings provide three new elements for discussion on income mobility. The first is related 
to the characteristics of the affluent. The Chilean case shows that the highest decile group has 
the particularity of combining two conflicting characteristics. On the one hand, it shows signs 
of fluency with the middle class, and on the other hand, it shows signs of income persistence 
explained by the state dependency mechanism. This particularity could be related to the level of 
heterogeneity of this group, which justifies an in-depth analysis of this segment of the 
population.  
 
The second element is related to the concept of poverty dynamics. The Chilean case shows that 
poverty reduction is accompanied by a high turnover around the poverty line, giving rise to a 
new class: people who are vulnerable to poverty. This poses the challenge of measuring and 
understanding better the determinants of this emerging group.  
 
Finally, the third element for the debate relates the scopes and limits of mobile societies. As my 
results show, Chile is an unequal and mobile society where position changes in the income 
distribution appear more linked to insecurity and instability than to progress and better life 
chances throughout individuals’ lifetime. My findings provide evidence that justifies delving 




Vulnerability to poverty 
 
In the third empirical chapter, I estimated two vulnerability lines that measure the risk of falling 
into poverty in the next period, using the World Bank’s poverty line for upper-middle-income 
countries. This measure of economic well-being allows identification of three types of 
household. The first group are the ‘highly vulnerable’. These are households that have an income 
below US$9.9 per person per day (pppd) at 2011 PPP, and whose probability of falling into 
poverty in the next year is equal to or greater than 17.1 per cent. These households are the ones 
that need the most support from social policies to stay out of poverty. This high vulnerability 
line is closely associated with the average risk of falling into poverty for decile groups 4 and 5 
of the income distribution. Therefore, using this vulnerability line, one could say that 40 per 
cent of the population in Chile were highly vulnerable during 2006 and 2009. 
 
The second group are the ‘moderately vulnerable’. These are households whose income is 
between US$9.9 and US$20 pppd (both cut-offs in 2011 PPP terms). The low vulnerability line 
is associated with an average probability of falling into poverty of 4.6 per cent, which relates to 
the risk of falling into poverty for decile groups 8 and 9 of the income distribution. This means 
that one-third of the population in Chile (between decile groups 5 and 8) were moderately 
vulnerable during the period studied. From a comparative perspective, it is important to say that 
this cut-off is close to the poverty line used to compare absolute poverty among high-income 
countries (Jolliffe & Prydz, 2016). 
 
These results have high relevance for the design of social policies because they show that a large 
part of the Chilean population is at risk of falling into poverty without being protected by the 
social security system and with access to low quality social services through the co-financing of 
benefits. This is due to the subsidiary rationale of the Chilean social policy, which focuses on 
and prioritises support for the low-income population. 
 
My findings imply that two vulnerability lines that I propose can be used in countries that only 
have cross-sectional household data. This allows for measuring the size of the three groups 
according to their degrees of vulnerability to poverty. Although several studies have used the 
World Bank vulnerability line to compare countries in Latin America, a new comparative study 




Two limitations of the vulnerability lines proposed should be mentioned. The absence of 
longitudinal data on households in Latin America does not allow for updating the vulnerability 
lines as time goes by. My data, although more up to date than those used by the World Bank, 
are from the period 2006-2009. The other limitation – that also applies for the World Bank 
vulnerability line – is that the estimation of the risk of falling into poverty depends on the form 
of the income distribution. Not all countries necessarily have an income distribution with similar 
characteristics to the Chilean case. Therefore, these considerations must be taken into account 
when applying these lines of vulnerability in contexts other than Chile. 
 
The values of the vulnerability lines that I propose allow for anticipating some results. A high 
proportion of the population that would be classified as middle class using the World Bank’s 
vulnerability line are households that, according to my approach, face a considerable risk of 
falling into poverty. Therefore, I would argue that the previous research has underestimated 
how many people in Latin America are vulnerable to falling into poverty and overestimated the 
growth of the middle class. The formation of a new and extensive social group in the Latin 
American region whose vulnerability to poverty is its main characteristic is one of the important 




In my fourth chapter, I propose an economic insecurity measure (MEII) that incorporates 
sources of stress and anxiety that are characteristic of households located at the two ends of the 
income distribution in middle-income countries. This is the case with unprotected jobs at the 
bottom of the distribution, and over-indebtedness at the top.  These features make the MEII a 
more versatile and useful tool for the diagnosis and design of social policies for countries such 
as Chile, and other similar countries in Latin America and the Global South.  
 
My results show that the income mobility affecting the entire income distribution in Chile 
(discussed in chapter two) is more associated with the high economic insecurity of the 
population than with a fluid society where there are no barriers to upward social mobility. 
During 2007 and 2017, for all income decile groups, urban households in Chile experienced 
economic insecurity due to the lack of both social protection and buffers to face unexpected 
economic shocks. The incidence of economic insecurity was around 80 per cent for the first 
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two income decile groups, while in the two highest income decile groups (9 and 10) was 12 per 
cent. 
 
When considering the entire population, the MEII shows that asset poverty is the indicator that 
contributes the most to economic insecurity. The other indicators follow this order: unexpected 
economic shocks, unprotected employment, and over-indebtedness.  
 
The people who are most exposed to economic insecurity are households headed by women 
who have more than one child, and households whose head of household has a low level of 
education and/or whose work is informal. The number of workers in the home is the most 
important predictor of economic insecurity. These results are consistent with those found in 
chapter three on vulnerability to poverty. Thus, it could be argued that policies that seek to 
reduce economic risk (vulnerability to poverty) for the poorest households meet several 
desirable objectives simultaneously, like for example, reducing the exposure to economic stress 
(economic insecurity). The most significant difference between the vulnerability to poverty and 
economic insecurity measures is that economic insecurity affects the entire income distribution, 
while vulnerability to poverty does not provide information on the highest income groups.  
 
The high economic insecurity experienced in Chile by all income groups finds an explanation in 
two critical and intertwined conditions. The first is the low level of income and wealth in 
absolute terms even of those in groups of deciles 9 and 10, which are not enough to protect 
people from the stress of future economic shocks. The liquid financial wealth of about 8 out of 
10 Chileans is less than three times the national income poverty line. In 2015, the OECD ranked 
Chile as having the greatest economic vulnerability among its members (Balestra & Tonkin, 
2018). The second is the weak social protection system, which is unable to work as a buffer to 
compensate for household economic insecurity. At present, the Chilean state and the 
households themselves share the financial risk of events such as one of their members becoming 
ill or unemployed through programmes such as unemployment insurance and public health 
insurance. However, these programmes, which are not universal, leave out a significant 
proportion of the population. In the case of unemployment insurance, those who have informal 
jobs, and in the case of health, those who do not belong to the lowest decile groups of the 
income distribution are not eligible. Therefore, these households rely on their own resources 




5.2 Policy implications 
 
Although the three welfare measures that I have proposed use different approaches (income 
persistence, vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity) and two households surveys with 
different periods of analysis, the empirical findings are entirely consistent. In the case of Chile, 
economic insecurity is highly correlated with vulnerability to poverty. This finding contributes 
to a deeper understanding of the levels of well-being (in terms of stress and anxiety due to 
economic uncertainty) of those who have managed to get out of poverty but have a significant 
risk of falling into it again.  
 
Also, the high levels of economic insecurity, even in the top decile groups show that high income 
mobility in Chile along the entire income distribution that is far from positive. There is no 
evidence that this dynamism is associated with an improvement in people’s life prospects, i.e. 
social mobility, compared to a more rigid society. The high mobility of income in Chile presents 
a rather negative aspect, since a significant proportion of households are exposed to fluctuations 
in their income and lack minimum social protections that would help them to face situations of 
economic loss better. 
 
Thus, the conclusions of my three empirical chapters have several implications for the design 
of social policies in countries such as Chile, in particular for policies related to monitoring social 
progress and improving the economic well-being of people from a social security perspective. 
Next, I present what I think are the most relevant elements to be considered in the design and 
implementation of social policies in Chile. To some extent, they are also applicable to other 
upper middle-income countries in the Global South which do not have data to make similar 
well-being economic measurements. 
 
First, the evidence found in the second chapter on the importance of past income position to 
explain the current position of income distribution shows that supporting households to prevent 
them from falling into poverty is an effective social policy. Since being poor in one period causes 
an increase in the risk of being poor in future periods, social programmes that aim to reduce the 
persistence of poverty should include in their strategies ways to prevent people and households 
facing an adverse economic situation from falling into poverty again.  
 
Second, the proposal to measure degrees of vulnerability to poverty developed in the third 
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chapter contributes to the design of this type of policy. Vulnerability to poverty lines offer the 
government a concrete way to improve the targeting accuracy of programmes that seek to 
reduce absolute poverty. The distinction between poor households and households with varying 
degrees of vulnerability to poverty (high, moderate and low) should enable the design of 
programmes specific to each target group. The extension of social protection coverage to these 
new social groups should be accompanied by the comprehensive design of social security 
programmes that consider vulnerability to poverty as part of economic welfare measures to 
assess social progress. In this way, the approach to vulnerability to poverty that I have proposed 
should fulfil a dual role: targeting and monitoring these new social groups. 
 
Third, in the multivariate analyses of the three chapters of this thesis, a change in the number 
of workers in the household is one of the most relevant variables for explaining income mobility, 
vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity. This is not surprising since the participation 
of women in the Chilean labour market is particularly low. Faced with this panorama, family-
oriented policies that encourage or protect women’s participation in the labour market could be 
of great help. In this regard, policies such as the promotion of full-time nurseries go in this 
direction if they succeed in encouraging dual salaries in the household and minimise disruptions 
in women’s careers. 
 
Fourth, if economic insecurity is deemed a measure of economic well-being that can inform us 
about the level of development of countries, then Chile certainly has a lot of work ahead.69 The 
fourth chapter showed that widespread economic insecurity affects a large part of the 
population. This finding has profound implications for the evaluation of the current social 
protection system and the design of a potential new social security system. Although Chile was 
classified as a high-income country a few years ago on the basis of its GDP per capita, the reality 
is that it still lacks a protection system that is capable of lessening households’ anxiety and stress 
due to not being able to cope with an economic loss, illness, death, disability or an involuntary 
loss of employment. 
 
In welfare states such as Chile, social policies aim to primarily support lower income households 
 
69 It is currently being debated whether or not the Human Development Index should include a dimension of  
economic stability of  the population (Levy, 2019). 
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to meet their basic needs through small and highly focused cash transfer programmes.70 This 
principle explains the non-coverage of the 40 per cent of the population who are at high risk of 
falling into poverty, let alone those with moderate vulnerability to poverty. It is worth 
remembering that in Chile, during the period studied, only 20 per cent of the population had a 
risk of falling into poverty of less than 4.6 per cent. This situation makes apparent the need to 
evaluate a coverage extension of the current social policy to minimise the economic instability 
of those who have managed to exit poverty. 
 
Financing and designing new social policies that aim to grow public social security networks 
should be part of the social development agenda in the coming years. The need to protect this 
segment of the population – vulnerable to poverty or economic insecure – is starting to rise on 
the public agenda. The current government administration in Chile launched this year a 
programme called ‘Protected Middle Class’, which considers all households that are not income 
poor, thereby targeting the group of households that I have identified as vulnerable to poverty.71 
However, the policies and strategies of that programme so far are a combination of the already 
existing programmes, except for one new health insurance for catastrophic diseases; hence its 
effectiveness and impact still need to be tested. 
 
The question that arises is whether an extension of the coverage of social programmes based 
on money transfers is sufficient to give economic stability to households that are vulnerable to 
poverty. It is known that a gradual growth in social security programmes is a feature of the 
economic progress of countries (Chetty & Looney, 2007). However, there are several reasons 
to go beyond an extension of the subsidiary state and to raise the idea of moving towards a 
welfare state where universal social insurance is the fundamental pillar (Levy, 2019). 
 
From a social welfare point of view, there are three reasons for moving towards a universal 
social protection model. The first is the high proportion of households in Chile – and other 
countries in the Latin American region – that are vulnerable to poverty. The second is the fact 
that households support and value measures that reduce their exposure to adverse economic 
 
70 This social policy is based on two principles: i) ensuring efficiency in the use of  resources that a small State can 
devote to social spending and ii) avoiding adverse incentives to work and the accumulation of  assets by beneficiary 
households (Repetto, 2016). Although the second principle is a valid concern, studies that have sought to 
demonstrate this adverse effect have not been able to prove it (Alzúa, Cruces, & Ripani, 2013; Banerjee, Hanna, 
Kreindler, & Olken, 2017; Carneiro, Galasso, & Ginja, 2015). 
71 See details in the following link: https://clasemediaprotegida.gob.cl/sobre-clase-media-protegida 
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shocks compared to other social demands. A recent study in the United States shows that 
households value the achievement of economic stability more than ascending the income scale 
(Morduch and Schneider 2017). The third is the failure of the current social security system, 
both in Chile and in the region more widely, which does not adequately protect workers from 
the risks that affect the economic well-being of their families.72 At present, the social security 
system provides low benefits to low-wage workers who face illnesses, dismissal or retirement 
and does not protect a large group of workers (e.g. informal workers and short-term workers). 
Considering Latin America as a whole, in 2016, only 46.9 per cent of the workforce were covered 
by these programmes (ILO, 2017). 
 
One of the most important arguments against a universal security system relates to the increase 
in social spending, since it is funded through tax rises, which affect economic growth. Yet the 
evidence collected from the current system proves that a social security system based on the 
contributions that companies make to the social security of their workers can affect countries’ 
productivity (OECD, 2019). Two arguments support this point. First, companies can change 
the nature and duration of the contracts they offer to their workers to avoid paying social 
security contributions. Although these contracts are not the most appropriate for their business 
model, companies might find it profitable to do so if cost savings compensate for productivity 
losses (Levy, 2019). Second, companies that do not pay social contributions to their workers 
often generate inefficiencies, since they limit their size to a scale lower than their optimum 
efficiency to avoid control (Dabla-Norris, Gradstein, & Inchauste, 2008). 
 
Undoubtedly, improving a measure of economic well-being by resorting to other measures 
besides or instead of GDP, such as economic insecurity or vulnerability to poverty, represents 
a major challenge for several reasons. First, it means recognising the limits of the current social 
policy model, which focuses on the poorest and delivers limited social security and, is therefore 
unable to meet the need of economic stability required by the new social groups in the region. 
Secondly, it entails moving towards a new universal security model focused on reducing the 
vulnerability to poverty and economic insecurity of the population, and in some cases, mitigating 
inequalities in income distribution.  
 
 
72 Social insurance is financed mainly by companies, which are required by law to pay a social security contribution 
that is proportional to the wages paid to their workers. These contributions are channeled into a common fund 
that is used against various contingencies faced by the worker. 
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It is time for evaluating the implementation of universal social insurance in Global South 
countries, which would mean changing and redirecting the path followed until now towards one 
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